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About Azim Premji University’s Work  
on Sustainable Employment 
Azim Premji University was established in 2010, by the Azim Premji Foundation, with 
a clear social purpose of working towards a just, equitable, humane, and sustainable 
society. All of the University’s programmes, teaching, research, and practice, work 
towards this purpose.
To contribute to the critical matter of India creating just and sustainable employment, the 
University has set up the Centre for Sustainable Employment (CSE), which conducts and
supports research in areas of work, labour, and employment. The University is attempting 
to provide empirically grounded, analytical reflections on the state of work and workers 
in India, as well as to evaluate and propose policies that aim to create sustainable jobs. 
To this end the University also gives grants to create new knowledge in the above areas. 
It also hosts a working paper series to which contributions are invited from researchers, 
policy-makers, civil society actors, and journalists. The University’s CSE website is an 
important part of this agenda. In addition to research papers and policy briefs, it hosts 
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Foreword
The Covid-19 pandemic has tested and hurt our society like no other crisis in recent 
memory. Migrant workers walking hundreds of kilometers in the summer heat are 
seared in our memory; death has knocked on too many doors. We must learn from the 
experience of the last year so that we do not repeat the mistakes. But not repeating the 
mistakes is not sufficient. It is the worst kind of systemic and moral failure that the  
most vulnerable always pay the greatest price for everything. We have to change this 
from the core.
 
This report is a small effort in this direction. It analyses information from the first year of 
the pandemic to draw lessons for the near and the not-so-near future. It shows us not 
only what happened to workers and their families, but also what we can do to prevent 
such suffering in the future, even if public health exigencies require restrictions on 
economic activity.
 
But alongside the deficiencies that were revealed in our social policies in the past year, 
there were also many lessons in how governments, communities, businesses, and ordinary 
people rose to the challenge and worked together. Unfortunately, none of that seems 
adequate. As I write this, the tsunami-like second wave of the pandemic is leaving an 
unimaginable trail of death and misery in India. While the lessons from the many efforts 
during the earlier part of the pandemic continue to be useful, the human devastation 
of the second wave only underlines that there is no substitute to strong fundamentals 
of a society: robust public systems of health and education, competent governance and 
administration, and basic social security for all. Heroic efforts are no substitute, and 
neither can they compensate, for structural weakness and injustice.
 
The challenge of providing dignified work, decent incomes, and social security, for all was 
with us before the pandemic, but its urgency and centrality for our national agenda has 
become inescapable now. If we focus on these fully, India can emerge stronger  
from these ruins.
Anurag Behar
Vice Chancellor, Azim Premji University
Bengaluru, April 27, 2021
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Executive Summary
This report documents the impact of one year of Covid-19 in India, on jobs, incomes, 
inequality, and poverty. It also examines the effectiveness of policy measures that 
have thus far been undertaken to offer relief and support. Finally, it offers some policy 
suggestions for the near and medium-term future. 
When the pandemic hit, the Indian economy was already in the most prolonged 
slowdown in recent decades. On top of this, there were legacy problems such as a slow 
rate of job creation and lack of political commitment to improving working conditions 
which trapped a large section of the workforce without access to any employment 
security or social protection.
Our analysis shows that the pandemic has further increased informality and led to a 
severe decline in earnings for the majority of workers resulting in a sudden increase 
in poverty. Women and younger workers have been disproportionately affected. 
Households have coped by reducing food intake, borrowing, and selling assets. 
Government relief has helped avoid the most severe forms of distress, but the reach of 
support measures is incomplete, leaving out some of the most vulnerable workers and 
households. We find that additional government support is urgently needed now for 
two reasons - compensating for the losses sustained during the first year and anticipating 
the impact of the second wave.
Our main data sources are the Consumer Pyramids Household Survey from the Centre 
for Monitoring the Indian Economy, the Azim Premji University Covid-19 Livelihoods 
Phone Survey (CLIPS) and the India Working Survey (IWS) (see Appendix of the report 
for details). We also draw on a large number of other Covid impact surveys conducted by 
Civil Society Organisations and researchers. In this Executive Summary, unless otherwise 
indicated, all estimates are from CMIE-CPHS. Most data pertain to the period between 
March 2020 and December 2020. We compare these months to pre-Covid periods as 
appropriate. 
At the time of writing, the country is in the throes of a second wave of infections and 
renewed restrictions on mobility. Hence findings presented here must be regarded as 
provisional. Neither the short-term impact nor the longer-term effects are fully clear. But 
this analysis can form the basis for policy action as we find ourselves in the midst of the 
most severe humanitarian crisis in recent memory.
Executive Summary
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1 / Employment and incomes bounced back in 
June 2020 but recovery remained incomplete
a. About 100 million lost jobs during the nationwide April-May 2020 lockdown. Most 
were back at work by June 2020, but even by the end of 2020, about 15 million workers 
remained out of work. Incomes also remained depressed. For an average household of 
four members, the monthly per capita income in Oct 2020 (I4,979) was still below its 
level in Jan 2020 (I5,989). 
Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Incomes are in Jan 2020 prices and 
adjusted for seasonality.









b. As a result of the employment and income losses, the labour share of GDP fell by over 
5 percentage points from 32.5% in the second quarter of 2019-20 to 27% in the second 
quarter of 2020-21. Of the decline in aggregate income, 90% was due to reduction in 
earnings, while 10% was due to loss of employment. This means that even though most 
workers were able to go back to work they had to settle for lower earnings. 
c. Job losses were higher for states with a higher average Covid case load. The map shows 
a state-level job loss representation index, or the ratio of the state’s share in jobs lost to 
its share in India’s workforce. Maharashtra, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi, 
contributed disproportionately to job losses. Mobility restrictions, such as those caused 
by lockdowns, predictably led to income losses due to decreased economic activity. We 
find that a 10% decline in mobility was associated with a 7.5% decline in income. This 






in jobs lost 




Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of September, 
October, November, December of 2019 and 2020. See Appendix section 2 for details. The representation 
index is a ratio of the state’s share in employment loss to its share in the pre-Covid total workforce. 
Representation 
Index
2 / Women and younger workers were 
disproportionately affected and many could not 
return to work even by the end of the year
a.  During the lockdown and in the months after, 61% of working men remained employed 
and 7% lost employment and did not return to work.  For women, only 19% remained 
employed and 47% suffered a permanent job loss during the lockdown, not returning to 
work even by the end of 2020. 







Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the December 2019-April 
2020-December 2020 panel. No effect: did not lose work during lockdown or after. Recovery: lost work 
during lockdown and recovered by Dec. Delayed job loss: did not lose work during lockdown but lost it by 
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b. The lack of fallback options for women is clear in Figure 4. It shows women  
leaving the workforce from every employment arrangement. For men, the share leaving 
the workforce is much smaller. Rather, when they lost jobs, they transitioned to  
self-employment.
OW - Out of Workforce, DW - Daily/Casual wage worker, SE - Self-employed, TS - Temporary Salaried, 
PS - Permanent salaried
Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of September, 
October, November, December (wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. Numbers on the left indicate percentage 
share of that employment arrangement in total workforce in 2019. Numbers on the right indicate 
percentage share in total working age population in 2020.







out of the 
workforce
c. For working women, the burden of domestic work increased without any 
corresponding relief in hours spent in employment. According to the India Working 
Survey conducted in Karnataka and Rajasthan, the proportion of working women who 
spent more than 2 hours a day cooking went up from 20 per cent to almost 62 per cent in 
Karnataka and from 12 to 58 per cent in Rajasthan. 
d. Alongside women, younger workers were much more impacted, experiencing higher 
job losses and a weaker recovery. 33% of workers in the 15-24 years age group failed  









to job loss 
with no 
recovery
Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the December 2019-April 
2020-December 2020 panel. No effect: did not lose work during lockdown or after.Recovery: lost work 
during lockdown and recovered by Dec. Delayed job loss: did not lose work during lockdown but lost it 
by Dec. No recovery: lost work during lockdown and did not recover by Dec.
3 / There was a large increase in informal 
employment. Salaried workers moved into self-
employment and daily wage work. Agriculture and 
trade emerged as fallback sectors. 
 
a. After the lockdown, workers came back into more precarious and informal forms of 
employment. Nearly half of formal salaried workers moved into informal work, either 
as self-employed (30%), casual wage (10%) or informal salaried (9%) workers, between late 
2019 and late 2020.
b. The nature of the fallback option also varied by caste and religion. General category 
workers and Hindus were more likely to move into self-employment while marginalised 
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Table 2:  
Monthly 
earnings 






Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data are for the months of September-
October of 2019 and 2020. Earnings include income from wages and salaries and income from business. 
Earnings are reported in Jan 2020 prices using rural/urban CPI. See Appendix Section 2 for details. 








Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of 
September,October,November,December (wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. See Appendix Section 2 for details 
of the sample.
c. Agriculture, construction and petty trade emerged as fallback sectors. Education, 
health and professional services sectors saw the highest outflow of workers into other 
sectors. About 18% of education sector workers were now in agriculture and a similar 
share of health sector workers were engaged in petty trade (see Table 4.6 in the report). 
For Hindus, agriculture was a major fallback sector absorbing between 10 to 20 percent of 
workers from other sectors. For Muslims, trade was the major fallback sector and about 
20 to 35 percent of workers from other sectors were now in trade. 
d. As a consequence of the move into informal work, as well as due to depressed 
economic conditions, monthly earnings of workers fell on an average by 17% during the 
pandemic. Self-employed and informal salaried workers faced the highest loss of earnings. 
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4 / Poorer households were worse affected, and 
poverty and inequality has increased.
a. Though incomes fell across the board, the pandemic has taken a far heavier toll on 
poorer households. In April and May the poorest 20% of households lost their entire 
incomes (Figure 6). In contrast the richer households suffered losses of less than a quarter 
of their pre-pandemic incomes. Over the entire eight month period we analyse (Mar to 
Oct), an average household in the bottom 10% lost I15,700, or just over two months’ 
income.










Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. The graphs plot the proportionate 
change in per capita income from an event study regression model, for each income decile. The event 
study estimates measure the impact of the the pandemic and the containment measures on the monthly 
per-capita household income, controlling for various household characteristics. The change in monthly 
incomes is reported as compared to incomes in February 2020. Households are classified into income 
deciles in each month separately based on their per capita incomes in that month. See Appendix  
Section 2 for the event study model as well as seasonality calculations.
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Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. The first panel is the change in number 
of people and lower panel is the change in proportion of people below the national minimum wage 
threshold.. The observed change is the change between covid months (March to October 2020) and the 
preceding months (July 2019 to February 2020). The average seasonally adjusted monthly per capita real 
incomes over the two periods are calculated and used to estimate the proportion of individuals who live 
in households earning below these levels. The change without Covid is the counterfactual scenario in 
which household incomes would have grown at the same rate as prior to the pandemic (see Chapter  
Five for details).
b. Coming on a low income base, this shock meant that the number of individuals who 
lie below the national minimum wage threshold (I375 per day as recommended by 
the Anoop Satpathy committee) increased by 230 million during the pandemic. This 
amounts to an increase in the poverty rate by 15 percentage points in rural and nearly 20 
percentage points in urban areas. Had the pandemic not occurred, poverty would have 
declined by 5 percentage points in rural areas and 1.5 percentage points in urban areas 
between 2019 and 2020, and 50 million would have been lifted above this line.
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Sources and notes: Azim Premji University CLIPS (October-November 2020)  See Appendix Section 3 for 
survey details.  
5 / Households coped by decreasing food intake 
and by borrowing
a. Households coped by cutting back on food intake, selling assets, and borrowing 
informally from friends, relatives, and money-lenders. An alarming 90 per cent of 
respondents in the Azim Premji University CLIPS reported that households had suffered 
a reduction in food intake as a result of the lockdown. Even more worryingly, 20 per cent 
reported that food intake had not improved even six months after the lockdown. These 
findings are consistent with other Covid impact surveys.
b. In the India Working Survey, over 90 per cent of respondents from Karnataka and 
Rajasthan reported having borrowed money sometime between April and August. 
The median loan amount was I15,000 (mean amount of I26,300). CLIPS revealed that 
amounts borrowed by poorer households were a much higher multiple of their pre-
pandemic incomes compared to better-off households (Table 3). And 84% of those 
who had borrowed money reported doing so to finance food, health, and other daily 
expenditures.










Sources and Notes: Azim Premji University CLIPS. The figure plots the response of survey respondents 
regarding the level of food recovery experienced by their households post the lockdown. The 
respondents could choose one of the following options to document how the lockdown impacted the 
food intake of the households and the level of recovery post the lockdown: No effect- Household’s 
food intake was not affected by the lockdown; Complete recovery- Household’s food intake fell during 
the lockdown, and was back to prelockdown levels during the post lockdown survey months; Partial 
recovery- While the food intake fell during the lockdown and, susequently, improved post lockdown, it 
has still not recovered to the prelockdown levels;  No recovery- Food intake fell during the lockdown 
and there has not been any improvemnt since then. The figure plots the proprotion of repsondents that 
chose each of these options. See Appendix Section 3 for survey details.   
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6 / Government relief measures helped, but 
exclusions were also common
a. Free rations, cash transfers, MGNREGA, PM-KISAN payments, and pension payments 
were some of the major support measures announced in 2020 as part of the Pradhan 
Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana (PMGKY) and the Atmanirbhar Bharat packages, to combat 
the effects of the pandemic on vulnerable households. We report survey evidence on 
the reach of food and cash elements of these packages. PDS coverage far exceeds 
the coverage achieved by Jan Dhan so far. Across multiple surveys, around 90% of 
households had a ration card but the Jan Dhan coverage was much smaller, around 50% of 
households had a woman-owned Jan Dhan account. 
However, the efficacy of PMGKY was similar for both types of relief measures. 
The India Working Survey (a largely rural random survey in Karnataka and Rajasthan 
conducted in August-September 2020) showed that, conditional on eligibility (those with 
priority ration cards or Jan Dhan accounts), 65% of card holders received some PMGKY 
allocation (i.e. grains in excess of the usual quota) while 35% only received their usual PDS 
quota (no extra grains). For cash, out of those having women-owned Jan Dhan accounts 
60% received one or more transfers, around 30% did not receive any transfers (and 10%  
did not know).
b. MGNREGA has played a vital role as a safety net in rural areas. As per the official 
database, till November 2020 over 252 crore person-days of work were generated, 
an increase of 43 per cent compared to previous year. Over 10 million (1 crore) more 
households worked in MGNREGA in 2020-21 as compared to previous year. The Azim 
Premji University CLIPS showed large unmet demand for MGNREGA work even as late 
as October-November 2020. Since April, only 55 per cent of those rural respondents who 
demanded work had been able to get it. Further almost everyone (98 per cent) who got 
work said they would like to work for more days.
c. States experimented with many policies to offer more support -e.g. Supplementing the 
cash amount, delivery of cash via ration shops, door delivery of cash, supplementing PDS, 
and launching urban employment programmes.
d. Circular migrants have borne the harshest impact of the Covid-19 shock. Class, caste, 
ethnic or linguistic identity, and lack of stable residence as well as political voice render 
casual wage migrants in industries such as construction, the most precarious and hard to 
reach with social protection policies. In Azim Premji University CLIPS 81% migrants lost 
employment in the lockdown compared to 64% non-migrants. 31% reported not being 
able to access rations compared to 15% non-migrants.
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7 / Bold measures will be required to emerge 
stronger from the crisis
a. So far, India’s fiscal response to Covid, amounting to around 1.5-1.7% of GDP, has been 
conservative. The impacts of the second wave are still unfolding and may be as large, 
or larger than those we report for the first wave. Further, coming as it does on the back 
of depleted savings, debt, and reduced fallback options, the second wave can lead to 
potentially larger impacts on work, incomes, food security, health and education. The 
states, who are at the forefront of the pandemic response in terms of containment as 
well as welfare, are severely strained in their finances. Thus there are compelling reasons 
for the Union government to undertake additional spending now.
b. We propose the following urgent policy measures -
• Extending free rations under the PDS beyond June, at least till the end of 2021. 
• Cash transfer of K5,000 for three months to as many vulnerable households as can 
be reached with the existing digital infrastructure, including but not limited to Jan 
Dhan accounts.
• Expansion of MGNREGA entitlement to 150 days and revising programme wages 
upwards to state minimum wages. Expanding the programme budget to at least I1.75 
lakh crores.
• Launching a pilot urban employment programme in the worst hit districts, possibly 
focused on women workers.
• Increasing the central contribution in old-age pensions to at least I500.
• Automatically enrolling all MGNREGA workers who do construction work, as 
registered workers under the Building and Other Construction Workers (BoCW) Act 
so that they can access social security benefits.
• A Covid hardship allowance to 2.5 million Anganwadi and ASHA workers of I30,000 
(5,000 per month for six months). 
These measures, taken together, will amount to approximately I5.5 lakh crores of 
additional spending and bring the total fiscal outlay on Covid relief to around 4.5% 
of GDP over two years. We believe that this large fiscal stimulus is justified given the 
magnitude of the crisis. For example, the proposed cash transfer is just equal to incomes 
lost last year by the poorest 10% of households, leaving alone the second wave impact. 
c. Failure to take action now will cause short-term hardship to continue, and may 
compound the long-term effects leading to years of lost welfare gains. Increased poverty 
as well as loss of savings and productive resources can lead to poverty traps. Nutritional 
and educational deficits, occurring due to stressed household finances, can have long-
term effects. Women leaving the labor market can lead to long term increases in already 
large gender gaps. Youth may also experience long-term impacts on earnings and 
productivity due to these lost years. 
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d. Some day the pandemic will be behind us, and the task of economic revival will 
include addressing weak structural transformation, persistent informality and inadequate 
employment generation. The time is also right to correct the historical undervaluation of 
workers who have played a crucial frontline role in the response to the crisis. We propose 
a framework for a National Employment Policy, which includes the promotion of public 
investment in social infrastructure as well as the facilitation of private investment. 
These, together with a comprehensive social security infrastructure that includes rights-
based entitlements, portable benefits, and empowered worker welfare boards, can tackle 
the persistent problems of low earnings, low productivity and precarity. 
We hope that the findings in this report contribute to the difficult journey of economic 
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This report documents the first year of Covid-19 
in India. At the time of writing, the country is in 
the throes of a second wave of infections and 
renewed restrictions on mobility. The first cases 
of Covid-19 were detected in January 2020. On 
March 24 2020, a two week nationwide lockdown 
was announced, which was subsequently extended 
three times, lasting almost till the end of May. 
After June, mobility restrictions were slowly relaxed 
and economic activity resumed. Confirmed cases 
peaked in September 2020 at nearly 100,000 daily 
and subsequently declined. After reaching a low 
of around 10,000 per day in early February 2021, 
cases started increasing again. The pace at which 
the virus has spread in the second wave has taken 
most by surprise. When we started writing this 
Introduction in mid-April, the daily cases stood at 
40,000. At the time of revision in late April, the 
number stands at 3,50,000 per day.1 
Our focus in this report is mainly on the first phase 
of the pandemic, in particular the period between 
March 2020 and December 2020. More recent data 
on employment and incomes are not yet available. 
We do not analyse the necessity of containment 
measures, nor do we enter into the debate over 
what works and what does not to control the 
spread of the virus. Our purpose is different. 
Given the state of infections and associated policy 
measures (such as lockdowns), we report on what 
happened to jobs, incomes, inequality, and poverty. 
We also examine the effectiveness of policy 
measures that were undertaken in 2020 to offer 
relief and support. Finally we offer some policy 
suggestions for the future to revive livelihoods and 
employment. The focus is primarily on the non-farm 
economy, though the impact on the farm sector 
is dealt with in a few places. The analysis as well 
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as the policy recommendations are mainly at the 
national level.
The nature of the shock delivered by the pandemic 
is complex and will unfold for years to come. 
The one-time severe supply and demand shock 
caused by the national lockdown in April-May 2020 
was only the beginning. There were persistent 
repercussions on aggregate demand resulting from 
almost total loss of incomes during those two 
months as well as continued mobility restrictions 
and voluntary reductions in mobility due to fear of 
infection. There were also continued disruptions in 
supply resulting from firm bankruptcies, mobility 
restrictions, and reverse migration of workers. 
Several large employers such as non-essential retail, 
hotels and restaurants, education, personal services, 
entertainment, tourism and transport never really 
recovered before the second wave hit. Finally, one 
also needs to take into account the impact of the 
global recession caused by the pandemic on the 
domestic economy. 
But even this is not all. Unfortunately, as we discuss 
in Chapter Two, the Covid-19 recession has come 
on top of the most serious economic slowdown 
since the economic reforms of 1991 and at a time 
when the pace of job creation has fallen far behind 
the rate of increase of the working age population. 
Further, the highly impacted sectors are also large 
employers and the dominant nature of employment 
is informal with little or no security. Hence the 
impact on workers and households has been 
immediate and severe. 
The employment ratio or the workforce 
participation rate (WPR) took a sharp dive in April 
due to the lockdown but recovered to around 90 
33
1. Introduction
per cent of its pre-pandemic value by June. Between 
July and December it stagnated. In Chapter Three 
we examine the nature of this trajectory in more 
detail. We show that the WPR bounce-back hides 
significant churn in the labour market. Workers who 
lost employment in April did not return to work 
even till December while others who were out of 
the workforce earlier took their place. This effect 
was particularly pronounced for women. 
In Chapter Four, we show that, in addition to 
increased joblessness, there was also a significant 
shift towards more informal work. Salaried workers 
returned to the labour market and had to be 
content with self-employment or temporary wage 
work. Further, self-employment in agriculture and 
retail emerged as the fallback options.
As a result of job losses and informalisation, the 
pandemic made a serious dent in household 
earnings and has significantly worsened their 
balance sheets. In Chapter Five we analyse the 
extent of decline in household incomes across the 
distribution and find that the cost of the crises 
has been borne disproportionately by the poorest 
households. There has been a huge increase in 
poverty as well as a rise in inequality as a result 
of this.
Low average earnings pre-pandemic and 
consequently low levels of savings meant that 
workers had to rely on assistance of either 
employers or the State. However, employer-
provided social safety nets, at least at the formal 
level, are only available to around 10 per cent of 
the workforce. In addition the public social safety 
measures, such as subsidised food under the 
Public Distribution System, right to work under 
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act, pension support under the National 
Social Assistance Programme, are rooted in 
domicile and not place of work. In Chapter Six, we 
review India’s social protection system going into 
the pandemic and identify the points of strength 
and weakness that are important to understand 
how the system has functioned so far during  
the pandemic.
Survey evidence, discussed in Chapter Seven, 
indicates that PDS as well as MGNREGA and to a 
lesser extent cash transfers helped in preventing 
widespread starvation. In addition many states 
enacted their own additional support measures and 
partnered with Civil Society Organisations (CSO) as 
well as the corporate sector.
Chapter Eight concludes the report by presenting a 
short, medium, and long-run policy road map.
The usual constraints of data availability are all the 
more binding for analysing the impact of the crisis 
on the vast majority of Indian households. The only 
source of household level nationally representative 
data is the Consumer Pyramids Household 
Survey (CPHS) of the Centre for Monitoring the 
Indian Economy (CMIE). The quarterly bulletin of 
the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) which 
covers the period April to June 2020 has recently 
been released, but the unit-level data are not yet 
available. The CMIE-CPHS forms the mainstay of 
our analysis in this report. Figure 1.1 shows the time 
periods used for the different analyses of CMIE-
CPHS data. 
In addition we use data from two surveys 
conducted by us during 2020, the India Working 
Survey (IWS) and the Azim Premji University 
Covid-19 Livelihoods Phone Survey (CLIPS). We 
also draw upon several other purposive surveys 
carried out by diverse organisations to estimate 
employment, income, debt, and other impacts of 
the pandemic on poor and vulnerable households, 
as well as informal workers. Reports and dashboards 
for these surveys (as available) are being archived by 
us online.2
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The India Working Survey (IWS) is a random sample 
survey of two states - Karnataka and Rajasthan. 
It is a collaborative project between researchers 
at Azim Premji University, the Indian Institute of 
Management, Bangalore (IIMB), and the University 
of Western Australia. It is supported by the 
Initiative for What Works to Advance Women and 
Girls in the Economy (IWWAGE) along with IIMB 
and Azim Premji University. The field survey was 
conducted by IFMR-LEAD during February and 
March 2020. The survey stopped operations in 
mid-March due to the pandemic. In August and 
September 2020, the second round was conducted 
via phone by a team of supervisors and enumerators 
based at Azim Premji University.  Respondents 
who had been interviewed during the field surveys 
in Rajasthan and Karnataka were revisited and 
asked details about their employment during 
the lockdown as well as about their employment 
in the week prior to the interview. The survey 
thus provides three time-points to measure 
employment: relatively normal months (February/
March), the lockdown (April) and afterwards 
(August/September) (Figure 1.2). 
The Azim Premji University CLIPS was conducted in 
collaboration with various civil society organisations 
to understand the economic impact of the 
lockdown on the livelihoods of informal workers. 
It was supported in part by the Azim Premji 
Philanthropic Initiatives as well as the Azim Premji 
Foundation. The CSOs for the first round of the 
survey were Aga Khan Rural Support Programme, 
Centre for Advocacy and Research (CFAR), Gauri 
Media Trust, Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samiti, 
Pradan, Samalochana, Self Employed Women’s 
Association, Srijan and Vaagdhara. Six out of these 
nine organisations, namely,  Centre for Advocacy 
and Research (CFAR), Gauri Media Trust, Paschim 
Banga Khet Majoor Samiti, Pradan, Samalochana 
and Self Employed Women’s Association were part 
of the second round of the survey. Respondents 
were contacted over phone via the networks of 
the collaborating civil society organisations in two 
separate rounds of the survey.
The first round of the survey was conducted 
between April 13  and May 23, 2020 interviewing 
























































































objective of the first round was to understand (and 
quantify) the extent of the lockdown’s impact on 
the employment and earnings of these informal 
workers. The second round of the survey took 
place between October 7 and December 23, where 
we re-interviewed 2,778 of the 4,942 respondents 
from the first round. The objective of resurveying 
the same respondents, six months later, was to 
understand what had been the nature of recovery 
since the unlocking of the economy and how 
effective  state intervention had been in mitigating 
the economic shock brought on by the crisis. In 
this second round of the survey, respondents were 
asked about their work and earnings in either 
September, October or November depending on 
the month of the interview. The data dashboards 
and other materials from both rounds are  
available online.3
The Appendix to this report gives more details 
about sampling, weighting, descriptive statistics, 
and construction of various datasets used in  
the analysis.
Since the pandemic is still raging, all findings 
presented here must be regarded as provisional. 
Neither the short-term impact nor the longer-
term effects are fully clear. Our understanding will 
undoubtedly improve over time. But the reality of 
extreme economic hardship today compels us to 
analyse and act even on the basis of an incomplete 
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The Indian 
economy prior to 
the pandemic
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2. The Indian economy prior to the pandemic
The magnitude of the Covid shock surpasses all 
previous episodes of recessions in independent 
India. But this impact needs to be understood in 
the context of the performance of the economy 
leading up to the pandemic. In this chapter, we 
analyse the decade prior to 2020 with an emphasis 
on employment, incomes, and structural change. 
2.1 / The pre-Covid 
slowdown
The Indian economy had averaged GDP growth 
of around 8 per cent between 2014 and 2017, but 
this slowed significantly to 6.5 per cent in 2018-19 
The Indian economy 
prior to the pandemic
and further to 4 per cent in 2019-20, immediately 
prior to the pandemic year (Figure 2.1). Table 2.1 
shows that when the pandemic hit, the economy 
was going through the most prolonged slowdown 
in the post-liberalisation period. A slowdown is a 
period when the GDP growth rate is lower than the 
previous period. Note the duration of the pre-Covid 
crisis, both in terms of total quarters of slowdown 
as well as number of consecutive quarters when 
the GDP growth rate was falling. The longevity of 
the slowdown (2017-18 to 2019-20) surpassed not 
only that of the 1990s or early 2000s, but even the 









Source and notes: EPWRFITS
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There were several domestic and global factors 
which triggered the slowdown. The causes 
identified in the literature include short-run  
shocks such as demonetisation and rollout of 
Goods and Services Tax (GST), medium-run factors 
including growing financial fragility, and long-
run structural weaknesses such as insufficiently 
broad-based domestic demand as well as debt-
financed consumption (Anand and Azad 2019; 
Chinoy and Jain 2021; Subramanian and Felman 
2019). In addition, at the global level, there was a 
sharp reduction in exports due to fall in demand. 
World GDP growth rate slowed down from 
2017-18 for three consecutive years, associated 
with increasing de-globalisation or a return to 
protectionist measures by the United States and 
retaliatory measures by its trading partners (IMF 
2019). This led to a decline in the growth rate of the 
volume of world trade and industrial production, 
particularly from January 2018 onwards. Reflecting 
the trend of global demand, India’s export growth 
rate registered a sharp decline (Dasgupta 2020). 
Such a fall in demand and profits adversely affected 
expectations regarding future sales and profitability 
and hence, pushed the producers to cut back 
investments leading to further reduction 
in demand. 
Chinoy and Jain (2021) note that strong export 
growth (around 16 per cent a year) drove high 
investment growth (around 11 per cent a year) 
between 2002 and 2011. In contrast, growth 
post-2013 was driven by private as well as public 
consumption. The private consumption, in turn, 
was financed by debt and reduced household 
savings. As a result individual debt increased from 
19 per cent to 28 per cent of GDP between 2015 and 
2019. Subramanian and Felman (2019) emphasise 
deteriorating balance sheets of the financial and 
non-financial corporate firms and consequent 
feedback effects on aggregate demand as the 
main cause of the crisis. This was a legacy of the 
investment boom of the first decade of the century. 
Since 2010 there has been a sharp rise in leverage 
ratios and deterioration of interest coverage 
ratios of the non-financial corporate sector. If 
the financially stressed firms are defined as those 
whose profit income (Profit Before Depreciation, 
Interest, Tax and Amortisation) is less than the 
interest payments (interest coverage ratio less than 
one), then the share of such stressed firms in the 
corporate sector firms increased since 2010. At the 
high level of interest payments that firms inherited 
by 2017-18, decline in demand following export 
Sources and notes: Calculated from National Accounts Statistics,CSO, Government of India. 
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slowdown led to greater incidence of insolvency 
among non-financial corporate firms as their 
profit income fell short of their inherited interest 
payments.
The consequent repayment crisis of the non-
financial corporate sector adversely affected 
interest income and profitability of creditors, viz, 
banks and Non Banking Financial Corporations 
(NBFCs). The dwindling profitability of NBFCs in 
turn pushed many to default. Some big examples 
of this are the defaults of IL&FS in September 2018, 
Reliance Home Finance and Reliance Commercial 
Finance in April 2019,  DHFL in June 2019 and Altico 
Capital in September 2019. The collapse of some of 
the biggest NBFCs initiated a contagion effect as 
lenders increasingly reduced their exposure to the 
NBFC sector in the midst of greater uncertainty 
and financial fragility. This process triggered a 
credit squeeze and led to further fall in output, 
investment, and demand. 
As these global and structural challenges were 
building up, the demonetisation of high-value 
currency notes in November 2016 and the 
introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
in 2017 also contributed to a climate of investment 
uncertainty while depressing consumer demand. 
Demonetisation led to a contraction in output of 
around two percentage points in the fourth quarter 
of 2016 as well as decline in employment of around 
five million jobs (Basole et al. 2019; Chodorow-
Reich et al. 2020; Ramakumar 2018).1 It also severely 
disrupted the informal economy with some 
estimates of output contraction going up to  
40 per cent.2 In addition it impacted the arrival  
and prices of agricultural produce across India 
(Aggarwal and Narayanan 2017).
The introduction of the GST further impacted 
supply chains and existing contracts particularly in 
the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) 
sector, and coming on the heels of Demonetisation 
and the NBFC crisis, it compounded bankruptcies 
in this segment. Credit growth to this sector, 
which was already weakening, turned negative in 
this period (Behera and Wahi 2018). In their SWI 
2021 background paper, Rathore and Khanna (2021) 
report qualitative findings from semi-structured 
interviews with owners of MSME units and office 
bearers of Industrial Associations. Interviews 
reveal that investment declined drastically post-
Demonetisation. After Demonetisation a change 
in rules that allowed firms to borrow only from 
private limited companies stalled investment. Firms 
owners reported not being able to bring currency 
into circulation for larger expenses even if they had 
significant cash reserves.
One troubling indication with regard to the welfare 
impact of the slowdown comes from the leaked 
results from the NSSO Consumption 
Expenditure Survey which showed 
an unprecedented decline in real 
consumption expenditure of about 
3.7 per cent between 2011 and 2018.3 
However, since the data for this 
survey round were not officially released, these 
results cannot be verified. Another measure of 
consumption in this period comes from a study 
by the National Council for Applied Economic 
Research (NCAER) and the University of Maryland. 
This suggests, not a decline, but a slowdown in 
consumption growth. In a panel of 4828 households 
across Rajasthan (2,706 households), Bihar (1,643 
households) and Uttarakhand (479 households), 
the study finds that per capita incomes grew by 3.5 
per cent per annum and per capita consumption 
expenditure grew by 2.7 per cent per annum. In 
contrast, the same households reported income 
growth of 7.2 per cent per annum and consumption 
growth of four per cent per annum between  
2004-5 and 2011-12.4
When the pandemic hit, the economy 
was going through the most prolonged 
slowdown in the post-liberalisation period. 
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In summary, when the pandemic hit, the Indian 
economy was in the midst of a serious slowdown 
triggered by global and domestic, short-run and 
long-run, incidental and structural factors. The fact 
that the slowdown turned out to be as prolonged as 
it did also indicated the structural and institutional 
constraints in undertaking effective counter-cyclical 
policies. Fiscal policy was rendered less effective 
than it could have been due to self-imposed 
institutional constraint of meeting deficit targets. 
Though the RBI responded to the slowdown by 
pursuing a loose monetary policy, it was 
ineffective in bringing about a recovery to any 
significant extent. 
There were at least two reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy. The first reason 
pertained to a weak transmission mechanism from 
the repo rate to long run interest rates (Anand 
and Azad, 2019).5 The second reason relates to the 
downward rigidity of interest rates in developing 
countries like India, as interest rates are kept higher 
than the ones prevailing in developed countries 
to avoid capital outflows. With sharp reduction 
in output growth rate and expectations at given 
interest rate and in the midst of downward rigidity 
of interest rates, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy remained limited. 
In general, the constraints in undertaking demand-
management policies does not become apparent 
in the midst of buoyant global demand. The 
period of global boom during the early years of 
this century is one such example where the Indian 
economy registered high growth rates despite sharp 
reduction in fiscal deficits. However, during a global 
slump, the possibility and the extent of recovery 
depends critically on the extent of fiscal support. 
The unprecedented shock delivered by Covid-19 has 
made fiscal intervention all the more urgent. We 
return to this theme in Chapter Six.
2.2 / Employment 
trends leading into the 
Covid crisis
The primary focus of this report is on employment, 
income, and welfare impacts of the Covid crisis. 
To set the stage for the subsequent analysis, we 
now look at how the Indian economy performed 
on job creation and quality of work, as well as how 
the process of structural change was occurring 
in the years prior to the pandemic. This section 
considers the medium-run employment scenario 
between 2011-12 and 2017-18 as well as job creation 
immediately prior to the Covid-19 crisis between 
2017-18 and 2019-19. The main data sources here 
are the NSSO Employment-Unemployment Survey 
(2011-12) and the Periodic Labour Force Surveys 
(2017-18 and 2018-19). The next section deals with 
structural change.
2.2.1 / Absolute fall in the
workforce: 2011-2017 6
Nath and Basole (2020) report trends in working 
age population growth and employment growth 
for men and women in rural and urban areas in the 
period between 2011-12 and 2017-18. They define 
working age to be 25 years and above, instead 
of the usual definition of 15 years and above, to 
exclude those for whom enrollment in education 
institutions could be a reason for withdrawal from 
the labour force. By this measure, between 2011-
12 and 2017-18 the working age population grew 
by 115.5 million. But the labour force grew only by 
7.7 million and the workforce actually shrank by 
11.3 million (Table 2.2). This resulted in a large fall 
in the labour force participation rate (LFPR) as 
well as workforce participation rate (WPR), and a 
dramatic increase in the unemployment rate (UR). 
There was an absolute increase of 19 million in the 
number of unemployed, and a rise in the rate of 
unemployment from 2.2 per cent to 6.1 per cent. 
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Further, the LFPR as well as the WPR fell for all 
demographic groups, men and women, urban and 
rural (Table 2.3).7 An absolute fall in the number of 
people employed as well as the sudden increase in 
the UR were both unprecedented phenomena since 
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Sources and notes: NSS 2011-12, PLFS 2017-18 and PLFS 2018-19. Numbers pertain to individuals aged 
25 years and above (see text for explanation). UPSS definition of employment (see Glossary). Absolute 
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Even by the liberal NSSO UPSS definition (see 
Glossary), employment growth fell well short 
of working age population growth for men and 
women in rural and urban areas (Table 2.4). The 
rate of growth of population among those aged 
25 years or above was around 2.5 per cent per 
year (compounded annual growth rate or CAGR), 
but the rate of employment growth (on a much 
lower base) was around 1.5 to 2 per cent. For rural 
women, it was negative. That is, the absolute fall 
in the workforce at the aggregate level was driven 
largely by rural women. The absolute number of 
women engaged in subsidiary activities (including 
those engaged in a principal activity alongside 
the subsidiary activity) fell by around 32 million 
between 2011-12 and 2017-18. More importantly, the 
total number of women engaged only in subsidiary 
activities fell by close to 23 million during this 
time. This fall is not due to women opting to move 
out of the labour force into education as much 
of the decline (around 62 per cent) took place in 
the age bracket of thirty years and above. This 
decline in employment could be due to factors 
such as a rising education levels as well as rise in 
family incomes resulting in withdrawal of women 
from the workforce8 or a decline in availability of 
work (Deshpande and Kabeer 2019). Much of the 
decline in the number of female workers engaged 
in subsidiary activities was in the agricultural sector, 
followed by manufacturing and construction.
A more stringent definition of employment is 
the Usual Principal Status, which only considers 
a person as employed if they have worked for at 
least six months of the preceding year. As the 
difference between the two measures in Table 2.4 
indicates, the decline in employment was confined 
to subsidiary activities. However, even if we do not 
see an absolute decline in employment by the UPS 
definition, the rate of employment growth still falls 
far short of the rate of population growth for all 
groups except urban women. For example, among 
urban men for employment to have kept pace with 
population growth, the former should have grown 
by 15 million over six years (Table 2.4, Hypothetical 
difference). Instead, it grew by 8.7 million (Table 
2.4b, Actual Difference). The corresponding figures 
for rural men are 30 million and 17 million. Thus, 
the concerning fact to be emphasised is that even 

































Sources and notes: NSS 2011-12 and PLFS 2017-18. Numbers pertain to individuals aged 25 years and 
above (see text for explanation). See Glossary for definitions of UPS (Usual Principal Status) and UPSS 
(Usual Principal and Subsidiary Status). Absolute numbers are calculated using population projections 
as described in Nath and Basole (2020). The Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) is calculated 
on absolute numbers. Hypothetical difference refers to the increase in employment that would have 
occured if the workforce grew at the same rate as the working age population. Actual difference refers 
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areas), employment grew at 60 per 
cent the rate of population growth. 
The result was an increase in open 
unemployment as well as a fall in the 
labour force participation rate.
To sum up, two points are worth emphasizing with 
respect to the employment trends between 2011-
12 and 2017-18. First, for men as well as women, 
the pace of employment creation fell far short of 
what was required given the rise in working age 
population. Second, there was an absolute decline 
in the number of women engaged in subsidiary 
economic activities in agriculture. We investigate 
the implications of this for India’s structural 
transformation later in this chapter.
2.2.2 / An employment recovery  
cut short?
Nath and Menon (2020) take advantage of the 
regular availability of annual PLFS data to look 
more closely at the situation just prior to the 
pandemic between 2017-18 and 2018-19. The main 
conclusion here is that the employment situation 
had started improving in the period just before the 
intensification of the pre-Covid slowdown.
Between the two PLFS rounds, the total workforce 
grew by 13 million, making up for employment lost 
between 2011-12 and 2017-18 (Table 2.2). While 
the working age population grew by 1.8 per cent, 
the labour force grew by 2.7 per cent and the 
workforce by 2.95 per cent. As a result, the LFPR  
as well as the WPR rose and the unemployment 
rate fell.
The improvement in LFPR and WPR was largely 
concentrated among rural women (just short of 
two percentage points), the same group that had 
seen the largest declines in the previous period. 
For urban women and for rural men, the increase 
in WPR was much smaller, to the extent of 0.2 
percentage points (Table 2.3).
These numbers are somewhat encouraging, but 
the intensification of the slowdown in 2019 and 
then Covid-19 shock have radically altered the 
economic situation going forward. 
2.2.3 / Youth unemployment
One of the most hotly debated economic 
issues during the 2019 general election was 
the unprecedented rise in the unemployment 
rate from 2.2 per cent in NSS-EUS 2011-12 to 
6.1 per cent in PLFS 2017-18.9 Going beyond 
the headline rate, it is worth keeping in mind 
that unemployment remains largely confined to 
educated youth as it has always been. However, 
what has changed is the proportion of educated 
youth in the labour force, and the capacity to wait 
for a more preferred job.
Figure 2.2 breaks the overall UR down into a 
youth UR (ages 15 to 30 years) and a UR for older 
workers who are more than 30 years of age. 
Three time points, 2011-12, 2017-18 and 2018-19, 
are shown. During 2011-12 to 2017-18, youth UR 
increased sharply for every level of education, 
going past 35 per cent for higher educated youth. 
That is, more than one-third of educated youth 
who were in the labour force were unemployed in 
2017-18. Encouragingly, the small improvement in 
the employment situation between 2017-18 and 
2018-19 was reflected at every level of education. 
However, there is clearly a long way to go since 
the unemployment rate for young graduates 
and postgraduates was still a very high 33 per 
cent. The problem was even worse for educated 
young women for whom the UR rose to an 
astounding 42 per cent. Given these large rates of 
unemployment even prior to the pandemic, the 
Between 2011 and 2017, employment 
grew only at 60 per cent the rate of 
population growth. 
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differential negative impact of the pandemic on 
younger workers, that we report in Chapter Three, 
becomes even more worrying.
For older workers (more than 30 years of age), 
unemployment rates fell to three percent: four 
percent for those with graduate or postgraduate, 
and to less than two percent for older workers 
with lesser education (Figure 2.2). Thus, open 
unemployment was practically absent for less 
educated and for older workers going into  
the pandemic. 
Two important implications can be drawn 
from this fact. First, despite formal educational 
qualifications, the educated labour force either 
does not have the necessary skills that are required 
in the job market or the economy is not generating 
jobs for this category in required numbers. 
Second, after searching for work for a few years 
in their twenties, eventually most workers do find 
employment, even if it does not match their skills 
or their aspirations. 
2.3 / Weak structural 
transformation prior to 
the pandemic10
In addition to the pandemic’s impacts on 
employment, incomes and welfare in the short-run, 
it is also important to consider longer-term effects 
on structural transformation of the economy. 
Recall, that structural transformation in the context 
of a developing country involves two distinct 
processes - a decline in the share of agriculture in 
employment (and a rise in non-farm work) and a 
decline in the share of the informal sector (and a 
rise in the scale of production). In State of Working 
India 2018, we referred to these two as the Kuznets 
Process and the Lewis Process respectively. In order 
to understand the impact that Covid may have on 
India’s structural transformation, it is necessary to 










Source and notes: NSS 2011-12, PLFS 2017-18 and PLFS 2018-19. See Glossary for definition of 
Unemployment rate.
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2.3.1 / Kuznets process
The fall in female agricultural employment between 
2011-12 and 2017-18 described earlier is part of 
an overall decline in farm employment, from 232 
million (49 per cent of the workforce) to 205 million 
(44 per cent of the workforce). Thus, the process 
of an absolute reduction in the number of people 
engaged in agriculture which started in 2004-05 
has continued apace. While a decline in agricultural 
employment is to be expected, more worrying is 
the fact that manufacturing employment also fell 
in the period after 2011-12, by 3.5 million, reducing 
an already low share in total workforce from 
12.6 to 12.1 per cent (Mehrotra and Parida 2019). 
Interestingly, even though overall employment did 
not grow in manufacturing, the organised segment 
consisting of firms that are registered under the 
Factories Act posted an increase of two million jobs 
in this period as per Annual Survey of Industries 
(ASI) data. Organised industries such as knitwear, 
plastics, leather and footwear have delivered well in 
terms of job creation as well as wage growth in this 
period (Basole and Narayan 2020).
In addition to the weak performance of 
manufacturing as a whole, another important 
reason for weak aggregate employment growth was 
the slowdown in the construction sector which was 
a large destination for workers leaving agriculture 
in the first decade of the century. This sector 
registered an increase of 3.6 million jobs between 
2011-12 and 2017-18, a weak performance compared 
to the previous period (2004-05 to 2011-12) when 
employment doubled from 25 to 50 million.
In contrast to manufacturing and construction, the 
services sector showed relatively stronger growth 
of jobs (three million per year) between 2011-12 
and 2017-18. Further, Mehrotra and Parida (2019) 
show that the modern services 
sector drove much of this growth 
in employment.11 As the authors 
note, this is good news for the 
share of formal youth employment 
in this sector, which has shown a 
consistent increase from 21 per cent (2004-05) to 
25.4 per cent (2011-12) to 31 per cent (2017-18).
In sum, however, the movement of workers from 
farm to non-farm work has been considerably 
dampened by workers withdrawing from the labour 
force entirely, especially women workers. Instead 
of enabling women to leave agricultural work and 
move towards relatively more productive labour-
intensive manufacturing jobs (as has occurred in 
East Asian and Southeast Asian economies as well 
as in Bangladesh), the Indian economy has instead 
pushed them out of the labour force altogether.  
As we will see in Chapter Three, the Covid impact 
has further worsened the situation with respect to 
participation of women in the workforce.
2.3.2 / Lewis process
The second dimension of structural transformation, 
closely related to the first, is the movement of 
workers from micro, family firms (or farms) to larger 
and more productive enterprises. This involves 
an increase in the overall scale of production 
as well as an increase in labour productivity, a 
decrease in own-account work and a rise in wage 
employment. Correlated with this movement, a 
rise in job security and an improvement in working 
conditions may be seen. However, the latter may 
or may not occur depending on the commitment 
of the State to ensuring labour rights. For example, 
recent trends indicate that there has been greater 
hiring of workers on fixed-term contracts in large 
firms, which has informalised the workforce and 
worsened conditions within the organised sector 
even as it has increased the aggregate proportion of 
regular wage workers in the economy (Kapoor and 
Krishnapriya 2017; Kumar and Kumar 2021).
Pre-pandemic unemployment rate for 
young graduates was very high at 33 per 
cent. For educated young women it rose  
to an astounding 42 per cent.
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There are two related ways that NSSO data allow 
us to estimate the pace of the Lewis process. The 
first is to calculate the proportion of the workforce 
that is employed in enterprises having at least 10 
workers (the organised sector).12 The second is to 
measure the proportion of workers who are self-
employed in own-account work (that is, work on 
their own with no paid workers). These are different 
ways of estimating scale in production. NSSO-PLFS 
data also allow us to estimate the proportion of 
the workforce with access to some forms of job 
or social security via their employment. This can 
include a written contract, paid leave, provident 
fund, gratuity, maternity leave and so on.
In 2018-19, around 81 per cent of the workforce 
continued to be employed in enterprises with less 
than 10 workers, down from 83.5 per cent in 2011.13 
Correspondingly, despite a steady increase in the 
share of regular wage workers, the proportion 
of workers who either work on own-account or 
as unpaid family workers stood at 50 per cent, 
barely reduced from 50.5 per cent in 2011-12. Thus, 
between 2011-12 and 2018-19, in percentage terms, 
the rate of decline in the proportion of workers 
engaged in agriculture (around five percentage 
points) was far higher than the increase in the 
scale of production (2.5 percentage points on a 
higher base) or a decline in self-employment (0.5 
percentage points).
Tables 2.5 gives the proportions and absolute 
numbers of workers engaged in various 
employment arrangements in 2018-19 for men and 
women in urban and rural areas. Formal workers are 
those who have a written job contract or access to 
at least one social security benefit (provident fund 
/ pension, gratuity, health care, maternity benefits). 
As expected, the urban workforce is far more 
formalised (22 per cent) compared to the rural (5 per 
cent). Overall formal employment accounts for just 
under 10 per cent of total employment. Also at an 
all-India level, regular wage workers accounted for 
24 per cent of total employment in 2018-19. Around 
41 per cent  of these workers fall into the category 
of formal regular wage workers. 
Thus, whether we look at scale of production or 
type of employment contracts, 80 to 90 per cent 
of the workforce worked in microenterprises or in 
informal arrangements just before 
the onset of the pandemic. A slow 
pace of structural transformation 
and lack of political commitment 
to improving working conditions 
thus trapped a large section of 
the workforce without access to 
any employment security or social 
protection. As we will see, this  
was a major cause of the extreme hardship  
imposed by the Covid crisis.
2.3.3 / Labour earnings prior to 
the pandemic
In addition to the security of employment, the 
ability to weather a crisis such as the one unleashed 
by Covid-19 depends greatly on the average income 
of an individual or a household. An important 
negative consequence of the slow pace of structural 
transformation described above is that labour 
productivity as well as earnings remain low in 
absolute terms.
Instead of enabling women to leave 
agricultural work and move towards 
more productive jobs the Indian 
economy has pushed them out of the 
labour force altogether.
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Even though India does not have a publicly available 
data source on household incomes, some data on 
labour earnings at the national level are available 
from the PLFS. In addition, regular income data 
are available from the CMIE-CPHS since 2014.14 
Though absolute levels of income are different 
in the two surveys on average by 20 per cent, 
with CMIE-CPHS reporting higher incomes, both 
datasets reveal a clear hierarchy of employment 
type or arrangement by income. Wage or salaried 
workers with formal jobs are the best-off with the 
highest average earnings (I23,300 per month in 
A slow pace of structural 
transformation and lack 
of political commitment to 
improving working conditions 
trapped a large section of the 
workforce without access to 
any employment security or 
social protection.
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Sources and notes: PLFS 2018-19. Formal regular wage workers are those who have a written job 
contract or access to at least one social security benefit (provident fund / pension, gratuity, health care, 
maternity benefits). See Glossary for definition of UPSS (Usual Principal Subsidiary Status).  



























































PLFS and I28,900 in CMIE-CPHS). Their relatively 
high earnings coupled with the fact that they draw 
a salary on a regular basis and receive at least some 
social protection from employers places them at 
the top of the employment structure. However, 
as we saw earlier, they account for only around 10 
per cent of the workforce. Regular wage informal 
workers (referred to in CMIE-CPHS as temporary 
salaried workers) and the self-employed earn 
considerably less followed by casual or daily wage 
workers. The average earnings of all four types 
of workers along with their proportions in the 
workforce in both surveys, are given in Table 2.6.
That a very small proportion of workers is 
engaged in what is described as the best form of 
employment, that is,  regular formal employment, 
is not just reflective of the overall conditions of the 
quality of employment but also the fact that these 
would have been the only category of workers who 
would have the financial wherewithal to cope with 
an income shock. The other categories of workers 
are likely to have been particularly vulnerable, albeit 
to differing extents, to the Covid-19 shock.
One indicator of the vulnerability of the workforce 
to the pandemic shock comes from seeing what 
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Table 2.6: A 
comparative 







Sources and notes: PLFS 2018-19, CMIE-CPHS 2018-19. See Appendix for details on CMIE-CPHS and 
PLFS comparison. Formal wage workers in PLFS are defined as wage workers having a written contract 
or receiving a social security benefit. Monthly earnings for casual workers in PLFS are calculated by 














proportion falls below the national floor minimum 
wage of I375 per day (or I9,750 per month).15 As 
per PLFS data, approximately 58.5 per cent of self 
employed workers reported monthly earnings 
below this threshold. For casual workers, the 
share was even higher at 88.5 per cent. For CMIE-
CPHS, which reports has higher average incomes 
in general, the corresponding numbers are 43.4 
per cent and 65.7 per cent. Thus even by the more 
optimistic numbers, half the workforce continues 
to earn less than the amount needed for a basic 
standard of living, let alone an aspirational income.
2.3.4 / Intersection of sectoral 
structure and informality
A final dimension of vulnerability to the Covid-19 
shock comes from the sectoral structure of India’s 
non-farm workforce. Table 2.7 gives the absolute 
number of workers by employment type in various 
major sectors of the economy. Also shown is the 
ILO’s risk classification of being affected due to 
Covid-19 (ILO 2020). Note that Informal (self-
employed and casual) workers in the medium 
to high-risk sectors such as manufacturing, 
construction, trade, transport, and hospitality 
constitute the most vulnerable section of the 
workforce. In 2018-19 these accounted for over  
125 million workers. 
In urban areas, this high risk group constituted 
almost 45 per cent of total employment based 
on PLFS data. The share of urban workers who 
were least likely to lose employment (regular wage 
workers in less impacted sectors) was 12 per cent. 
That such a high proportion of the urban workforce 
is classified as being highly vulnerable gives us an 
idea of the immensity of the crisis that ensued 
during and after the lockdown. 
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To summarize the points made in 
this chapter, we have seen that the 
Indian economy was in a significant 
slowdown in the year leading up 
to the pandemic. This was on top of a persistent 
problem of weak structural transformation that left 
the majority of the workforce in informal and poorly 
paid work arrangements. As we shall see in Chapter 
Six, the existing social protection architecture also 
had large lacunae, which became all too obvious 
during the nationwide lockdown in April and  
May 2020.
In the next two chapters we closely analyse the 
employment and income impacts of the pandemic, 
drawing largely on CMIE-CPHS data supplemented 
by two primary field surveys - the Azim Premji 
Covid-19 Livelihoods Surveys and the India Working 
Survey (IWS).
Informal workers in medium to high Covid 
risk sectors accounted for 45% of the 
urban workforce.
51
2. The Indian economy prior to the pandemic
Endnotes
1 Also see Nagaraj, R. 2020. The India Forum. 












5 If the long term market interest rate is perceived 
to be a sum of short term market interest rate 
and the risk premium, with the short term market 
interest rate being determined by the repo rate, 
then the trend in long term interest rate in India in 
the recent period can be explained by the changes 
in factors (such as oil prices) which affect the risk 
premium (Dilip 2019).
6 This section draws on Nath and Basole (2020).
7 Note that “Employment” is defined here as per 
the NSSO Usual Principal and Subsidiary Status or 
UPSS, where a person is considered employed if 
they worked in any form of market activity (such 
as self-employment, salaried work or casual labour) 
for at least 30 days in the preceding year. The 










10 This section is based partly on a policy paper on 
Covid-19 and Social Protection written for the  
Asian Development Bank by Radhicka Kapoor  
and Amit Basole.
11  The authors include the following in this 
category: education, hotel and restaurant, and 
other food service activities, health and community 
social services, telecommunication, business 
support service activities, sale, maintenance and 
repair of motor vehicles, financial intermediation, 
computer related activities, research and 
development, modern auxiliary transport, real 
estate services, and insurance and pension funding.
12 As per the National Commission for Enterprises 
in the Unorganised Sector the unorganized sector 
(or informal sector) “consists of all unincorporated 
private enterprises owned by individuals or 
households engaged in the sale and production 
of goods and services operated on a proprietary 
or partnership basis and with less than ten total 
workers” (Sengupta et al. 2007).
13 The share of employment in the unorganized 
sector is smaller in urban areas (64 per cent) 
compared to rural areas (88.5 per cent). Strikingly, 
there is not much difference in the distribution of 
employment across organized and unorganized 
sectors for men and women.
14 Since we use the CMIE-CPHS data extensively 
in this report for analysis of Covid-19 impact on 
employment and incomes, we have given detailed 
comparisons of these data with PLFS numbers in 
later chapters (see Appendix to Chapter Three for 
employment statistics and Box 4.2 for incomes in 
these two surveys).
15 In 2017, the Government of India appointed 
an Expert Committee to recommend a national 
minimum wage to provide a decent standard of 
living and meet basic needs, including education, 
food and healthcare. The Committee set the single 
value of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) for 
India at I375 per day  as of July 2018, irrespective of 
sectors, skills, occupations and rural-urban locations 
(GOI 2019).
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3. Employment loss and recovery
This chapter as well as the next two constitute the 
core of our analysis of how the Covid pandemic 
impacted employment, incomes, and welfare in 
India. It should be emphasised that the pandemic 
is still raging at the time of writing. Hence the 
analysis is necessarily provisional and the effects  
are still ongoing. The aim is to bring together 
evidence from various sources on the nature of  
the impact thus far and to provide an empirical 
basis for policy action. 
We draw on nationally representative household 
survey data from the Consumer Pyramids 
Household Survey conducted by the Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE-CPHS)  as 
well as  several smaller surveys that were carried 
out to understand the impact of the pandemic. 
The latter are often focused surveys, targeting a 
specific demographic of workers, and although 
not representative of the entire country, they 
provide valuable insight on the nature of the impact 
across different kinds of workers. Although official 
employment statistics for urban areas, from the 
Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) have recently 
become available with the release of the Quarterly 
Bulletin for the period April 2020 to June 2020, for 
the period from July onwards,  the  CMIE-CPHS 
remains the main source of employment and 
income information, along with smaller surveys 
done across the country. 
 
Since several different sources are used in this 
analysis, periods of comparison often vary. 
Therefore, some broad periodic classifications 
are worth keeping in mind. ‘Lockdown’ refers 
to the months of April and May. Pre-pandemic 
comparisons have been made either with the 
months immediately prior (January and February)  
Employment loss 
and recovery
or with comparable months of 2019 depending on 
data availability and the nature of the question 
asked. ‘Post-lockdown’ refers to the entire period 
after June 2020 and differs from survey to survey. 
3.1 / Massive job losses 
during the lockdown 
were followed by a 
rapid recovery - and 
then a stagnation 
In April 2020, according to CMIE-CPHS estimates, 
the workforce participation rate (WPR) for men, or 
the share of working-age men who were employed, 
fell from 66 per cent in February just before 
the pandemic, to 46 per cent. Using population 
projections for 2020 (see Chapter Two for method), 
we estimate that this corresponds to a fall in total 
employment of 100 million. The corresponding fall 
for women was from 8.8 per cent in February to 5.3 
per cent in April, a fall of approximately 17 million. 
The WPR for the lockdown month (April) was 
around 65 to 70 per cent of the level immediately 
prior (February 2020) for both men and women in 
rural and urban areas. Readers familiar with NSSO-
PLFS estimates of female workforce participation 
rates will note that the CMIE-CPHS estimate is 
only half of the former during normal times. The 
Chapter Appendix elaborates on this difference and 
the broader question of measurement of women’s 
employment and comparability across different 
databases. 
For that part of the workforce which relies entirely 
on labour earnings for day-to-day survival, the 
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lockdown proved to be catastrophic. Multiple 
‘lockdown surveys’ reveal the plights of workers 
in the months of April and May (Box 3.1). The 
complete stoppage of economic activities meant 
they did not even have the option of working to 
meet their daily basic needs.
We might be poor people without a lot of 
knowledge but we are not beggars. We don’t 
have anything but we have our bodies. That was 
enough. We always knew that if we work hard, we 
will have food in our bellies, come what may. But 
the lockdown broke our faith. How can they make 
working illegal?
   
These were the words of Jahanara, a domestic 
worker in New Delhi, as recounted by Chanchani 
and Garimella (2021) in their SWI 2021 background 
paper. Jahanara had moved to Delhi from a small 
village in North Bengal. During the lockdown, 
she lost her job and savings. In another SWI 
2021 Background paper, Yadav (2021) shares the 
experience of a scrap collector based in Delhi. 
Because of the pandemic, doors and windows were 
shut on scrap dealers like me. When I began work 
in May, when some movement on the streets was 
allowed by the police, I struggled a lot to earn. I 
would make rounds of colonies in Delhi, call out 
‘Kabaadi’, to collect scrap from houses but no one 
heard me, no one called out back to me like earlier 
to stop and sell scrap – glass bottles, newspapers, 
tin cans – to recycle. They were terrified that a 
pandemic was going on. It impacted my work very 
severely for months.
Earlier, they would call out, someone or two would 
even offer water or tea or a slice of bread once in 
a while. But now, they kept their doors shut for 
weeks terrified of the disease.
 
The Resident Welfare Associations crack down 
on any scrap buyer like me who enters without a 
pass, and now they have become even stricter in 
the pandemic. And because of COVID-19 fears, the 
mansion owners are stricter, they say: ‘Hey, please 
stay away, stay far, maintain distance!’
These immediate effects were expected and, for 
the most part, temporary. However, the extent and 
kind of support that was made available via public 
policy fell well short of what was necessary. We 
discuss this in more detail in Chapter Seven.
Box 3.1 : Findings from purposive lockdown surveys
During April and May 2020 a large number of 
independent surveys were carried out by civil 
society organisations, academic researchers and 
others. Many of these were conducted during the 
course of administering relief and were based on 
purposive sampling of relatively more vulnerable 
sections of the population (such as informal sector 
workers, migrant workers, slum dwellers, etc.). 
Hence statements made on the basis of the surveys 
only apply to the sample. The sample sizes vary 
from a few hundred to 10,000 or more. We have 
compiled a database of such surveys online and as 
of April 2021, it contained 76 surveys.1 
Most surveys covered three broad areas: effect 
of the pandemic (primarily the lockdown) on 
employment and livelihoods, household level 
impacts on financial and food security, and access 
to relief measures. Taken together, these surveys 
constitute a valuable resource for analysing the 
immediate impact of the lockdown as well as the 
reach and efficacy of state and central government 
relief and support measures. The table below shows 
the headline loss of employment in three surveys. 
Across the surveys, nearly 80 per cent of urban 
informal workers lost their livelihoods during the 
lockdown months.
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A few surveys were also conducted in multiple 
rounds, giving a picture of recovery from lockdown, 
e.g. Azim Premji University Covid Livelihoods 
Phone Survey (CLIPS) and surveys by Dalberg, 
Dvara Research, ActionAid, Rural Communities 
Response to Covid (conducted by a large coalition 
of rural CSOs) and the Delhi NCR Coronavirus 
Telephone Survey (DCTVS, conducted by NCAER).
Action Aid Round Two (August) surveyed around 
17,000 individuals (of which 4,800 respondents 
were from Round 1) and found that the proportion 
of jobless workers dropped from 78 per cent during 
lockdown to 48 per cent in August. However, 
around 42 per cent of the workers who resumed 
employment post the lockdown reported being 
only partially employed (Action Aid 2020). Similarly, 
Dvara Research conducted three rounds of surveys 
of low income households between April to June 
2020. Around 80 per cent reported not having any 
income generating activity during the lockdown in 
April, and post the lockdown in June the proportion 
was still 40 per cent (Agrawal and Ashraf 2020). 
NCAER-DCTVS undertook four rounds of surveys 
of citizens of Delhi NCR between April 2020 
and January 2021. In round 4 of the survey, the 
proportion of men working rose from 62 per cent in 
Round 2 (23-26 Apr) of 2020 to 84 per cent in Round 
4 (23 Dec - 4 Jan). For women, the recovery was 
much more tepid, rising from 27 per cent in Round 2 
to 36 per cent in Round 4.2 
As is well known, the effects of the lockdown were 
particularly severe on migrant workers. We discuss 
this issue in detail in Chapter Seven. Here we briefly 
summarise the findings from various surveys, with 
regard to migrant workers. In CLIPS, three-fourths 
of all migrants had been working in non-native 
districts for more than a year. Intra-state migrants 
were far more likely to have returned to their 
native place as compared to interstate migrants (55 
per cent versus 21 per cent). A third of inter-state 
migrants were unable to return home due to the 
lockdown at the time of the interview (April-May 
2020) while about 30 per cent of the migrants who 
had reached home had no plans to return to the 
place of work after the lockdown was lifted either 
immediately or after a few months. In the Dalberg 
survey this number is 43 per cent while in the RCRC 
survey it is 34 per cent (RCRC 2021; Dalberg 2020). 
In the Action Aid survey, out of 5,800 migrant 
workers, 18 per cent were stranded for more than 
50 days. An additional 20 per cent were stranded 
between 40 to 50 days, and 27 per cent between 
20 to 40 days. Loss of employment was also more 
severe for migrant workers at 81 per cent compared 
to 71 per cent for non-migrant workers (Action Aid 
2020). It should be emphasised that these numbers 
continued to change over the lockdown period and 
afterwards, as government relief measures started 
taking effect and special trains were organised to 
transport migrant workers back to their homes. The 
efforts of a coalition of volunteers under the name 
Stranded Workers Action Network (SWAN) deserve 
to be particularly singled out here. SWAN organised 
relief and transport for thousands of workers across 
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By May, as economic activities recovered, the male 
and female WPR had recovered to around 80 per 
cent of its pre-pandemic value and was up to 90 
per cent by June. However, subsequently, there has 
been a stagnation with the WPR hovering around 
95 to 98 per cent of its pre-pandemic value. As of 
the most recent data available (December 2020), 
it was yet to recover fully (Figure 3.1). This means 
that the total workforce stayed on average around 
15 million below its size in February 2020 until 
December 2020.
With the coming of the second wave in April 2021 
and with renewed restrictions on mobility,  
it remains to be seen how the recovery progresses 
and also whether there are likely to be more 
permanent changes in labour demand over the 
longer term.
Another estimate of aggregate loss of employment 
over the previous year comes from Parida and Suri 
(2021) who calculate that 18.5 million 
fewer people will be employed 
in 2020-21 compared to 2019-20. 
The authors base this estimate on 
employment elasticities reported 
in Mishra and Suresh (2014)  for the 
period 2004-05 to 2011-12. Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI)  and MoSPI 
(Ministry of Statistics and Plan Implementation) 
forecasts of GDP growth for 2020-21 are then 
used along with total labour force estimates for 
2019-20 and 2020-21 (based on CAGR between 
2011-12 and 2018-19) to estimate the absolute loss in 
employment. They find that the workforce may be 
expected to decline to an estimated 456.9 million 
in 2020-21 instead of reaching 475.7 million as 
estimated under the pre-COVID scenario, i.e. 18.5 
million jobs lost.
This indirect method based on employment 
elasticities is used because, until recently, there 
was no publicly available data on the employment 
impact of the pandemic (CMIE-CPHS is a private 
database). With the release of the quarterly bulletin 
of the PLFS for Q1 of 2020-2021 (April-June 2020), 
we have some estimates of job loss, albeit only for 
urban areas (Box 3.2).
Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations using CMIE-CPHS.






By July most of the loss in employment had 
been recovered. However, subsequently, 
there has been a stagnation with the total 
workforce staying on average around 15 
million below its February 2020 level.
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Box 3.2 :  What do official statistics say about the impact of the lockdown  
on the labour market?
Statistics from the PLFS for the first quarter of 
2020-21 (April, May, June 2020) have recently 
become available, allowing us another estimate of 
the impact of the lockdown on employment for 
urban areas.1
In the first quarter of 2019-20 the urban WPR for 
men was 67.3 per cent and for women it was 16.9 
per cent. During the lockdown quarter, male WPR 
fell by 10 percentage points to 56.9 per cent, and for 
women by  1.4 percentage points to 15.5 per cent. 
By comparison, according to CMIE-CPHS, the fall 
in WPR for men and women is about 20 percentage 
points and 3.5 percentage points respectively in 
urban areas. 
At first glance, it would seem that  the PLFS 
estimates suggest a much smaller fall in the WPRs 
for men and women compared to CMIE-CPHS. 
However, we believe that this  mismatch arises 
from inclusion within the workforce of those self-
employed workers who could not work due to the 
lockdown. The PLFS quarterly estimates use the 
Current Weekly Status (CWS) approach to measure 
employment where a person is identified as 
employed if they worked for at least an hour in the 
last week. CWS allows workers in self-employment 
or casual wage work to identify themselves as 
generally working although they did not work due 
to sickness or other reasons. The rationale behind 
this exercise is to include those people whose 
absence from work during the reference period 
is temporary.2 During normal times, such people 
constitute less than 1 per cent of the workforce. 
The figure shows that the share of those identifying 
as self-employed but not working was around 1 per 
cent  for the three quarters prior to the lockdown 
quarters. It rose to 3 per cent during January-March 
2020 (possibly driven by the last week of March, 
2020 when the lockdown had been put in place) and 
to an unprecedented 16 per cent in April-June, 2020. 
This category termed ‘SE-not working’ constituted 









Sources and notes: PLFS Quarterly Bulletin, April-June 2020. 
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These individuals who fall under the category of 
‘SE-not working’  are counted as workers when 
estimating WPRs. However,  such categorisation 
of employment status that relies on self-identified 
status may not be applicable in the case of 
exceptional circumstances where the economic 
activity itself was completely stopped (Abraham 
2020). If we estimate WPRs after excluding these 
individuals, the male WPR in April-June 2020 
becomes 47 per cent and female WPR was 14 per 
cent.3  For men, this WPR from PLFS is almost 
exactly the same as that estimated by  CMIE-CPHS. 
For women, a difference of ten percentage points 
remains but this is a difference that has persisted 
across the years between these two surveys (See 
Chapter Appendix). More importantly, the extent 
of fall in WPR for men and women, across CMIE-
CPHS and PLFS, i.e. a fall of about 20 and 3.5 
percentage points for men and women respectively, 
are similar when we use this modified definition of 
WPR in PLFS. 
1 Quarterly reports are released only for urban areas. The 
fieldwork for PLFS was terminated in mid-March and  
resumed on 1st June 2020. 61 per cent of the schedules 
for this quarter were collected over telephone. There was 
a delay in the collection of information for this period 
as respondents were approached later than they would 
normally have been but information was collected with 
respect to the actual reference period that would have been 
adopted had there been no pandemic. Furthermore, the 
sample size of this round is around 96 per cent that of the 
previous year’s April-June quarterly sample.
2 https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/are-conventional-
metrics-employment-accurate-during-economic-lockdown
3 We calculated the size of the urban workforce by applying 
the WPRs given in the quarterly reports to the working-age 
population projections. We then excluded from this worker 
population, the number of ‘self-employed not working’. This 
was divided by the overall working-age population to arrive 
at ‘modified WPRs’ comparable with CMIE-CPHS.
3.2 / Beyond the
aggregate employment 
numbers: Variation 
and flux in the labour 
market 
The aggregate WPR numbers suggest a 90 per 
cent recovery in employment. However, these 
numbers hide substantial variation and flux 
in the workforce in terms of entry and exit of 
workers, their movement across different types 
of employment arrangements, as well as across 
sectors and industries. First, the 
lockdown may have rendered many 
workers jobless and in the months 
after, while many have returned to 
work, it is also likely that many who 
were previously not working (either unemployed or 
out of the workforce) may have entered the labour 
market. Second, workers may also find employment 
of a different nature, moving, say, from self-
employment to casual wage work, and/or across 
sectors, say from manufacturing to agriculture.  And 
third, recovery in employment may not necessarily 
imply a recovery in earnings.  Furthermore, all of 
the above can vary with the social and demographic 
characteristics of the worker. For example, several 
Covid-19 impact surveys suggest that the impact of 
employment loss appears to be much harsher for 
low income and vulnerable workers.
90 per cent of men who were employed 
in late 2019 were employed in late 2020. 
For women the corresponding number is 
only 50 per cent.
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Here we analyse entry and exit and 
how it has varied across states and 
demographic groups. In the next 
chapter we analyse transitions to 
informal employment arrangements 
and the resulting impact on labour incomes.  
The periods of analysis are the months of 
September to December 2019 compared to 
September to December 2020 (CMIE-CPHS  
Wave 3 for both years).1 
There is substantial variation across states, as 
might be expected, since different states have 
been affected to different degrees by the pandemic 
and state-level responses have also varied. We 
investigate state-level policy approaches to the 
pandemic in Chapter Six. Here we only note that 
some states such as Maharashtra, Kerala, Tamil 
Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi, have contributed 
disproportionately to job losses observed in the 
CMIE-CPHS data i.e., their share in job losses was 
higher than their share in the pre-Covid workforce. 
(Figure 3.2). Many others, such as Andhra Pradesh, 
Telangana, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar have 
roughly equal shares in job losses as their share in 
the entire Indian workforce. On the other hand, 
Karnataka, West Bengal, Odisha and Jharkhand 
are under-represented in the job loss numbers 
compared to their share in the total workforce.
As might be expected, a higher average Covid 
case load (confirmed cases per month over the 
four month period being analysed) is associated 
with a higher job loss representation index 
(Figure 3.3).2 Interestingly, some states which 
have a representation index greater than one 
(such as Maharashtra) lie close to the regression 
Figure 3.2 : 
States’ 
share of job 
loss as a 
proportion 
of share in 
workforce
Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of September, 
October, November, December of 2019 and 2020. See Appendix Section 2 for details. The representation 
index is a ratio of the state’s share in employment loss to its share in the pre-Covid total workforce. 
Across states, a higher average Covid case 





State of Working India 2021






Sources and notes: CMIE-CPHS data for Sept-Dec 2019 and Sept-Dec 2020. See the previous figure for 
explanation of the job loss representation index. Data on confirmed Covid cases per month for the same 
period are obtained from PRS Legislative Research (https://prsindia.org/covid-19/cases). 
line, suggesting that extent of job 
loss is well predicted by the Covid 
load, while others such as UP, 
Tamil Nadu, and Kerala are farther 
away, suggesting the influence 
of other factors in accounting for 
job loss. Delhi is a clear outlier but 
even when it is removed from the 
analysis confirmed case load remains 
significantly correlated with the job loss index.
Returning to the national-level analysis, around 85 
per cent of those who were employed between 
September to December 2019 were also employed 
during the same months, a year later. The 
remaining 15 per cent were either unemployed or 
out of the workforce. The net result was a stable 
WPR.3 However, the extent of entry and exit varies 
substantially between men and women. For men, 
90 per cent of those who were employed in late 
2019 were employed in late 2020, in alignment 
with the overall recovery in WPR seen earlier. For 
women, on the other hand, the corresponding 
number is only 50 per cent (Table 3.1). That is,  
50 per cent of previously employed women were 
not employed any longer after the lockdown. Yet, 
as for men, the WPR for women had returned more 
or less close to pre-lockdown levels.
The explanation lies in the fact that a large share of 
women who were previously out of the workforce 
or unemployed, entered the workforce. The near-
complete restoration of WPR to pre-Covid levels 
for women occured because the exit of women 
from the workforce was accompanied by entry of 
women who were not employed in the comparable 
period the previous year. 
The near complete restoration of WPR 
to pre-Covid levels occured because the 
exit of women from the workforce was 
accompanied by entry of those who were 
not employed in the comparable period 
the previous year.
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Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of 























Employment status in 2020
A second source of information for this flux is 
the India Working Survey (IWS) conducted in 
two states (Karnataka and Rajasthan).4 Though 
the two surveys are not comparable, it is worth 
noting that IWS finds a similar influx of previously 
out-of-workforce women into employment after 
the lockdown. Prior to the pandemic, the rural 
employment rate for the IWS sample in Rajasthan 
and Karnataka was 63 per cent for men and 44 
per cent for women.5 With the imposition of the 
lockdown, the employment rate fell by around 
10 percentage points for women, in both states. 
By August-September WPR had recovered for 
both men and women. But as in CMIE-CPHS 
data, the recovery of aggregate WPR numbers 
hides a lot of flux within the workforce. Of all 
the women employed in September, 42 per cent 
were not employed in February-March. The 
corresponding number for men in IWS was 33 per 
cent.6 This points to the precarity of employment 
arrangements, which is higher for women than  
for men.
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Box 3.3 : Exploring the reasons behind labour market entry and exit
During the IWS phone survey, respondents who 
were working previously (in February or March) 
but were not working in August and September, 
were asked the reasons for their withdrawal from 
work. The primary reason given by women was that 
suitable work was not available, followed by illness. 
The ‘new’ female entrants into the workforce were 
asked the reasons behind their entry into paid work. 
For more than half the respondents across both the 
states, the responses indicate distress-driven entry. 
Joining paid work was imperative as household 
incomes had fallen or the husband/primary 
earner had lost their jobs or could not operate 
their business. The figure below provides further 
evidence of distress driven employment.
We asked respondents how their household income 
for the period April to August 2020 compared to 
their incomes during the same time last year.  First, 
we find that about 90 per cent of women reported 
that their household income had reduced since the 
previous year (not shown in Figure). We also see 
a clear pattern of more women transitioning into 
work when the household income has decreased, 
whereas where household incomes have improved 
we see that women are more likely to leave  
the workforce.
The distress driven entry of women into the 
workforce is further buttressed when we look at 
the caste composition and its changes pre and 
post-lockdown. The proportion of Scheduled Caste 
(SC)  women in the workforce increased between 
February-March and August-September, along with 
a reduction in the proportion of general category 
women. For men, the caste composition remained 
largely the same.
The overall picture of women’s employment 
seems to be of distress driven transitions into 
employment, resulting in crowding out of some 
of the work opportunities of previously employed 













Sources and notes: India Working Survey 2020
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3.3 / Trajectories of
employment
To understand the patterns of entry and exit from 
the labour market better, we now look at  those 
individuals who were in the workforce prior to the 
lockdown and follow them through the lockdown 
and afterwards. To do this, we use the fact that 
the CMIE-CPHS survey is a panel dataset where 
each household is interviewed three times a year. 
Those who were interviewed in April (the lockdown 
month) were earlier interviewed in December 2019 
and then again in December 2020. (see Figure 1.1  
in Chapter 1).7
Four outcomes are possible as depicted in Table 
3.2. More than half (57 per cent) of the workforce 
continued to stay in employment during the 
lockdown and post the lockdown (Figure 3.4, no 
effect). Additionally, around 28 per cent of the 
workforce followed a recovery trajectory. In total, 
about 85 per cent of those who were working in 
December 2019 were in employment by December 
2020. 10 per cent had not returned to work 
even after a year (no recovery). Finally, 5 per cent 
experienced a delayed job loss, losing work not 

















































Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the December 2019-April 
2020-December 2020 panel. See Appendix section 2 for details.
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The proportions differ between rural and urban 
areas. While 61 per cent of the rural workforce 
remained employed throughout, the corresponding 
figure for urban areas was 52 per cent, indicating 
a relatively lower impact in rural areas in terms 
of employment loss. But, in urban areas, a larger 
share, 32 per cent, were able to return to work after 
having lost employment, compared to 25 per cent in 
rural areas (Figure 3.4). 
Overall, while the immediate impact of the 
lockdown in terms of job loss was harsher in the 
urban areas, it also experienced a sharper recovery 
post the lockdown. As a result, the long term 
persistence of the impact - either in terms of a 
no recovery or a delayed job loss trajectory - was 
not very different between the two regions, with 
around 14 per cent of the rural workforce and 16 per 
cent of the urban December 2019 workforce losing 
employment and continuing to be unemployed in 
December 2020.
These aggregate numbers hide 
substantial variation across social and 
demographic groups. It is well known 
that the employment status in India 
is strongly correlated with gender, 
caste, religion, and age, and it is likely 
that the lockdown had differential 
impacts on workers based on their 
social identity. We now turn to an analysis of the 
employment experiences of these groups. 
3.3.1 / Women were  
much more likely to lose jobs and 
much less likely to recover
In terms of employment trajectories, the contrast 
in employment experiences between men and 
women is stark with losses being much higher (in 
proportionate terms) and the recovery much slower 
for women compared to men. While 61 per cent 
of men followed the no effect trajectory over this 
period, the corresponding figure for women was 
only 19 per cent. Further, while only 7 per cent of 
men followed a no-recovery trajectory, the figure 
for women was 47 per cent. Women were also 
much more likely to also experience a delayed job 
loss even after the lockdown relative to men  
(Figure 3.5).
61 per cent of men followed the no 
effect trajectory. The corresponding 
figure for women was only 19 per cent. 
Further, only 7 per cent of men followed 
a no-recovery trajectory, while the 
figure for women was 47 per cent.








Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the December 2019-April 
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Corroboration of this differential impact on women 
workers also comes from the  India Working 
Survey. Recall, that this two-state survey was 
carried out with the purpose of measuring women’s 
employment better than is done in standard 
surveys. Figure 3.6 shows IWS data for the same 
trajectories that we have analysed for CMIE-CPHS 
data. The time points here are February-March, 
April, and August-September. As is evident, in 
general, about one-third of women (26 per cent 
in Rajasthan and 35 per cent in Karnataka) lost 
employment and did not get it back - this number is 
between 10 to 14 per cent for men. In addition only 
28-29 per cent of women in the sample were able 
to retain employment through the lockdown, while 
the proportion of men who could do so was much 
higher (43-50 per cent).
CMIE-CPHS data also reveal another important 
dimension of the crisis faced by women workers. 
Even though the proportion of those who followed 
the recovery trajectory only varied by 4 per cent 
points between men (28 per cent) and women (24 
per cent) (Figure 3.5), this hides the fact that, having 
lost employment during the lockdown, men were 
eight times more likely to return to work compared 
to women. 
One question that arises is, do these gendered 
differences remain if we account for the 
differences in the industry and the kind of work 
that men and women do?  Oxfam (2021) , for 
instance, in their report find that the occupation 
and industrial segregation exposed women, far 
more than men, to the economic impacts of the 
pandemic. Abraham, Basole and Kesar (2021) find 
that, even after controlling for various social and 
demographic attributes (including age, education, 
caste, religion, presence of children in household, 
and marital status) and labour market factors 
(such as experience, work arrangement, sector of 
work) women were seven times more likely to lose 
employment during the lockdown relative to men 
and, upon having lost employment, eleven times 
more likely to not return to work post lockdown. 
The authors also find employment arrangements  
and industry of work had similar impacts on the 
likelihood of employment loss and recovery for 
both men and women. Workers in younger age 
Figure 3.6 : 
Employment 
trajectories 





Sources and notes: India Working Survey, 2020
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groups and those working as daily wage workers 
were more susceptible to job loss, among both 
men and women. But, the relation of other, non-
employment specific attributes with employment 
loss and recovery differed between men and 
women. While married women were less likely to 
return to work, married men were more likely to 
return to work, indicating the gendered nature 
of work responsibilities (male breadwinner and 
female household care worker). Religion and gender 
intersected to exacerbate the disproportionate 
impact. Muslim women were more likely to not 
return to work upon having lost employment, while 
there was no such significant impact for Muslim 
men. While education shielded male workers from 
job loss, with higher educated men being less likely 
to lose jobs, higher educated women were more 
likely to lose jobs.
The phenomenon of women being hit harder 
during the pandemic is not unique to India, but 
it is particularly worrying for an economy where 
women’s participation in the workforce has been 
low and even falling over the last two and a 
half decades.8 When there is a shortage of work 
available, women generally are the first to face 
the consequences of this. For instance, a study of 
waste-pickers by WIEGO (2020b) found that even 
as lockdown restrictions eased, the volume of waste 
collected reduced and recyclers were reluctant to 
hire as many workers as before, and women , who 
are primarily engaged in sorting activities, were 
particularly affected. Increased patrolling, lack of 
mobility and increased household responsibilities 
further constrained women’s return to employment 
(Deshpande 2020; ISST 2020; WIEGO 2020b; 
2020a).
Box 3.4 : A look at the informal workforce - 
                 Findings from Azim Premji University CLIPS 
Azim Premji University CLIPS was conducted across 
12 states of India, interviewing workers mainly 
in the informal economy and from vulnerable 
households (see Figure 1.2 for the time period of 
the survey).  Of the 2,778 respondents interviewed 
in February 2020,  69 per cent lost work during 
the lockdown (in April or May 2020). After the 
lockdown, in the months of September, October 
and November, 19 per cent of these workers 
continued to be out of work (see figure below). 
This estimation is based on defining individuals as 
employed if they reported working for even a single 
day during the reference period of the past thirty 
days. If the definitional bar for employment is raised 
to 15 days of work in a month, the percentage of 
the February workforce that were unemployed post 
lockdown becomes 35 per cent.
Furthermore, an examination of the employment 
trajectories for this sample of workforce suggest 
that 26 per cent of the February workforce followed 
a no effect trajectory as they continued to remain 
employed both during and post the lockdown, 55 
per cent followed a recovery trajectory having lost 
jobs during the lockdown but recovered them after 
the lockdown, another 15 per cent followed a no 
recovery trajectory and 5 per cent followed a lagged 
job loss trajectory. The lower proportion of the no 
effect trajectory in these data can be attributed to 
the higher proportion of informal workers in the 
sample compared to CMIE-CPHS.
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A differential pattern of recovery between women 
and men is also observed in this survey. Out of 
every 100 female workers in February, 25 remained 
unaffected and 53 managed to recover their lost 
jobs. In effect, 78 were back or continued at work. 
Out of every 100 male workers, 28 were unaffected 
and 57 managed to recover employment, and so, 
85 were back at work. About 17 per cent of female 
workers were not able to return to work having 
lost employment, while the corresponding number 
for men was 11 per cent. It is possible that higher 
impact on women workers, observed in random 
sample surveys like CMIE-CPHS and IWS is because 
women tend to be over-represented in informal 
activities. On the other hand, CLIPS was mainly an 
informal worker survey, so both men and women 
are likely to be similarly impacted.
A logistic regression estimating determinants 
of recovery finds that female workers, urban 
workers, and older workers were significantly less 
likely to recover from a loss, after controlling for 
the industry of employment, education levels, 
household income and state where they worked. 
In particular, for women workers, being Muslim, 
married and from urban areas further exacerbated 
the likelihood of not recovering from employment 
loss (Nath, Mandela, and Gawali 2021). 
Nearly 







Sources and notes:Azim Premji University CLIPS. See Appendix section 3 for survey details.
3.3.2 / Lower caste workers were 
more vulnerable to job loss but 
also more likely to return to work
For this analysis, workers are broadly categorised 
into four caste groups - scheduled caste (SC), 
scheduled tribe (ST), other backward castes (OBC) 
and general category  (GC). General category 
workers were much less likely to be impacted as 
a result of the lockdown relative to the socially 
marginalised castes. While 69 per cent of GC 
workers followed a no effect trajectory, the 
corresponding figures for SCs were 49 per cent, 
55 per cent for OBCs and 63 per cent for STs. 
The relatively less drastic impact for STs (out of 
all non-GC groups) could be partly explained by 
higher dependence on agriculture, which was least 
impacted in terms of employment loss.
Interestingly, having lost jobs, lowers caste groups 
were more likely to recover relative to general 
category workers. While 17 per cent of GC workers 
followed a recovery trajectory, the corresponding 
percentage for SCs and OBCs was 27 and 30 per 
cent, respectively. The higher likelihood of job 
loss as well as recovery for these caste groups 
can potentially be explained by their involvement 
in relatively more informal and flexible work, 
characterised by ease of entry and exit.
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Across religious groups, Muslim workers tend to 
be relatively worse off, in terms of employment 
trajectories, although the difference is not 
substantial. Fifty-eight per cent of Hindu workers 
were unaffected during the lockdown, while 
the corresponding percentage for Muslims was 
54 per cent. Furthermore, Muslims were more 
likely to experience a delayed job loss, with 8 per 
cent Muslims experiencing a delayed job loss, 
relative to 5 per cent Hindus. There was, however, 
no significant difference between Hindus and 
Muslims in terms of the recovery and no-recovery 
trajectories.
It is likely that individual attributes intersect to 
exacerbate some of these effects. For instance, 
among women, being married or being Muslim 
further increased the likelihood of not recovering 
from job loss (Abraham, Basole, and Kesar 2021). 
Similarly, in Azim Premji University CLIPS women, 
in general, were less likely to return to work, but 
Muslim women were even less likely to do so  
(see Box 3.4).
3.3.3 / Young workers were more 
likely to lose employment. More 
educated workers were less 
affected
The extent of impact and subsequent recovery 
varied significantly by age groups. Older age groups 
were more likely to remain employed during and 
after the lockdown, that is, follow the ‘no effect’ 
trajectory compared to younger age groups. For 
example, six out of ten workers in the 35-44 age 
group followed the no effect trajectory, compared 
to only three out of ten workers in the 15-24 age 
group (Figure 3.7). This indicates that younger 
workers may be more likely to be in employment 
that is relatively less secure. Further, firms faced 
with a contraction in demand and an economic 
downturn fire young workers first as they are 
‘cheaper’ to lose, given their lower experience and 
lesser firm investment in their skills and knowledge 
(ILO 2020).    





to job loss 
with no 
recovery
Sources and notes: 
Authors' calculations 
based on CMIE-
CPHS. Data is for the 
December 2019-April 
2020-December 2020 
panel. See Appendix 
















3. Employment loss and recovery
Younger workers were more impacted not just 
in terms of higher job loss, but also in terms of 
returning to work.  Thirty three per cent of those 
in the 15-24 age group followed the no recovery 
trajectory, relative to 6 per cent in the 25-44 years 
group.  At the same time, only 23 per cent of those 
in the 15-24 age group are following a recovery 
trajectory compared to 29 per cent in the 35-44 
years age group.  Together, this indicates that job 
losses among the younger workers were more 
permanent in nature. By the end of the year, only 
54 per cent of the younger age group workers 
were back at work. In contrast, among the older 
workers, between 85 to 93 per cent were back in 
employment by December 2020. Young workers are 
constrained in terms of their job search abilities, 
access to networks and in skills which hinder their 
return to work (Verick 2009). 
As we saw in Chapter Two, unemployment rates 
among the youth, particularly, educated youth 
were already a matter of concern prior to the 
pandemic. In 2019, as per CMIE-CPHS, 44 per cent 
of 15-24- year old youth in the labour force were 
unemployed.9 The disproportionate impact of the 
economic shock on young workers implies that 
unemployment rates are going to rise even further. 
Indeed, in 2020, the unemployment rate among the 
15-24 year old labour force rose to 53 per cent, with 
a large share of this increase coming from those 
reporting as unemployed but not looking for work, 
indicating the rise in the number of discouraged 
workers in the labour force. The exit is particularly 
high among graduate youth, and unemployment 
rates for this group of workers rose from 65 per cent 
to 77 per cent in 2020. 
The large exodus of young workers is manifested 
in a change in the overall age structure of the 
workforce. In 2019, the young 15-24 year old workers 
comprised 10 per cent of the workforce. By the end 
of 2020, their share in the workforce had fallen to 
8 per cent.  For a young nation, the massive job 
losses coming on the back of an ongoing economic 
slowdown are likely to have scarring effects for  
the youth (Kahn 2010).
Education, expectedly, appears to be a crucial 
factor determining the extent of job loss. Those 
with higher levels of education, particularly 
graduates and above, were significantly less likely 
to lose employment as a result of the lockdown, as 
is evident in Figure 3.8 where the share of workers 
unaffected in terms of job loss increases as the 
education level increases. Among graduates, 70 
per cent of workers followed the no 
effect trajectory. The corresponding 
share for those with education 
below the 5th Standard was 53 per 
cent.  While job loss is high among 
the less educated, it is also the case 
that these workers also experienced 
higher rates of recovery.  Thirty 
three per cent of the least educated 
workers returned to work, having lost employment, 
compared to only 16 per cent of graduates. In 
fact, having lost employment, the least educated 
workers were three times more likely to return to 
work, than not. For graduates, on the other hand, 
the likelihood of returning to work was only twice 
that of not returning. Less-educated workers 
are more likely to be employed in sectors and 
arrangements that are more flexible. The increased 
precarity of this kind of work also implies more ease 
of entry, enabling a quicker return to employment. 
More educated workers, in relatively more secure 
employment, may not be as susceptible to job  
loss, but find it harder to return to work, if they  
lose employment.
Younger workers were more impacted with 
higher job loss, but also weak recovery. Thirty 
three per cent of those in the 15-24 age group 
followed the ‘no recovery’ trajectory, relative 
to 6 per cent in the 25-44 years group.
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Sources and notes: 
Authors' calculations 
based on CMIE-
CPHS. Data is for the 
December 2019-April 
2020-December 2020 
panel. See Appendix 
section 2 for details.





to lose work 
as well as 
return
3.3.4 / Workers from poorer 
households were more likely to 
lose work and more likely  
to recover
A dimension of vulnerability to employment loss 
that is related to, but distinct from caste and 
education, is household income. CMIE- CPHS 
collects information on households’ income from 
various sources, including wages, rent, business 
income and transfers. Workers can be classified 
into groups based on  their household income, 
pre-lockdown, that is, in December 2019. The first 
quintile comprises the poorest households, i.e. 
the bottom 20 per cent, and the fifth quintile, the 
richest (top 20 per cent). 
There is a strong negative correlation between the 
income quintile of a worker and the likelihood of 
their employment being impacted by the lockdown. 
Workers in the top quintile were least affected in 
terms of employment loss. 75 per cent of workers 
in the top quintile followed a no effect trajectory, 
and this share steadily declines as we move to 
lower quintiles from  64 per cent for those in the 
4th quintile to 44 per cent in the lowest quintile 
(Figure 3.9).  This can partly be attributed to the 
fact that the high paying jobs are usually also the 
most secure. This indicates that different forms 
of precarity - both in terms of job security as well 
as income levels - often exist together, making a 
certain section of the population more vulnerable 
to losses on multiple fronts.
Similar to what we see in the case of caste 
and education, where disadvantaged workers 
(marginalised communities or less educated) were 
more likely to return to work compared to their 
more privileged (higher educated, general category 
caste) counterparts, here too, we see a similar 
relation. Workers in the lower quintiles were more 
likely to return to employment having lost work 

















Below 5th Standard 6th-10th Standard
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Thirty-eight per cent of workers from the lowest 
quintiles returned to work compared to only 12 
per cent in the highest quintile.  The nature of 
employment for low-income workers is likely to be 
characterised by easier exit and entry. The relatively 
higher impact on low-income workers but their 
higher return to employment has meant that, in 
effect, the share of workers out of employment 
at the end of the year (that is, the no recovery 
trajectory and the delayed job loss trajectory), 
across income quintiles, is more or less similar. 
About 17 per cent of workers in the lower quintiles 
and a similar share of 15 per cent from the higher 
quintiles were out of work in December 2020.10
Sources and notes: Authors' 
calculations based on 
CMIE-CPHS. Data is for 
the December 2019-April 
2020-December 2020 panel. 
See Appendix section 2 for 
details.
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3.4 / MSMEs distress 
and employment 
At the end of our analysis of the employment 
effects of the pandemic, we return to the 
nationwide lockdown and its impact on the Micro, 
Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSME) sector. 
As we have seen in Chapter Two, the overall 
scale of production in the India economy remains 
small, with nearly 80 per cent workers employed 
in enterprises with less than 10 employees. Even 
if agriculture is removed from consideration, 
the MSME sector accounts for nearly 110 million 
workers, a substantial fraction of India’s  
non-farm workforce. The bulk of this employment 
(75 per cent) is generated at the micro end of the 
spectrum, in firms that employ up to three workers 
(Basole and Chandy 2019). Low cash reserves and 
resulting dependence on day-to-day transactions, 
as well as dominance in trade and other services, 
make these firms very vulnerable 
to containment measures as well 
as supply-chain disruptions. In turn, 
firm closures in this segment have 
immediate welfare implications 
because the workforce is either self-
employed or in precarious forms of  
wage work without access to social 
protection through employers. 
The largest lockdown survey of MSMEs was 
conducted by the All India Manufacturers’ 
Organisation (AIMO) in association with nine 
other industry associations (24–30 May 2020). 
In a sample of over 42,000 self-employed and 
micro-entrepreneurs, it found that a third were 
on the verge of closing down and more than 70 
per cent reported having fired workers (see Unni 
(2020) and references therein).11 Rathore and 
Khanna (2021), in their SWI 2021 Background paper, 
present results from a detailed survey of 400 firms 
conducted in May-June 2020 across 20 States and 
Union Territories.  In addition they report findings 
from qualitative interviews with entrepreneurs, 
representatives of business associations and 
administrators. The study finds that by the end of 
May 2020 capacity utilisation fell from about 75 
per cent before the crisis to 11 per cent. Loss of 
sales amounted to about 17 per cent of past year’s 
revenues on average but the impact was more 
severe on smaller firms. Microenterprises lost 20 per 
cent of annual sales, medium and large enterprises 
lost about 11 per cent. There was a massive 55 
per cent decline in the pre-Covid workforce and 
here again, the smaller firms were worse off. 
Microenterprises could retain only 37 per cent of 
their workforce, while for large enterprises this 
number was 57 per cent (see Figure 3 in the paper). 
Using regression analysis the authors show that 
higher distress levels for microenterprises relative to 
larger firms persist even after controlling for  
firm and owner characteristics as well as  
geographic location. 
Job losses in the MSME sector manifested as an 
‘infantilization’ or shrinking of already small firms. 
For example, in a four-wave panel survey of 1,461 
microenterprises, conducted between May 2020 
and January  2021 by the Global Alliance for Mass 
Entrepreneurship (GAME) and LEAD at Krea 
University, Buteau (2021) finds that over the course 
of the year, the share of ‘solopreneurs’ (one person 
firms) in the sample increased from 24 per cent to 
30 per cent, while share of larger firms (more than 
5 workers) shrank from 26 per cent to 20 per cent 
(see Figure 1 in the paper).12 Immediate impact 
on women-owned microenterprises in particular, 
is also studied in another survey conducted by 
Firm closures in the MSME segment have 
immediate welfare implications because 
the workforce is either self-employed or in 
precarious forms of wage work without access 
to social protection through employers.
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researchers at LEAD at in collaboration with 
IWWAGE. This survey covers 2000 women-led 
non-farm microenterprises across four states 
(Bihar, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh) 
interviewed in the months of June-July 2020. It finds 
an average drop of 72.5 per cent in incomes during 
the lockdown, consistent in magnitude with many 
other lockdown surveys. Further 1 in 3 firms were 
temporarily or permanently closed. Just over 10 
per cent were permanently closed. However, the 
survey also found that 62 per cent of entrepreneurs 
of temporarily closed businesses and 64 per cent 
of operational ones were confident of recovery. 
However, knowledge of policy support measures 
and inclination to avail of such support were weak. 
In this context, we point readers to an online 
dashboard on Covid-19 impact on microenterprises 
hosted by GAME.13
CPC analytics in an online survey of business 
owners and employees in the state of Maharashtra 
found that of all sectors, manufacturing firms 
were the worst hit by the lockdown.14 Around 60 
per cent of manufacturing firms with less than 50 
employees could retain labour without additional 
income for one month. While the concerns of the 
smaller manufacturing firms mainly revolved around 
immediate cash and credit needs, those of the 
larger firms revolved around a fall in demand and 
disrupted supply-chains. 
FICCI-IAN surveyed 250 start-ups and 27 investors 
during the lockdown month of April 2020 and found 
that 12 per cent of start-ups could not operate 
during lockdown, while an additional 60 per cent 
reported disrupted operations.15 Manufacturing 
firms were the hardest hit by the lockdown, with 
46 per cent reporting a complete shut down in 
their operations. Further, nearly one-fifth had only 
one month’s worth of cash reserves in order to 
cover the fixed costs and only 14 percent reported 
not having to undertake cost-reduction measures 
during the pandemic. Another 29 percent of 
respondents reported that they would have to 
lay-off employees if the lockdown continued till 
May 2020 (which it did). Moreover, 65 percent of 
pre-lockdown pitches had been either put on hold 
or the investors had not got back to the startups. 
Furthermore, 10 percent of deals were canceled and 
only 8 percent signed the agreement and received 
the funds. 
NCAER-DCVTS in the 3rd round  of the survey 
found that 63 per cent of businesses either 
totally closed or suspended operations during the 
lockdown months of April-May, 2020.16 Moreover, 
only 22 per cent could retain all their workers while 
39 per cent could not pay any salaries. Post the 
lockdown by June, about 38 per cent of the closed 
businesses had reopened. The recovery, however, 
was partial, with 70 per cent reporting large income 
losses and 43 per cent reported indebtedness.
Even though the bulk of the workforce in the 
microenterprise sector is informal and lacks formal 
access to social protection, it is worth noting some 
anecdotal evidence on how micro-employers tried 
to retain workers during this time of stress or how 
they negotiated the situation when they could not 
do so (see Box 3.5).
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Box 3.5 :  Informal safety nets in the MSME sector 
Buteau (2021) recounts the following stories from 
their survey of 1,431 firms.
Case 1: 
Vengadesh is a small business owner who employs 
close to seven people in his welding workshop in 
the small town of Tirunelveli in Tamil Nadu. All 
of them have worked with him for over a decade 
and four of these are migrants. On being asked 
how COVID has impacted his business, he said, 
“Despite this situation, I did not consider laying 
off my workers. Instead, I had a conversation with 
my workers about their preferences. Based on 
that discussion, I continue to pay two of my staff 
members who were willing to come in for work and 
retained the others without salary.”
Case 2: 
Satish owns a small paint workshop in Trichy, Tamil 
Nadu. Despite the downturn in business caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, he still continues to pay 
his four employees on a weekly basis. He goes on to 
state that “My staff has been working with me for 
close to four years. How could I suddenly abandon 
them in tough times? I dipped into my savings to 
pay their dues and asked them to come to work 
once the business resumes operations.”
Case 3: 
Nashim runs an electrical repair shop in New 
Delhi. He had employed four staff and had to lay 
off everyone. Was it difficult? “For two years we 
have been eating together - just like friends. With 
the lockdown, my business was out of any work 
and had zero cash inflow. How would I pay them a 
total of I20,000 for their work? It was impossible. 
All of them understood my situation and migrated 
back to Bihar.” If the demand goes up, we enquired, 
won’t he face a workforce shortage? “My workers 
went with a plan to come back post Diwali for 
work, hoping business restarts by then. But I can 
not say anything for certain”.
3.5 / Conclusion
The immediate impact of the nationwide lockdown 
in April and May 2020 was, as expected, devastating 
for the labour market and for informal workers in 
particular. More disturbingly, the recovery from the 
lockdown shock while being quick, was incomplete. 
As late as December 2020, a substantial proportion 
of the pre-pandemic workforce was out of work. 
Since then, the resurgence of infections and the 
return of containment measures may have only 
worsened the situation, though data are not 
available at time of writing. The impact on the 
labour market, however, went far beyond just a 
loss of employment. In the next chapter we show 
that there was increased informalisation during 
this period accompanied by a significant loss of 
earnings, for both, those who lost their jobs and 
those who retained employment.
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Chapter Appendix : On the question of measuring women’s paid work 
According to the CMIE-CPHS, the female 
workforce participation rate in 2017-18 was 10.5 per 
cent. For the same period, the PLFS estimate was 
22 per cent. For men, in contrast, the estimates 
were similar, 71 per cent in PLFS, and 69 per cent 
as per the CMIE-CPHS.  The differences are 
similar in other years. Therefore, the  CMIE-CPHS 
consistently estimates the female WPR at 50 per 
cent of PLFS. Given the differences in the levels of 
WPR for women, cross-survey comparisons, at least 
in level terms, are not possible. But it is still useful 
to analyse the changes in the levels within each of 
these surveys to understand the extent and nature 
of the impact of the economic shock on women. 
Assuming representative samples and appropriate 
weighting, the differences could be explained by 
variations in enumerator training, extent of probing, 
identity of the respondent, and type of questions 
asked. Several studies have investigated the issue 
of measuring women’s paid work either through a 
critical examination of existing secondary data, or 
highlighting  the need for sensitising enumerators, 
changing the kind of questions asked, or who they 
are asked to (Deshmukh et al. 2019; Deshpande 
and Kabeer 2019; Mondal et al. 2018; Sudarshan 
2014). The type of work that women do may also 
be inherently more difficult to capture, for example 
by being part-time, irregular, interspersed with 
household work, or unpaid (in family enterprises). 
The table compares the distribution of individuals in 
the working-age population in  CMIE-CPHS (2017) 
against the PLFS (2017-18) by nature of activity.  For 
men, the two distributions are similar. According 
to PLFS, about 37 per cent of the working-age 
population of men are in self-employment, 
compared to 33 per cent in CMIE-CPHS, a 
difference of about 4 percentage points. The share 















































Sources and notes: CMIE-CPHS, PLFS 2017-18. CMIE-CPHS data corresponds with the PLFS survey 
period of July 2017 to June 2018. Refer to Abraham and Shrivastava (2019) for details. Salaried workers in 
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However, for women, we see large divergences in 
the distribution. According to PLFS, self-employed 
workers (comprising unpaid workers, employers 
and own-account workers) account for nearly 10 
per cent of working-age women. The CMIE-CPHS 
puts the number at 3 per cent. CMIE-CPHS does 
not distinguish between unpaid workers, own 
account workers and employers within the category 
of self-employed. But it is possible that failure to 
capture unpaid work in family enterprises (which 
is the predominant activity for self-employed 
women, as per PLFS) explains at least part of the 
underestimation. However this cannot explain the 
entire difference because the proportion of  
women in salaried work are also lower in the  
CMIE-CPHS data. 
What are the implications of all this when we 
try to measure the impact of the pandemic on 
women workers? To the extent that women who 
are more affected by the economic shock are also 
those that the CMIE-CPHS does not capture as 
being employed, it is possible that our numbers of 
job loss among women may be under-estimates. 
The reverse may also apply, that is, if women that 
CMIE-CPHS does not capture are those who are 
least affected by job loss, then job loss numbers 
may be over-estimates.  If recovery of work  among 
women occurs into those activities that  CMIE-
CPHS does not capture, then recovery will be 
underestimated. Despite these caveats, however,  
we believe that estimating the impact of the shock 
on women workers identified in the data, and their 
employment trajectories remains a useful exercise. 
One recent survey that tries to capture women’s 
paid work more accurately is the India Working 
Survey (IWS) conducted by researchers at Azim 
Premji University, Indian Institute of Management, 
Bangalore, and the University of Western Australia 
with support from the Initiative for What Works 






Sources and notes: CMIE-CPHS (wave 1 of 2019), PLFS (2018-19, first quarter), India Working Survey, 
round 1. We construct comparable definitions of employment for all three surveys. See Appendix  
Section 2. Data pertains to individuals aged 15 years and above.
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This is a random survey carried out in Karnataka 
and Rajasthan. IWS uses a number of approaches to 
address standard oversights in measuring women’s 
paid work. Female respondents are interviewed by 
female enumerators. Men and women are asked 
detailed questions about their activity status in 
the week preceding the interview. These questions 
specifically ask whether an individual  is engaged 
in each type of employment (own account work, 
unpaid work, salaried work, daily wage  work) rather 
than leaving it to the person to list their activities. 
It also allows individuals to list multiple activities 
that they engage in, for example, domestic chores 
alongside unpaid work in the family enterprise, 
or wage work. 
For instance, the respondent is asked whether 
in the last week, they did “any kind of business, 
farming or other self-employed activity to generate 
income, even if only for one hour?”.  Irrespective 
of their answer to this question, they are then  
asked, if in the last week, they “assisted without 
pay in a business/farm/livestock of a household 
or family member even if only for one hour”? In a 
similar vein, the respondent is asked whether they 
engaged in salaried work or casual wage work in 
the last week. The intention of this detailed step 
by step questioning of the kinds of work individuals 
engaged in over a week is to make sure that all 
kinds of employment activities are captured. 
Although the three surveys (PLFS, CMIE-CPHS and 
IWS) do not use the same questions to arrive at 
employment status, we have tried to approximate 
the employment definitions across surveys  as 
closely as possible. See Appendix Section 4 for 
more details. Here we show estimates of the WPR 
based on a definition that considers an individual 
employed if they reported working for eight hours 
a day on average in market activities, i.e. a strict 
definition of being employed.
The estimates for the male WPR vary by 10-20 
percentage points across the three surveys with 
PLFS reporting a rate 5-6 percentage points over 
CMIE-CPHS and IWS being 13-14 percentage 
points higher than PLFS. These differences are 
worth investigating further. However, much larger 
differences emerge when comparing female WPR 
across the three surveys. For Karnataka, the PLFS 
estimate is 20 percentage points larger than the 
CMIE-CPHS and the IWS estimate is 30 percentage 
points over PLFS. For Rajasthan the divergence 
between PLFS and IWS is less striking (7 percentage 
points) but that between CMIE-CPHS and PLFS 
is even larger than for Karnataka (25 percentage 
points). Thus the CMIE-CPHS and PLFS divergence 
that we saw at the national level manifests even 
more sharply within states. 
The female WPR for Karnataka as reported in IWS 
is 57 per cent, a far cry from the numbers we are 
used to seeing for women’s participation in paid 
employment in India. The detailed questioning 
alongside self-reporting of statuses (rather than 
a proxy) may explain the higher levels of WPR for 
women and men compared to other surveys. 
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Endnotes
1 See Appendix Section 2 for details of this sample.
2 Google Mobility Data reports changes in 
movement over time across six different categories 
of places - retail and recreation, groceries and 
pharmacies, parks, transit stations, workplaces, 
and residential. Changes for each day are reported 
vis à vis the corresponding day in the baseline 
week,  where the baseline is the median value for 
the weeks from January 3rd 2020 to February 6th 
2020. The Mobility Index  is calculated as a simple 
average of the daily reported numbers for retail and 
recreation, groceries and pharmacies, parks, transit 
stations and workplaces for every day for every 
state for each month.
3 As compared to the corresponding non-pandemic 
period or what we refer to as the baseline period 
(i.e., between Sept-Dec, 2018 and Sept-Dec 2019) 
this movement in and out of the workforce is 
relatively higher. See Appendix Table 1 for baseline 
estimates.
4 See Chapter One and Appendix Section 4 for 
details of this survey and the sample.
5 An individual is identified as employed, if in the 
reference week of the survey, they worked for at 
least 20 hours in the week collectively across all 
kinds of activities.
6 The corresponding numbers in CMIE-CPHS, 
quoted earlier, were 46 per cent for women and 7.6 
per cent for men. However, the two surveys are not 
comparable due to differences in sample size and 
questions asked.
7 See Appendix Section 2 for details on the creation 
of this panel.
8 As mentioned earlier, CMIE-CPHS estimates 
of women’s WPR is lower compared to PLFS 
estimates. Given this, it is possible that certain 
kinds of work, particularly ones that women engage 
in and are included in PLFS estimates, are not 
captured by CMIE-CPHS estimates. If employment 
loss particularly impacts this category of work, it is 
likely, then that CMIE-CPHS underestimates the 
extent of employment loss among women.  
On the other hand, if recovery from loss is into this 
kind of work, then, it is likely that  CMIE-CPHS 
will not capture these women workers who have 
experienced an employment recovery, thereby 
overestimating the employment loss  
among women.
9 CMIE-CPHS categorises an individual into 
‘Unemployed, willing and looking for a job” 
and ‘Unemployed, willing but not looking for a 
job”. The unemployment rate including both of 
these categories is referred to as the ‘greater 
unemployment rate’. The unemployment rates here 
include both categories unless otherwise specified.
10 We construct the same trajectories of 
employment for the same period in the previous 
year. Appendix Table 2 shows the distribution of 
trajectories by each of the above dimensions- 
gender, age, caste, religion and region. The extent 
of job loss and no recovery for the same period in 
the last year is well below that seen now.
11 “Nearly 35% MSMEs close to winding up: 




12 This is a stratified, convenience sample 
representing industries in manufacturing, services 
and trade.  Bulk of the microenterprises in the 
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Loss of employment, described in the previous 
chapter, is only one of three distinct impacts that 
the pandemic has had on workers. In addition, 
those who returned to work have often had 
to make do with more precarious employment 
arrangements (increase in informality). And, for 
many of those who remained employed or returned 
to work, earnings have fallen. In this chapter we 
investigate these two dimensions of impact. Once 
again, we rely primarily on CMIE-CPHS data 
supported by IWS, Azim Premji University CLIPS, 
and other smaller surveys.
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting what 
the pandemic has done at the macroeconomic 
level to the labour share of income in the economy. 
Data on labour earnings are available from CMIE-
CPHS for the second quarter of 2020-2021 (July-
August-September). We find that aggregate GDP 
in nominal terms fell from 49.2 lakh crores in Q2 of 
2019-20 to 47.2 lakh crores in Q2 of 2020-21. Since 
the workforce also fell between these two periods, 
GDP per worker remained more or less unchanged 
(I41,126 versus I41,115 per month). Average monthly 
nominal earnings however fell sharply from I13,385 
to I11,085. As a result the labour share of GDP 
(i.e. average monthly earnings divided by GDP per 
worker) fell by over 5 percentage points from 32.5 
per cent in Q2 of 2019-20 to 27 per cent in Q2 of 
2020-21. This is a very large and rapid, if temporary, 
change. To keep this in perspective, note that 
the previous steepest drop was by 6 percentage 
points (38 per cent to 32 per cent) over eight years 
between 2000 and 2008) (ILO 2018).1
Informalisation and 
earnings losses
4.1 / Decomposing 
aggregate income loss
Earnings data are available from CMIE-CPHS till the 
month of October 2020. For the rest of the analysis 
presented in this chapter, we have taken average 
earnings over a two month period for September 
and October.2 The reason for excluding the earlier 
months (April-August) is that we wish to focus on 
the medium term impact rather than the immediate 
impact of the lockdown. Further, selecting the 
September-October period also allows us to align 
the analysis with Wave 3 of the CMIE-CPHS 
employment data that we use for the employment 
numbers. 
We start by asking how much of the aggregate loss 
of earnings between 2019 and 2020 is accounted 
for by loss of employment and how much by 
a reduction in incomes for the employed. The 
overall WPR changed from 40 per cent prior to 
the pandemic (September-October 2019) to 39 per 
cent as of most recent data available (September-
October 2020). The average earnings of workers 
fell from I15,500 to  I12,500 in the same period.3 
Since WPR had almost completely returned to pre-
pandemic levels while earnings per worker remained 
suppressed, not surprisingly, a decomposition 
analysis reveals that 90 per cent of the decline in 
aggregate incomes between was due to reduction 
in earnings of workers who were employed and only 
10 per cent due to the loss of employment.4 That 
is, even as most workers were back in employment 
over the course of twelve months, for many this 
was accompanied by a reduction in earnings. 
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But the story is very different across 
different types of workers. CMIE-
CPHS broadly categorises workers 
into permanent salaried, temporary 
salaried, self-employed and daily 
wage workers. As we saw in Chapter 
Two, these categories correspond well to the PLFS-
NSSO categories of formal regular salaried, informal 
regular salaried, self-employed and casual wage. 
For daily wage workers the experience has been 
similar to the overall picture - a broad recovery of 
employment but a large fall in average earnings 
with the latter accounting for about 85 per cent 
of the loss in earnings for this category of workers 
(Figure 4.1). 
For the self-employed, the employment loss term 
in the decomposition is positive indicating that the 
share of such workers increased post-pandemic 
(which we confirm in subsequent analysis). 
However, earnings declined substantially for such 
workers. For the temporary salaried, decline in 
average earnings and the loss of jobs contributed 
more or less equally to the overall decline in 
incomes, indicating that these types of workers are 
vulnerable on both fronts. Finally, for permanent 
salaried workers, the majority of earnings loss was 
due to loss of jobs. Decline in wages accounted 
for only 18 percent of the aggregate earnings loss 
among this group. This suggests that rather than 
decreasing wage rates, employers may choose to 
fire certain employees (such as younger workers). 
Further, having lost a job, permanent salaried 
workers have a lower chance of returning to 
employment unlike other kinds of workers. This 
resonates with the findings from Chapter Three 
where temporary salaried and self-employed 
workers who lost work were more likely to return 
to employment, unlike their permanent salaried 
counterparts. 
Having addressed the issue of employment loss in 
Chapter Three, we now investigate the fall in labour 
earnings for workers who are employed. These 
losses can occur because of falling wages rates 
and self-employment incomes or because workers 
are transitioning into less productive sectors and 
occupations or both. We look at each in turn. 
Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data are for the months of September 
and October of 2019 and 2020. Earnings includes individual's income from wages and salaries, and 
income from business for the self-employed. See Appendix Section 2 for details. 
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4.2 / Increased 
informality during 
the pandemic 
Did workers who lost work during the lockdown 
months return to the workforce under more 
precarious circumstances, for example, accepting 
casual wage work instead of salaried employment, 
or falling back on self-employment due to a 
lack of salaried jobs? Did they also crowd into 
fallback sectors such as agriculture or petty retail 
which usually absorb surplus labour that is not 
employed elsewhere? In this section we address 
whether informalisation in terms of employment 
arrangements has taken place in the labour market. 
Section 4.4 addresses the informalisation by sector 
of employment.
One indication, at the aggregate level, that such 
transitions did occur is provided by the change 
in the overall composition of the workforce. 
Compared to the pre-pandemic period there was 
a reduction in the proportion employed in salaried 
employment, with a corresponding rise in self-
employment of about 3 percentage points (from 
50 to 53 per cent). However, simply studying the 
overall structure conceals the nature of underlying 
transitions, making it important to study individual 
level transitions during the pandemic (Kesar 2020). 
This is possible with panel data from the CMIE-
CPHS.
To do this, we map the transitions in the 
employment arrangements for those workers who 
were employed in both periods, i.e.  September 
to December 2019 and September to December 
2020 (wave three of CMIE-CPHS, see Figure 
1.1). Additionally, we also follow new entrants 
into the workforce, that is, those who were not 
employed prior to the pandemic, to see which type 
of employment they entered. By comparing the 
same months in different years, we account for 
any seasonal variations. Further, we compare these 
transitions over the same months in the previous 
two years (employment in 2019 against employment 
in 2018) to understand to what extent patterns 
observed during the pandemic year differ from 
previous years.5 
4.2.1 / Transitions in employment 
arrangements
The transitions are presented as matrices or 
tables, where each row represents the pre-
pandemic employment arrangement and each 
column represents the post lockdown employment 
arrangement as well (Table 4.1). The cells can 
therefore be interpreted as follows: for every 100 
workers who were in a particular employment 
arrangement prior to the pandemic, how many 
ended up in another kind of employment 
arrangement, and how many remained in the same 
kind. The diagonal represents the percentage of 
workers who continued in the same employment 
arrangement, while the off-diagonal elements 
indicate the proportion that transitioned to 
another employment arrangement. Since some 
transitions are expected even during normal times, 
we compare these numbers to the transitions in a 
baseline period, that is, from September-December 
2018 to September-December 2019. 
First, we look at the diagonal shares in the 
transition matrix, that is the share of workers in 
each employment arrangement who remain in that 
arrangement between two time periods. Note that, 
even in normal times, a significant share of workers 
transition across arrangements, indicating a general 
volatility in the labour market. However, here we 
wish to emphasise that across all arrangements, 
compared to baseline we see fewer workers able 
to remain in the same kind of employment during 
the pandemic (Table 4.1).  Self-employed work 
saw the most ‘stickiness’ with nearly 75 per cent of 
self-employed workers remaining self-employed in 
both periods. But this was still below what is seen 
during baseline (82 per cent). During normal times, 
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temporary salaried workers see among the highest 
levels of transition into other arrangements. During 
the Covid period, this was further exacerbated. 
Only 36 per cent of temporary salaried workers in 
2019 remained in that employment arrangement 
into 2020 (compared to 54 per cent during baseline). 
31 per cent of temporary salaried workers moved 
into self-employment, and 23 per cent became 
casual wage workers. To gain some more insights 
into the working life of a temporary salaried worker, 
we provide a first person account in Box 4.1 of  
a worker in an automobile factory interviewed  
by Yadav (2021).
Notably, in the most secure of employment 
arrangements, permanent salaried, which typically 
does not have much flux (77 per cent remain in the 
same status during baseline), nearly half moved 
to other kinds of employment between 2019 and 
2020. The massive exit of workers from permanent 
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Box 4.1 : Hearing from a ‘temporary salaried’ worker
The CMIE-CPHS divides salaried employment into 
permanent salaried and temporary salaried. Pre-
Covid, the temporary salaried accounted for 10 
per cent of the workforce with the predominant 
occupations being support staff, industrial workers 
and non-industrial technical employees. The 
experience of these temporary workers, both 
during the lockdown and afterwards indicates 
that this kind of work is particularly insecure since 
not only did a large share lose work during the 
lockdown, they were also unable to return to work 
in the months after, unlike daily wage workers, 
and self-employed who lost work but were able 
to return. In her background paper, Yadav (2021) 
shares her interview with a temporary worker in a 
multinational automobile factory throwing valuable 
insight on the nature of this employment and the 
challenges these workers face. 
I am 25 years old. I work as a contract worker in 
Haryana. The factory where I work – one of India’s 
largest automobile factories – terms contract 
workers like me as a ‘Temporary Worker -TW 1, TW 
2’ and so on till TW 3, based on how many times 
it has employed us earlier in the previous two to 
three years.
 
Earlier, I had worked as ‘Temporary Worker TW 
1’ in the same factory four years back, in 2016. 
Then, after a seven month term, the company 
removed me, and the whole batch of recruits who 
had joined along with me, saying it may recruit 
us again later as ‘Temporary Worker 2’, after a 
gap of a few months. The company refers to us as 
‘Temporary workers’, but we do all the assembly 
and main work. At one time, it hires for a seven 
month contract, then it lays us off for a gap, and it 
may call us again a second or third time with gaps 
in the middle.
This factory (belonging to a multinational 
corporation) in this industrial township, pays 
I21,000 a month. This is nearly twice what other 
firms pay in the area, though it is less than one-
third of permanent workers’ pay. But the tenure 
is so short. When one applies for jobs in this area 
after this seven month TW stint, the new employer 
will usually pay around  I8,000-10,000. Then, this 
drastic drop in wage feels odd, uncomfortable. 
Also, one wonders, what is the point if one earns  
one lakh in seven months and spends it in the next 
4-5 months without a job? It would be better to 
keep looking for a job where at least one can find 
employment for a year, rather than remain stuck in 
this seven month system.
This is because in our monthly pay of I10,300, a 
component of I2,000 is given only if we stayed 
present and worked the whole month, it is shown 
as an ‘extra’. If we take two days’ leave in a month, 
we lose I3,000, which is about a third of the 
monthly pay. So, there is no scope to fall ill, or if 
anyone in your family falls ill. When my husband 
was in the hospital, I was away from work almost 
12-13 days, and that month, I earned only I2,000 or 
so. After the lockdown, the contract has stopped 
even providing a pay-slip, citing the pandemic.
In-depth interviews such as the one above reveal 
that temporary salaried workers often have to 
negotiate the responsibilities and workload of a 
permanent salaried worker, while at the same time 
having an insecure job with unpredictable earnings. 
See Nayanjyoti and Amit (2018) for more on this 
system. During the pandemic, these vulnerabilities 
increased.
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Flows of workers between employment 
arrangements can be depicted using ‘alluvial graphs’ 
shown in Figure 4.2. As can be seen, during the 
Covid period, self-employment saw a large influx 
of workers from other employment arrangements. 
For instance, about 34 per cent of permanent 
salaried workers were now in self-employment.  
This is twice what is normally seen in the baseline. 
A similar share, about 30 per cent, of temporary 
salaried and daily wage workers moved into self-
employment into 2020. Again, during the same 
time in our baseline period (2018 to 2019), only 
about 20 per cent of such workers had moved to 
self-employment. Clearly, self-
employment emerged as fallback 
employment in the face of massive 
job losses during and after the 
lockdown. 
Thus, it is evident that employment recovery is 
characterised to a significant extent by increased 
levels of informality. This indicates a paucity 
of labour demand since both self-employment 
and casual labour markets typically expand to 
accommodate an excess supply of labour, via 
income and work-sharing norms  (Ghose 2016). 
Other analyses also confirm an unabated transition 
to informal work post-lockdown (Kumar and Kumar 
2021; World Bank 2020).
Nearly half the permanent salaried workers 
who usually have the most secure jobs moved to 










Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data are for the months of September-
December (wave 3) of 2018, 2019 and 2020. See Appendix Section 2 for details. Numbers in brackets 
indicate the percentage share of that employment arrangement in total workforce in that year. The 2018-
2019 panel is different from the 2019-2020 panel. Hence overall distribution of the workforce in 2019 will 
be slightly different between the two panels.
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Finally, there also seems to be a clear ordering in 
terms of who moves into what. Among permanent 
salaried workers, the predominant transition is into 
self-employment, whereas, for temporary salaried 
workers, the larger share moves into daily wage 
work. Given that daily wage work is the least paid 
occupation, this suggests that even in transitions, 
initial hierarchies matter in determining the kind of 
transition. 
Notably, the degree of stability and transition 
also varies by region, that is, rural and urban (data 
not shown). While the percentage of those who 
continued in self-employment was 80 per cent in 
rural areas, the percentage was 65 per cent in urban 
areas. These percentages in the non-pandemic 
baseline period were 83 and 72 per cent. In other 
words, not only is urban self-employment relatively 
more unstable, this instability (and the difference 
between rural and urban areas) increased during 
the pandemic period - from a difference of 8 
percentage points between rural and urban areas 
in the non-pandemic period to 15 percentage point.  
It is likely that agriculture absorbed much of the 
transitioning workforce, and the absence of such 
a fallback sector is reflected in the higher volatility 
in urban areas. We examine this more closely when 
looking at sectoral transitions. 
Salaried work, unlike self-employment, saw more 
flux  in rural areas than in urban areas.  While 
salaried work was equally stable in rural and urban 
areas in the baseline period, during the pandemic 
period,  only 41 per cent of rural permanent salaried 
(compared to 51 per cent of urban permanent 
salaried) were able to retain their employment 
arrangement. Furthermore, the proportion 
transitioning into casual wage employment from 
salaried employment is also higher in rural areas 
than in urban areas.
Further, as we saw in Chapter Three the flux is not 
just limited to within the workforce. Instead, there 
was considerable entry and exit of workers from the 
workforce. In terms of exit, temporary salaried work 
saw the highest share of workers exiting with 21 
per cent exiting the workforce. Thirteen per cent of 
permanent salaried workers and about 16 per cent 
of daily wage workers exited. Self-employment saw 
the least share of workers exiting (11 per cent). For 
all employment types, the share exiting during this 
period was higher than in the baseline.
In sum, on one hand, several of those who were 
employed prior to the lockdown have moved to 
more precarious forms of employment and towards 
sink sectors. There was also an exodus of workers,  
particularly from salaried wage work.  On the other 
hand, many individuals who were not employed 
in the period prior to the lockdown entered 
into the workforce - suggesting a replacement 
of the worker who was earlier employed. This 
indicates a high degree of churning both across 
employment arrangements and towards and out of 
the workforce. In the next section, we see to what 
extent these transitions varied by gender, caste and 
religious identity of the worker. 
4.2.2 / Social identities and 
employment transitions
We now compare the nature of transitions before 
and after the lockdown between the last four 
months of 2019 and the same months in 2020 
along the lines of gender, caste, and religion. Here, 
instead of looking at transition only within the 
workforce (across types of employment) we widen 
the analysis to include ‘out of workforce’ as a 
transition category. This is because women tended 
to exit altogether rather than move between 
employment types.
Gender
First, we compare the share of workers in each 
employment arrangement who exit the workforce.  
Irrespective of their employment arrangement, 
a startlingly high share of women, nearly half,  
withdrew from work over this one year, compared 
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to only 11 per cent of men. This is seen clearly in 
the ‘alluvial graphs’ shown in Figure 4.3 (men and 
women). Notice the difference between the ‘out of 
workforce’ category. Women from all employment 
categories exited the workforce in far higher 
proportions than men.
Worryingly, in proportionate terms, the exit was 
highest in the case of salaried women workers (56 
per cent). For men, the level of exit was much lower 
with the highest exit being seen among temporary 
salaried workers (16 per cent). In other employment 
arrangements too, women exited in larger shares 
compared to men. Forty four per cent of self-
employed women had left the workforce, compared 
to 10 per cent of men (Table 4.2). In general, the 
share of women exiting from any arrangement is 
at least twice their share in that arrangement in 
the pre-pandemic period. In fact, in the case of 
permanent salaried and self-employed work, the 
share of women exiting was between three to four 
times their share in those categories. In contrast 
for men, there is no such over-representation in 
the share exiting any arrangement. The garment 
sector for instance, one of the major  sources of 
regular salaried employment for women, saw a 
massive contraction. According to a survey by the 
Garment and Textiles Workers’ Union (GATWU) 
and Alternative Law Forum (ALF), even in factories 
that have opened, workers were asked to resign 
and often coerced to resign with threats of non-
settlement of dues. Factories have also used other 
tactics such as transferring workers to distant units 
without providing transport facilities.6 












Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of September, 
October, November, December (wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. Numbers on the left indicate percentage 
share of that employment arrangement in total workforce in 2019. Numbers on the right indicate 
percentage share in total working age population in 2020. 
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Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based 
on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of 
September,October,November,December 
(wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. See Appendix 
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Second, the extent and the nature of entry differed 
substantially between men and women. As we saw 
in Chapter Three, the female workforce saw far 
more churn with nearly half of the 2020 workforce 
being women who were not previously employed 
in 2019. Not only did the female workforce see a 
higher level of entry, the kinds of work women 
were entering into were different in comparison to 
men. Half of the men entered into self employment 
(Figure 4.4). A smaller share, 28 per cent, entered as 
daily wage workers. For women, on the other hand, 
more entered as daily wage workers (43 per cent) 
and a relatively smaller share as self-employed  
(37 per cent). 
The third, and final observation is about the men 
and women who stayed employed between the two 
periods. The diagonal elements in Table 4.3 indicate 
that women, in general, have higher ‘stickiness’, 
remaining in the same employment arrangement 
over the year. Except for the self-employed, where 
the share who remain are similar between men and 
women, for all other employment arrangements, 
women are more likely to stay as is, compared 
to men. At first glance this would  suggest that 
women are more ‘secure’ in their given employment 
arrangement. But, when we place this in context 
of the larger exit of women from the workforce 
seen earlier, it is apparent that the stickiness we 
see for women comes from them not having other 
fallback options for employment, and instead 
leaving the workforce entirely. So, when we restrict 
our analysis to just women in the workforce, the 
higher diagonal elements are indicative not of 
women being unaffected in terms of transitions, but 
rather that when women are forced to transition, 
it is more likely to be a transition out of work, 
rather than into fallback employment options. 
When women do transition across employment 
arrangements,  they have fewer and worse fallback 
options. For example, 21 per cent  of self-employed 
women moved to more precarious daily wage 
work. The corresponding number for men was only 
15 per cent. Similarly, among temporary salaried 
work which was another employment category 
that saw a lot of flux, for men, the movement was 
towards self employment, whereas for women, this 
movement was into daily wage work.
Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of September, 
October, November, December (wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. See Appendix Section 2 for details. 










































Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based 
on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of 
September,October,November,December 
(wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. See Appendix 






























































It should be noted that men tend to have better 
fallback options even during a normal year and 
women tend to transition out of employment more 
frequently than men even during normal times  
(Appendix 1 Table 3). But the gender differential has 
been particularly pronounced during the pandemic.
Religion & Caste
We now come to the differences in the kind of 
transitions observed among Hindu and Muslim 
workers. During the pandemic year,  far fewer 
Muslims were able to maintain their permanent 
salaried status. Forty-eight per cent of Hindus who 
were permanent salaried remained so compared 
to only 33 per cent Muslims (Appendix 1 Table 4). 
About 43 per cent of permanent salaried Muslim 
workers moved into self-employment and 15 per 
cent in daily wage work. Among permanent salaried 
Hindus, the corresponding shares were lower at 
34 per cent and 9 per cent respectively. Neither of 
these — higher transition out of permanent salaried 
work and higher influx into daily wage work among 
Muslims compared to Hindus — is observed in the  
baseline year (Appendix 1 Table 4). 
With respect to caste, a significant difference is 
observed in the kind of fallback sectors that are 
accessible to different caste groups. Casual wage 
work is much more likely to act as fallback for 
less privileged caste groups than for the general 
category groups.  Only between 3 to 15 per cent 
of general category groups transitioned to daily 
wage work from various other categories. On the 
other hand, anywhere between 18 to 30 per cent 
of SCs or STs moved into daily wage work from 
other forms of employment (Appendix 1 Table 5). 
For example, only 3 per cent of permanent salaried 
general category workers moved to daily  
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wage work. In contrast, about 18 per cent of SC or 
ST workers had moved to daily wage work. 
Self-employment, which is relatively better 
than daily wage work in terms of the associated 
earnings, is more likely to act as fallback for general 
category workers. For example, 43, 38, and 36 per 
cent of upper caste workers from daily-wage, 
permanent salaried and temporary salaried work 
arrangements transitioned to self-employment, the 
corresponding percentages for SC workers was 23, 
23, and 21 per cent, respectively. While 82 per cent 
of general category self-employed workers before 
the pandemic continued to be in this arrangement 
post the pandemic, the arrangement was much 
less stable for SCs and STs, with only 60 and 75 per 
cent continuing to be in this arrangement. We also 
see that the differences with other castes are less 
pronounced during the baseline period (Appendix 1 
Table 5). In other words, the pandemic widened the 
gulf in quality of work between caste groups.
4.2.3 / How secure were 
permanent salaried workers?
Permanent salaried work is generally viewed 
as the most secure form of employment in the 
economy. However, the pandemic has exposed 
the vulnerabilities even in this relatively privileged 
type of work. Of all the workers who were in 
permanent salaried employment before the 
lockdown (September-December 2019), only 42 
per cent continued to be in permanent salaried 
arrangements in the same period in 2020. 8 per cent 
transitioned to temporary salaried employment, 8 
per cent transitioned to casual wage work, 29 per 
cent moved to self-employment and another 13 
per cent to unemployment and out of the labour 
force. These percentages are much higher than the 
baseline period (2018 to 2019), where 71 per cent 
remained in salaried employment. 
If we group permanent salaried workers into 
quintiles based on their pre-Covid earnings, the 
percentage of permanent salaried workers that 
continued in this employment arrangement post-
lockdown increases as one progresses to higher 
income quintiles (Figure 4.5). For example, 26 per 
cent of permanent salaried workers in the 1st 
quintile (poorest 20 per cent), 34 per cent of those 
in the 2nd quintile, 43 per cent of 3rd quintile and 51 
per cent of 4th quintile and 63 per cent of the 5th 
quintile (richest 20 per cent) were able to maintain 
their position as permanent salaried workers.
Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of September 
- December (wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. Quintiles are calculated based on individual's wage earnings in 
wave 3 of 2019. See Appendix Section 2 for details. 
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Furthermore, those in lower quintiles were more 
likely to transition to daily wage work and self-
employment than those in the upper quintiles. For 
example, 13 per cent of permanent salaried workers 
in the 1st income quintile transitioned to daily wage 
work, while only 2 per cent of those in the 4th 
quintile transitioned to daily wage work. Moreover,  
those at the lower end of the income distribution 
are more likely to move to unemployment and out 
of the workforce, relative to those in the upper 
end, thereby suggesting a more stability in higher 
income permanent salaried jobs.7 Therefore, there 
is a diversity of work within permanent salaried and 
accompanying variations in the security of work. 
Interestingly, similar occupations are found across 
income quintiles. For example, teachers, industrial 
workers, and clerks are present in every quintile, but 
clearly they are part of very different kinds of labour 
markets. As expected, wages and precarity are 
inversely related, with some markets characterised 
by lower wages and higher precarity and others by 
the inverse. But similar professions or occupations 
are found in both markets (e.g. private school 
teachers versus government school teachers).
Even for those permanent salaried workers who 
remain employed, the conditions of work could 
have become harder and more tenuous. Yadav 
(2021) in an SWI background paper, shares the 
words of a metal fabricator worker in Delhi, 
describing the situation of his permanent salaried 
colleagues from an earlier workplace. 
I am in regular touch with my permanent worker 
colleagues in my old workplace from eight years 
ago. They are having the hardest time right now. 
The company is treating them like deadweight, or 
debris, making every effort to oust them from their 
jobs after it has re-opened after the lockdown. I 
joke with them – ‘Hum log theek ho gaye, nikaal 
diya, baahar kar diya, sukoon hai’ (We are okay 
now, we have been removed, fired and now 
we have no tension)  – that we got redeemed, 
removed earlier from our so-called permanent jobs. 
As we have already been thrown out, that is its 
own kind of peace.
Finally, there is a great deal of state-level variation 
in the extent of informalisation, that must be 
acknowledged. The map shown in Figure 4.6 shows 
that even states hard-hit in terms of overall job 
loss  like Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu (see Chapter 
Three) saw a lesser proportion 
of permanent salaried workers 
becoming informal, compared to 
Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. The 
extent of variation, ranging from 
40-50 per cent to 70-80 per cent, for 
the major states, needs to be carefully examined. It 
is possible that both the nature of occupation and 
industry as well as state policy affect employment 
security leading to divergent outcomes.




When he closed down the fabricator due to 
lockdown, the owner paid us only I1500, about 
one tenth of our pay, for the three weeks we had 
worked in March. He paid us nothing in April. 
When he re-opened the workshop on May 11, that 
month he paid us nothing, then, at the end of June 
he paid us one month’s pay for 50 days’ work.
     - A metal polisher, as reported in Yadav (2021)
Between September-October 2019 and 
September-October 2020, real median 
earnings per worker fell by 30 per cent.
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Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data are for the months of September - 
December (wave 3) of 2019 and 2020.  See Appendix Section 2 for details. 
As the economy recovered, and workers returned 
to work, for many the return meant a fall in 
earnings. Large losses in employment followed by 
a recovery characterised, in part, by transitions to 
more precarious types of work were accompanied 
by significant drops in earnings. At the same time 
the overall fall in labour demand further eroded 
bargaining power, forcing workers to accept work 
despite lower wages. 
4.3.1 / Evidence from CMIE-
CPHS data
This section looks at the fall in earnings between 
September-October 2019, and September-
October 2020 for workers in different employment 
arrangements, as well as the fall in earnings that 
accompanies transition across employment types. 
For salaried and wage workers, earnings are an 
individual’s monthly income from wages and 
salaries, while for self-employed workers, both 
labour income and business income are considered.8 
The other months of the wave, i.e. November and 
December are not included since income data for 
these months are not available at time of writing.9 
Note that earnings per worker observed in CMIE-
CPHS data are higher than those observed in PLFS 
by around 20 per cent on average. We discuss this 
issue further in Box 4.2.
Between September-October 2019 and September-
October 2020, real median earnings per worker 
fell by 30 per cent.10 This drop in earnings is seen 
across all employment arrangements (Table 4.4). 
Self-employed workers saw the highest fall, with 
earnings declining by nearly 23 per cent from 
I12,000 in 2019 to I9,500 in 2020.  Median earnings 
of daily wage workers also saw a fall of about 13 per 
cent. Given that a large share of workforce is in self-
employment and daily wage work, this sharp fall in 
earnings has significant welfare implications.
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Table 4.4 : 
Monthly 
earnings 





Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data are for the months of September-
October of 2019 and 2020. Earnings includes income from wages and salaries and income from business 
for the self employed. See Appendix Section 2 for details. 






by a fall in 
earnings
D- daily wage, S- self employed, T- temporary salaried and P- permanent salaried.
The size of the bubble indicates share of that transition in total workforce. 
Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of 
September,October of 2019 and 2020. Earnings includes individual’s income from wages and salaries 
and income from business. See Appendix Section 2 for details. 
The aggregate impact on labour incomes is further 
exacerbated by the fact that there were frequent 
movements into informal work arrangements as 
described in the previous section. We overlay the 
different kinds of employment transitions that 
we saw earlier with their accompanying median 
earnings, pre-Covid and during the pandemic. 
Figure 4.7 shows the median earnings pre and 
post Covid on the axes. The size of the bubble 
represents the share experiencing the transition. 
Any point below the 45 degree line indicates that 
that transition was accompanied by a fall  
in earnings.
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Box 4.2 : Labour earnings prior to the pandemic - 
                 A comparison of CMIE-CPHS and PLFS data 
Historically, nationally representative, large-scale 
surveys in India such as those carried out by the 
NSSO have collected data on consumption rather 
than income. The reason is that consumption data 
can be collected at a disaggregated level and are 
therefore more reliable. Collecting earnings of 
household members and total household incomes 
is difficult due to variability of incomes, difficulty in 
recall and time required to ask detailed questions 
to ascertain incomes. Survey respondents (typically 
one per household) may also have much more 
imperfect knowledge of other members’ income 
than they do of household consumption. Finally, 
in an highly informal economy like India, collecting 
information on incomes is even more difficult 
as most micro and small businesses lack proper 
accounting and are wary of disclosing information 
to surveyors.
The NSSO Employment-Unemployment surveys 
(conducted till 2011-12) did collect data on salaries 
and wages, but not on earnings from self-
employment. This left out more than half of the 
workforce. In addition non-labour incomes were 
not collected at all.  Until the 2004-05 and 2011-12 
India Human Development Survey (IHDS) rounds, 
individual and household incomes from labour 
and non-labour sources were not available at the 
national level. Since 2011-12 (the last IHDS round) 
labour earnings for salaried and wage workers as 
well as for the self-employed are available from the 
two PLFS Employment Unemployment surveys 
(2017-18 and 2018-19). In the interim (2015-2016), 
the Labour Bureau Employment-Unemployment 
survey reported incomes in categories (Azim Premji 
University 2018)  for an analysis of these data. 
Lastly, the CMIE-CPHS has been reporting  
income data at the household and individual  
level since 2014. 
Here we compare incomes as captured in CMIE-
CPHS and PLFS 2018-19  to provide context to 
our income data analysis reported in Chapter Four 
and Chapter Five.12 On average, we find that CMIE 
earnings levels are substantially higher than those 
collected by PLFS for the 2018-19 period for the 
individuals who are employed. As we saw in Table 
2.6, CMIE-CPHS data also show higher earnings for 
all four employment arrangements. The distribution 
of CMIE labor earnings in rural and urban areas is 
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 Average monthly earnings across all employment 
types in rural India in 2018-19, were I12,286 as 
reported by CMIE-CPHS and Rs. 8413 as reported 
by PLFS. In urban India, average monthly labour 
earnings were I19,207 in CMIE-CPHS and I17,021 in 
PLFS. The corresponding median values are shown 
in table below. More details on the distribution as 
well as the Gini are given in Appendix Table 13. 
CMIE-CPHS also reports a significant number 
of zero incomes within the employed sample. 
Consequently, we do the analysis both including 
zeroes, as well as excluding them. These data are 
available in Appendix Table 13 and 14. 
One reason for greater disagreement in measuring 
rural incomes (46 per cent) compared to urban  
(13 per cent) could be that agricultural incomes are 
more difficult to ascertain. Indeed, farm incomes 
estimated by CMIE are 75 per cent higher than 
those estimated by PLFS, while the divergence 









Sources and notes: PLFS 2018-19 and CMIE-CPHS Wave 3 of 2018, Waves 1 and 2 of 2019. X axis scale is 













































































































Sources and notes: PLFS 2018-19 and CMIE-CPHS Wave 3 of 2018, Waves 1 and 2 of 2019. See Appendix 
Section 2 for details.
Other reasons for the divergence include 
differences in sample composition, method of 
asking questions, under-representation of women 
workers (who are usually paid less) in CMIE-CPHS, 
and selective attrition in the CMIE-CPHS panel. 
Without further analysis it is difficult to say more 
on which estimate might be closer to the actual 
values.  Further, as noted at the beginning of this 
box, incomes are intrinsically harder to measure, 
particularly when the majority of the workforce 
is informal and incomes fluctuate on a daily basis. 
Hence, we believe that the two estimates (PLFS 
and CMIE-CPHS) should be used to define a range 
within which actual incomes likely lie wherever 
possible. Secondly, and importantly for our present 
purposes, the impact of Covid is mostly measured 
by changes in levels and not in levels themselves. 
Thus, even if CMIE-CPHS level estimates are higher 
than actual incomes, we may still be able to get a 
good idea of the extent of fall in incomes due to 
the pandemic.
The highest fall in earnings is experienced, not 
surprisingly, by individuals moving from permanent 
salaried work into self-employment. Earnings 
for this group of workers fell by 40 per cent 
from I30,000 in 2019 to  I16,000 in 2020. They 
accounted for 4.5 per cent of the workforce. 
Transitions from permanent salaried work into 
daily wage work or temporary work  was also 
accompanied by a similar fall in income by 40 
per cent, although the share of such workers is 
smaller, together accounting for 2 per cent. In fact, 
any movement into daily wage work, as would be 
expected, is accompanied by large loss in earnings. 
Self-employed and temporary workers moving into 
daily wage faced an income loss of nearly 10 per 
cent, and together accounted for 10 per cent of 
the workforce. And since daily wage work and self 
employment absorbed large shares of the displaced 
workforce, this also meant a fall in earnings for 
these workers from anywhere between 40 per cent 
to 10 per cent of pre-Covid earnings. 
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Even earnings of workers who remain in the same 
kind of employment were affected. Thirty-five 
per cent of the  workforce were self-employed in 
both time periods and experienced a fall in median 
earnings by 15 per cent. Similarly, for daily wage 
workers who remain as daily wage workers and 
account for 18 per cent of the workforce, there 
was a similar fall in median earnings by 11 per cent. 
Tahir, a fellow with the Stranded Workers Action 
Networks (SWAN) notes,
People are finding it difficult to find jobs, we have 
work on one day…then no work for three days. It is 
not like before where we had confirmed work. We 
have to go and live with a friend, look for work  
and do whatever we get.
Similarly, Raunaq Parveen (also a SWAN fellow) 
notes, 
We get between I200-300 for the pant suits we 
stitch. Before Corona we used to get at least 2 
pant shirts a day (I600), now there is hardly  
any demand.11 
For a small share of workers, about 5 per cent, there 
is an increase in earnings, which has come from 
moving into irregular employment to permanent 
salaried work.
Notably, such high volume of transitions associated 
with a fall in median earnings, is specifically a 
characteristic of the lockdown year. In the baseline, 
barring a  few exceptions, almost all transitions 
were associated with an increase in median 
earnings as depicted by earnings ratio greater than 
one (Appendix 1 Table 7).  
4.3.2 / Evidence for large income 
losses over several months from 
Covid impact surveys
Smaller purposive surveys also support the findings 
of earnings loss across workers. During the 
lockdown, the Dalberg survey conducted across 15 
states  finds that the average monthly household 
income declined from I9,960 (pre-crisis) to I4,110 as 
of early June (Dalberg 2020). On average there was 
a decline of 65 per cent in monthly income reaching 
as high as 81 per cent in Maharashtra. Diverse 
occupational categories (agricultural labourers, 
construction workers, farmers, and the urban 
self-employed), reported losing 60-70 per cent of 
monthly income. 
According to a random sample survey of 8,500 
workers in urban India conducted by the Centre 
for Economic Performance at the London School 
of Economics (LSE-CEP), the mean earnings loss 
was 48 per cent (Bhalotia, Dhingra, and Kondirolli 
2020). When disaggregated by kind of employment, 
the authors find that for informal workers the 
loss in earnings was relatively higher,  to the 
extent of 63 per cent compared to 17 per cent for 
formal workers, something which will clearly have 
implications for economic inequality as we will see 
in the next Chapter.
The NCAER-DCTVS survey of workers in Delhi 
and selected districts of Haryana, Rajasthan and 
Uttar Pradesh  reported that for 44 percent of the 
respondents the casual daily wage rate was lower 
in November relative to that in the pre-lockdown 
period (NCAER 2020). A survey of 770 gig workers 
in India’s largest cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai 
and Bangalore) found a severe income loss for 
workers in precarious jobs (Flourish Ventures 2020). 
While 90 per cent of the respondents had an 
income in excess of I15,000 per month prior to the 
lockdown in March, after the lockdown in August 
this proportion had dropped to 10 per cent. In light 
of these falling incomes, only 12 per cent reported 
health safety as their primary concern, while  
61 percent were primarily concerned about 
livelihood security. 
Women in Informal Employment: Globalising and 
Organising (WIEGO) conducted a survey of 580 
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informal workers in Delhi, Ahmedabad and Tiruppur 
between April and July 2020 (WIEGO 2020c; 
2020a; 2020b), The survey finds that the conditions 
of informal workers under lockdown was vastly 
different from the rest of the population. While 99 
per cent of domestic workers in Delhi could not 
find work during the lockdown month of April, 
about 42 per cent could resume work only by July. 
The average earnings of rag-pickers, street vendors 
and home-based workers in Delhi fell by 90 per 
cent. The June earnings of home-based workers in 
Tiruppur had recovered only to 14 per cent of the 
pre-lockdown levels. In Ahmedabad, the average 
June earnings were only at 30 per cent of the 
February level. 
The Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) 
recently conducted a ‘National Study on Future of 
Work for the Informal Workers’ in collaboration 
with IWWAGE-IFMR to suggest evidence-based 
policy measures to increase productivity and 
improve working conditions for urban informal 
workers (SEWA, 2021). The study consists of 
a primary survey of 2,668 workers (55 per cent 
women) in street vending, construction and 
domestic work across five cities (Delhi, Lucknow, 
Ranchi, Ahmedabad, and Thiruvananthapuram). 
Like many other studies, the primary survey found a 
large drop in household earnings (an average fall of 
90 per cent) during the lockdown. Seventy-eight per 
cent of construction workers reported zero earnings 
during the lockdown. For domestic workers and 
street vendors, the proportions were 60 per cent 
and 68 per cent respectively. Post-lockdown, as 
well, household incomes were 20 per cent lower 
than pre- pandemic levels. Further, this shock has 
come on an already low base. Before the pandemic, 
50 per cent of the sample households earned less 
than I10,000 a month. After the lockdown, half the 
households were earning less 
than I8,000 per month. Average 
monthly income for domestic 
workers was I5,700 before the 
lockdown and reduced further 
to I4,800 in the post-lockdown period. The average 
monthly earning of street vendors was about I8,500 
before the lockdown and declined to I6,140 in the 
post-lockdown period. Delhi reported the highest 
monthly mean income and Jharkhand reported 
the lowest (before the lockdown), however street 
vendors of Delhi reported the maximum decline 
of 36 per cent in their earnings. 10.6 per cent 
street vendors even reported having no earnings 
post-lockdown. Another survey of street vendors 
(referred to in the SEWA study) shows that monthly 
income fell by nearly 50 per cent, from I9,588 before 
lockdown to I5,378 in the post-lockdown period.
The Azim Premji University CLIPS panel of 2,778 
respondents from vulnerable households across 12 
states in India collected earnings of workers pre 
and post lockdown in two separate phone surveys. 
This allows us to calculate the ratio of pre to 
post-lockdown earnings at the individual level. The 
median ratio is calculated for two different samples 
- one, covering all workers with a positive income in 
the pre-lockdown period, irrespective of their post 
lockdown employment status, and second, covering 
workers with non-zero earnings in both pre as 
well as the post-lockdown period.  For the former, 
workers who lost jobs or became unpaid helpers 
are assigned zero earnings. Note that farmers were 
excluded from both estimations due to the fact that 
their earnings tend to be non-uniform across the 
year (Nath, Mandela, and Gawali 2021). 
As reported in Chapter Three, a significant share 
of the sample was still out of work six months 
after the lockdown. Hence for the first measure 
(including those with zero earnings post-lockdown), 
earnings were half of the pre-lockdown levels 
(Figure 4.8). The situation in urban areas was 
worse with overall earnings being only 40 per cent 
As per the India Working Survey, proportion 
of workers with no income increased sharply 
between February and August.
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Figure 4.8 : 
Ratio of 





Sources and notes: Authors' calculations using Azim Premji University CLIPS. See Appendix Section 3 
for details.
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of pre-lockdown levels. However, restricting the 
sample to workers who regained employment in 
the post lockdown period (that is, reported positive 
earnings), earnings had nearly recovered to the pre-
lockdown levels.
Consistent with CMIE-CPHS data being discussed 
in this chapter, CLIPS data also show that regular 
salaried workers transitioned to more precarious 
types of employment. Around 60 per cent of those 
employed as regular salaried workers before the 
lockdown were self-employed or doing casual wage 
work in October-November. For such workers, 
post-lockdown earnings were 75 per cent of pre-
lockdown earnings. 
The India Working Survey (IWS) is another panel 
survey that gives information on pre- and post-
lockdown earnings for the months of February 
2020 and August-September 2020 for Karnataka 
and Rajasthan. There is a large increase in the 
proportion of individuals who report zero earnings 
despite being employed (Table 4.5). Even in normal 
times, as expected, a relatively larger proportion of 
self-employed workers compared to wage workers, 
report zero incomes in a given month. Since the 
sample is predominantly rural, it is also possible 
that some of these zero incomes have to do with 
seasonality of farm earnings. However, for every 
employment category, the percentage of those 
reporting zero incomes went up dramatically during 
the pandemic.  
Lastly, it is important to note that informalisation 
and fall in earnings have also been accompanied by 
an intensification of work at least in some sectors 
(Box 4.3).
Sources and notes: Authors' calculations from India Working Survey panel. Mean incomes are calculated 
excluding zero incomes. See Appendix Section 4 for details. 
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Box 4.3 :  Intensification of work after the lockdown
Though no national level statistics are available, 
there have been reported instances of an 
intensification of work and an increase in the 
numbers of hours worked without a concomitant 
increase in wages after workers returned to work. 
Yadav (2021) shares the words of a young worker in 
a fan factory: 
Since the factory reopened, the work is on at a 
maddening pace compared to earlier. I have been 
working 12-hour shifts, but the firm refuses to pay 
overtime as required to at double the hour rate for 
these extra hours even as it is asking to do longer 
shifts now.
An automotive factory contract worker narrates:
Earlier, when we first returned to work in July, our 
shifts were eight hours, now, in October, the shifts 
have got longer to 12 hours and production has 
increased a lot now. I don’t know if it is because 
people are buying more cars or are the companies 
stocking it, or what is the reason. ‘Aaj kal toh 
company mein behraaye ke kaam ho raha hai’. 
Work is at a maddening, intense pace these days.
They are extracting a lot of work, more than 
before. Earlier it was not this hectic, it has become 
excessive now. Maybe it is so because the company 
had to stay shut for three months? I have not ever 
seen production at this pace ever in the last 2-2.5 
years I have worked, it is that intense.
Safety and social distancing protocols at factories 
and workplaces have become lax. Most workers do 
not have the income or insurance to cover them 
in the event of a health crisis. At the same time, 
companies have seized the opportunity to set up 
intrusive monitoring mechanisms under the guise of 
protocol and safety. Yadav (2021) shares the words 
of an automobile factory worker:
Now, in October, they have removed many Covid 
protections, even though the Covid-19 numbers are 
peaking. Initially, production was very low. Now, 
it is picking up. The firm too is not as strict about 
enforcing social distance etc. as more production 
is required. Now, they do some sanitizing at the 
entrance of the factory, and we wear masks. 
All distancing inside and shields etc have been 
removed.
So many of my co-workers have fallen ill in the 
past few weeks. We get no access to diagnosis 
and treatment through the company. If you go to 
the doctors in the urban areas near the industrial 
township, they will immediately give an injection 
without explaining what it is for and charge 
I5,000 for it. One young apprentice worker has 
died of COVID-19.
I had high fever around September 27, but I still 
went to work till because I had already taken three 
days leave in the first quarter, between July to 
September, for the Raksha Bandhan festival. Now, 
marking it in Arogya Setu would mean getting 
I16,000 only in pay instead of I21,000, and losing 
I 4,100. So, I went into work after taking a pill 
to reduce temperature to delay taking leave, as 
otherwise I would have had to automatically take 
four 4 days off.
The company’s sick leave policy is that if I mark 
Aarogya Setu app as red, then you cannot enter 
the factory premises for four days and will be 
marked as sick. But this policy makes no sense 
given the overall leave policy. As per this, in a 
quarter, which is three months, a worker can take 
a total three days off. If you take more leaves 
than that in a quarter, then your monthly ‘bonus’ 
component of the pay,  I4,100, will be deducted.
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4.4 / Agriculture and 
petty trade were the key 
fallback sectors
We close this chapter by taking a look at sectoral 
transitions that occurred as a result of the shock. 
For this we return to CMIE-CPHS data. Just as self-
employment and casual wage work act as fallback 
options for workers losing salaried employment, 
in sectoral or industry terms, agriculture and petty 
retail constitute the principal fallback options for 
workers losing work in higher risk sectors such as 
transport and manufacturing. In 2019, agriculture, 
according to CMIE-CPHS, accounted for  37 
per cent of the workforce. A year later, its share 
increased to 39 per cent. On an already large base 
this two percentage point increase represents 
millions of workers. On the other hand, an already 
small manufacturing sector shrank further from 10 
per cent to 7.6 per cent of the 
workforce. Education sector also 
saw a large decline shrinking by 
nearly 1.5 percentage points to 
only 2 per cent of the workforce. 
Here, we aggregate sectors of employment into 
twelve major groups: agriculture, mining and 
utilities, light manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, 
construction, travel and communication, trade, 
modern services personal non-professional services, 
health, education and public administration. 
Appendix Table 8 provides details of classification 
of industries. Using  transition matrices we map the 
movement of the workforce across sectors between 
the pre-pandemic period (September-December 
2019) and the most recent period for which data 
are available (September-December 2020), i.e. the 
same sample used to look at transitions across 
employment arrangements. Like before, we also 
compare these transitions with the baseline period, 
i.e. the same months over the years 2018 and 2019. 
Recall that these tables are in percentages that sum 
to 100 along a row. They answer the question, for 
every 100 workers who were in manufacturing in 
period 1, how many transitioned to which sector in 
period 2.
As expected, there is a relatively high level of 
retention in the case of agriculture with 70 per 
cent of workers remaining in the same sector. 
Construction and trade are the next highest in 
terms of ‘stickiness.’ These sectors also saw the 
highest shares of workers entering from other 
sectors, as indicated by the warmer shades in these 
columns. For instance, 21 per cent of workers who 
were employed in modern services in 2019 moved 
to trade in 2020.  About 18 per cent of workers in 
heavy manufacturing had moved into construction 
work in 2020 (Table 4.6). Compared to the baseline 
period (Appendix Table 9) we find an increased 
degree of mobility across sectors in the  
pandemic period. 
Therefore, agriculture, construction and 
trade were the fallback sectors, akin to self 
employment and daily wage work in terms of 
employment arrangements. Since these sectors 
and arrangements often go hand in hand, this is 
not unexpected.  It is also interesting to note that 
while construction has absorbed a vast proportion 
of workers transitioning from other sectors, it has 
also shed a large proportion of workers, who are 
not finding employment in other sectors. This 
particularly points to the high level of flux and 
precarity that characterizes the Indian economy in 
general, and this sector in particular, and especially 
during the lockdown period.
A gender-wise disaggregation of sectoral transitions 
echoes the observations made when looking at 
differences in transitions between employment 
Women were much more likely to lose work 
in those sectors where they were relatively 
weakly represented in the first place.
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Table 4.6 : Agriculture and trade were the principal fallback sectors during the pandemic
arrangements between men and women (Table 
4.7). Women, compared to men, are more likely 
to remain within the same sector between the 
two years. However, as mentioned earlier, this 
is because they typically do not move across 
industries, but rather exit the workforce altogether 
when they lose work. In other words, women do 
not have many fallback options. Construction, trade 
and agriculture absorb substantial shares of men 
from other sectors whereas for women, agriculture, 
and to a lesser extent, non-professional services are 
the major fallback sectors. 
This disproportionate impact on women across all 
industries is apparent in Figure 4.9. We calculate 
a representation index that is the share of women 
in the total workers who have lost jobs in a sector 
industry as a ratio of the overall share of women 
workers in that industry.  For example, women 
constituted 14 per cent of the workforce in 
agriculture but accounted for 38 per cent of the 
agricultural workers who lost work. The job-loss 
representation index for women captures this 
over-representation, with any value greater than 
one indicating that women are overrepresented in 
Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data 
are for the months of September-December (wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. 
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job loss compared to their representation in that 
industry’s workforce. Across all industries, women 
were over-represented in job loss. But there was a 
negative relationship between women’s share in an 
industry and the representation index, indicating 
that women were much more likely to lose work 
in those sectors where they were relatively weakly 
represented in the first place. For example, the 
index was highest in the travel and communication 
sector and public administration and defense. This 
is only a correlation and more work is needed to 
elucidate the mechanisms that may explain why 
women workers were more precarious in male-
dominated sectors.
When transitions are disaggregated by caste 
groups, trade and agricultural sectors are found to 
be important fallback sectors  for all caste groups. 
These sectors absorbed between 10 to 30 percent  
of the workforce from other sectors. Notably, the 
more precarious construction sector was not a 
fallback for the general category workers. At most, 
about 14 per cent of general category workers 
from the personal non-professional sector moved 
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into construction, but from all other sectors the 
movement is below 10 per cent. On the other  
hand, around 15 to 18 per cent of ST workers  
from other sectors moved into construction 
(Appendix Table 10).
There are some notable differences in the inter-
sectoral movement of workers from different 
religions. For Hindus, agriculture is a major fallback 
sector absorbing between 23 per cent (construction) 
to 10 per cent (modern services) of workers  from 
other sectors (Appendix Table 11). Trade is a 
secondary fallback sector, and the largest influx 
into this sector trade is from the health sector (17 
per cent).  For Muslims, in contrast, agriculture is 
less of a fallback sector, perhaps attributable to 
the lower shares of Muslims with access to land 
assets. Instead, trade emerges as a major sector 
absorbing large shares of the Muslim workforce 
exiting other industries. Thirty five per cent and 
32 per cent of workers from education and health 
respectively, entered into the trade sector between 
















Sector of employment in 2020
Women
Sources and notes: Authors’ calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data 
are for the months of September-December (wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. 
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2019 and 2020. For Hindus, the shares from 
education and health entering into trade is lower, 
at only 19 per cent and 17 per cent respectively.  In 
fact, for Muslims, trade absorbs nearly a quarter of 
the workforce from other sectors. Chanchani and 
Garimella (2021) share the words of Nasim, a street 
vendor from Muzzaffarnagar. 
During the pandemic, my family faced an acute 
financial crisis, making me run here and
there for work. After not seeing any chance to 
move to Maharashtra (where I was working as a
street vendor selling clothes), I ventured into many 
fields to sustain my family. I tried working in
the fields where the wages went low due to an 
abundance of hands looking for any kind of work
in the rural economy. Then, I went to the nearby 
fields to collect herbs, which someone told me,
would fetch some money by selling it in the 
market. However, this did not work as we were not
allowed by the landowners to enter their fields.
4.5 / Conclusion
This chapter and the previous one together present 
extensive evidence from nationally representative 
as well as purposive surveys showing that the 
pandemic has had a devastating impact on India’s 
workers. Even after the immediate impacts of the 
nationwide lockdown were over, employment levels 
remained slightly below pre-pandemic levels for 
several months, and more importantly there was 
a significant drop in earnings and rise in precarity. 
Women and younger workers were hit particularly 
hard both in terms of loss of work and ability to 
re-enter the labour market. Workers crowded 
into fallback arrangements and sectors further 
lowering earnings. All these impacts have obvious 
implications for household finances, food security 
and other welfare indicators. It is these that we 
turn to in the next chapter.
Figure 4.9 : 
Women 
more likely 







Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Data is for the months of September, 
October, November, December (wave 3) of 2019 and 2020. Mining and utilities not shown due to small 
sample size.  See Appendix Table 8 for details of industry categorisation. 
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Endnotes
1 The exact numbers will change if we use PLFS 
workforce participation rates instead of CMIE-
CPHS, since the former tend to be higher than 
the latter by 7 percentage points or so. However, 
PLFS estimates for this Q2 of 2020-21 are not yet 
available. Nevertheless the fall in labour share will 
still be of the same order, 5 to 6 percentage points.
2 See Data Appendix Section 2 for details of this 
sample.
3 Average earnings are calculated for all individuals 
who report being employed in a particular period. 
It should be noted that around 10 per cent of 
individuals in the CMIE-CPHS data report zero 
earnings for a given month even when they are 
employed in that month. This proportion increased 
during the pandemic (see Appendix Section 2 for 
details). In normal times such zero incomes are 
observed much more frequently for self-employed 
workers. During the Covid period, it became even 
more likely that self-employed workers were 
operating businesses but making no income (as 
discussed in Box 3.2 in the previous chapter for 
PLFS data), or that wage workers had retained 
employment but had not been paid. For the 
purpose of this analysis, we include zero incomes 
in the average. However, the results are not 
fundamentally altered by excluding zero incomes.
4 The decomposition is done as follows:  
NtYt-Nt-1Yt-1= (Nt-Nt-1)*(Yt-1) + (Yt-Yt-1)*(Nt-1) +  
(Nt-Nt-1)*(Yt-Yt-1) where Nt refers to the number 
employed in period t, and Yt is average earnings.  
The first term on the RHS is the change in income 
due to change in employment, the second is the 
change due to decline in earnings, and the final  
term is the interaction term.
5 For details on the construction of these panels,  




7 While there is a similar ordering of transitions out 
of permanent salaried employment across income 
quintiles in the baseline year, i.e. 2019 to 2018, for  
the same months, the scale of exit and transition is 
much lower (Appendix 1 Table 6)
8 CMIE-CPHS collects information on members’ 
income from wages which includes income for self-
employed individuals if they take a salary from their 
business. CMIE-CPHS also collects information 
on households’ income from business activities. 
For self-employed individuals, household-level 
business income is apportioned equally between 
all self-employed members in the household, and 
this amount is added to the wage income to arrive 
at total earnings of self-employed workers. See 
Appendix Section 2 for details.
9 Employment transitions for the September-
October panel between 2019 and 2020 is similar 
to that observed in  the larger September to 
December panel
10 All reported earnings are median values and  
include zero earnings. Earnings are deflated to 
January 2020 prices using the respective state-wise 
rural or urban Consumer Price Index. Removing 
zero earnings alters levels but does not alter the 
results qualitatively. During  the same months in 
the baseline period (2018 and 2019) there was a 10 
per cent drop in real earnings indicating the impact 
of the economic slowdown discussed in  
Chapter Two.
11 http://strandedworkers.in/the-swan-fellowship/
12 The two surveys differ in the way they ask  
earnings questions; in the underlying definitions of 
business earnings; and the frequency with which 
data are collected (see Appendix for details).
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5.  Falling incomes, rising hunger and indebtedness
We continue our investigation of the economic 
impact of Covid and containment measures by 
shifting the focus from workers to households. 
The analysis presented in Chapters Three and 
Four demonstrates large and persistent losses in 
employment and labour earnings. These are likely 
to manifest at the household level in various ways, 
including reduced incomes, increased debt and 
increased food insecurity. This chapter examines 
the evidence for such impacts. 
We first document the fall in total household 
incomes during the pandemic months. Our analysis 
shows that on average, households lost around 
22 per cent of their cumulative income over eight 
months (March 2020 to October 2020). Next we 
show that the impact has been regressive with 
poorer households losing a larger proportion of 
their already low incomes. This has led to a large 
increase in poverty in India in 2020. Lastly, we show 
that households have coped with the shock by 
borrowing (largely from informal sources), selling 
assets, cutting back on food consumption, and 
increased burden on women’s time.
Our analysis relies mainly on monthly household 
income data from the CMIE-CPHS (see Appendix 
Section Two for details). In addition we draw on 
data from the India Working Survey (IWS) and 
Azim Premji University Covid Livelihoods Phone 
Survey (CLIPS) (see Appendix Section Three and 
Four for details). Finally, when relevant, we bring 
in other purposive surveys that were carried out to 
understand the impact of the pandemic.
Falling incomes, rising 
hunger and indebtedness
5.1 / The pandemic 
caused a large drop in 
household incomes
5.1.1 / Average household incomes 
- trends and cumulative losses
We begin with an analysis of the trends in average 
per-capita household incomes over the course of 
one year, between October 2019 and October 2020 
(the last available data point at time of writing). 
The pre-pandemic per capita monthly incomes as 
measured by CMIE-CPHS were around I6,000. As 
a point of comparison, recall that per capita GDP 
pre-pandemic was around I13,000 per month.1 
Compared to their immediate pre-pandemic levels, 
average monthly incomes declined in real terms 
from I5,518 per month in February 2020 to I3,869 
in April 2020, a drop of 30 percent (Figure 5.1). 
The drop in incomes was starker in urban areas 
compared to rural areas. This is expected since 
the pandemic and the containment measures 
have impacted economic activity much more 
in urban areas. Income for a family of four in 
urban areas dropped by I14,495 in 
April 2020 than in February 2020 
(a drop of 50 per cent), while in 
rural areas the corresponding drop 
was I5,206 (a fall of 28 per cent). 
As expected, immediately after the lifting of 
lockdown restrictions, incomes started recovering. 
By October, in rural areas the recovery seemed 
complete while in urban areas incomes were 8 per 
cent below February levels.
However, an important caveat here is that incomes 
are generally higher than average in October 
since it is harvest and festival season. Seasonally-
Seasonally adjusted incomes in October were 
still 13 per cent below February levels.
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adjusted incomes in October 2020 were still 13 
per cent below February levels.2 In fact, seasonal 
adjustments make a large difference to the impact 
and recovery trends. The difference in losses 
between rural and urban areas reported above for 
the unadjusted numbers, narrows significantly. 
Seasonally adjusted rural incomes in April 2020 
were 39 per cent below their February 2020 level 
bringing the size of the shock much closer to 
the urban value of 50 per cent reported earlier. 
Finally, another indicator of incomplete recovery 
of incomes is that, in comparison to the same 
month the previous year (October 2019), household 
incomes in October 2020 were 17 per cent below in 
real terms.
It is worth noting here (and can be seen in Figure 
5.1) that incomes were already on a downward trend 
prior to the Covid shock, possibly due to the overall 
economic slowdown in 2019. As noted in Chapter 
Two, the Covid crisis has hit the Indian economy on 
the back of the most prolonged slowdown in recent 
history. This points to potentially severe distress 
particularly among vulnerable households.
It is possible to argue that the income decline was 
sharp but localised to the lockdown months of 
April and May and that the recovery of incomes 
post-June 2020 implies that the impact of Covid 
is in the past. Quite apart from the fact that the 
second wave of the pandemic is now upon us, there 
is another reason why such a conclusion would 
not be valid. This is because incomes lost during 
the months when economic activity was more 
severely impacted leave a long-term  impact either 
as depleted savings or as incurred debt, which 
must be built back or paid back, by curtailing future 
consumption and investment. Thus, the fact that 
income levels in a particular month (say October) 
are almost back to pre-pandemic levels, does not 
mean that no future negative effects on welfare or 
demand will be observed. Hence, a better measure 
of the likely longer term impact on households is 







Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Monthly averages are calculated 
by averaging per-capita incomes for all the households interviewed in the month without doing any 



























5.  Falling incomes, rising hunger and indebtedness
As of the time of writing, we have 
data available for the Covid period 
from March 2020 to October 2020. 
The seasonally-adjusted cumulative 
income in the months of March 
to October was 22 per cent less 
compared to the preceding eight months of July 
2019 to February 2020.3 The cumulative decline 
was higher in urban areas than rural areas (26 per 
cent versus 21 per cent). For an average household 
in urban areas this amounts to losing 2.1 months 
of income (about I64,000 for a family of four) and 
in rural areas losing 1.7 months of income (about 
I34,000 for a family of four). 
Thus, whether we look at the immediate impact 
of the lockdown or at the cumulative impact over 
eight months, there is a large drop in household 
incomes that can have serious consequences for 
food security, education, and health.
5.1.2 / Event study model of  
income dynamics
An important consideration when analysing the 
impact of the pandemic on household incomes is 
that different households are differently equipped 
to weather the crisis - resilience varies with 
occupation, caste, location and many other factors. 
In order to measure the extent of income loss 
while controlling for such observed and unobserved 
household characteristics that do not change in this 
period but that may affect the ability to withstand 
the shock, we perform an event study regression.4 
This helps us isolate the impact of the pandemic 
on incomes. We find that the pandemic and the 
subsequent lockdown caused a 47 percent drop in 
the seasonally-adjusted per capita real household 
income in April relative to February and even in 
October, incomes remained 17 percent below 
February levels, controlling for various household 
characteristics. 
In line with the descriptive findings that showed 
a 39 per cent drop in rural and a 50 per cent drop 
in urban areas in April compared to February, the  
event study also shows that the pandemic caused 
larger income declines in urban areas (53 per cent) 
than in rural areas (40 per cent). The income levels 
in both the regions vis-a-vis February recovered 
sharply till June but subsequently slowed down. 
Between August and October recovery stagnated 
(Figure 5.2). Given the already low average incomes 
of I7,334 in urban and I5,004 in rural areas, this 
decline has massive implications for household 
welfare. In line with the descriptive results 
presented above, in October 2020, income levels 
were around 16 to18 per cent below February levels 
in both rural and urban areas.
Thus, both for incomes and for employment 
(reported in Chapter Three), we see a similar 
pattern over this period. There was a rapid bounce 
back from the lockdown impact in the months 
of June and July, but thereafter, both the WPR 
and household incomes stagnated and had not 
recovered to pre-pandemic levels till the months 
for which CMIE-CPHS data are available (October 
for incomes and December for employment). The 
coming of the second wave of infections in March 
2021, accompanied by another round of mobility 
restrictions indicates that a full recovery will be 
further delayed.
5.1.3 / State-level analysis
Finally, we analyse state-level variation in the fall 
in household incomes. The availability of monthly 
income data over the eight month period (March to 
October) along with Google Mobility data, allows 
us to examine the state-level impact of mobility 
restrictions on income. Mobility data measure the 
proportionate reduction in footfalls in outdoor 
areas compared to a baseline period in January-
Both for incomes and for employment, 
there was a rapid bounce back in June 
and July, but thereafter, both the WPR 
and household incomes stagnated.
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Source and notes: Author's calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. The graphs plot the proportionate 
change in per capita income estimated separately for rural and urban sectors using an event study 
framework. The event study estimates measure the impact of the the pandemic and the containment 
measures on the monthly per-capita household income, controlling for various household characteristics. 
The change in monthly incomes is reported as compared to incomes in February 2020. The estimates are 
reported along with their 95% confidence intervals. See Appendix Section 2 for the event study model as 
well as seasonality and inflation adjustments.     
February 2020 (see Endnote 2 in Chapter Three for 
more details). The scatter plot in Figure 5.3a shows 
all the state-month combinations (where 1 = March 
and 8 = October). As expected, the earlier months 
(April and May) when the full lockdown restrictions 
were in place, are associated with higher drops in 
mobility and larger drops in income. 
These data also allow us to calculate the average 
relationship over time for a state. Delhi, for 
example, experienced a 50 per cent decline in 
mobility on average between March and October 
and this was accompanied by a 39 per cent loss in 










income. Uttar Pradesh, on the other hand, was less 
affected, with a 32 per cent decline in mobility and 
a 22 per cent loss in income. Because states differ 
in their pre-pandemic per capita State Domestic 
Product (SDP), the extent of urbanisation, structure 
of the workforce, and other factors that can affect 
the impact of the pandemic, we examine the 
average relationship between mobility reduction 
and income loss in a regression framework with 
state fixed effects (i.e. controlling for factors that 
are specific to a state and do not vary over this 
eight month period).5
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Figure 5.3b : 
A mobility 
reduction 






Sources and notes: Authors' calculations from CMIE-CPHS data for the months of March to October 
2020 compared to February 2020. Mobility data are from Google (see Chapter Three, endnote 2 and 
Appendix Section 2 for details). Average drop in mobility for the month with respect to a baseline period 
in Jan-Feb 2020. The figure in (a) shows a bivariate regression with no controls. The partial residual plot 
in (b) is the result of a regression with state fixed-effects (see text). Numbers next to state labels indicate 
month (1= March and 8 = October).
This relationship between mobility and income, 
after controlling for state fixed effects, can be 
depicted as a partial residual plot (Figure 5.3b). In 
such a plot, the x and y axis show departures from 
the trendline for a given state-month pair (residuals 
in the regression). Clearly, positive deviations 
from average (mobility decline less than average) 
are associated with positive deviations in income 
(income drop less than average).6
The above analysis enables us to estimate the likely 
income loss that will result from future restrictions 
on mobility and can help in designing effective 
policy support.
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5.2 / The impact was 
felt more severely by 
poorer households
5.2.1 / Income losses across  
the distribution
In this section we show that the impact on 
household incomes has been regressive and that 
this has caused a large increase in poverty in India. 
First we examine the drop in incomes across the 
distribution by arranging households from lowest 
to highest incomes into hundred equal-sized groups 
(percentiles). The cumulative loss in incomes in the 
Covid months as compared to pre-Covid months is 
higher for the lower percentiles and decreases for 
higher percentiles, before showing a small increase 
again at the very top of the distribution (Figure 5.4). 
On average, the bottom 10 percentiles (first 
decile) experienced a 27 per cent drop in incomes 
which declines to 23 per cent for the 40 to 50 
percentiles and further drops to 22 per cent on 
average for the top 10 percentiles. The pattern is 
broadly similar in rural and urban areas with the 
urban losses being higher and more regressive till 
the 90th percentile. Households in all percentiles 
in urban areas experienced higher declines than 
their corresponding percentiles in rural areas. The 
difference of a few percentage points between the 
poor and the relatively well-off may not appear 
too significant, but it is worth remembering that 
for an average household of four members in the 
bottom decile, the proportionate loss of 27 percent  
translates in absolute terms to a decline of I15,700, 
or just over two months’ income. And this loss is 
on a very low base to begin with, thus implying a 
severe reduction in welfare during the Covid period.
5.2.2 / A large increase in 
poverty
As a result of the shock, the income 
distribution has clearly shifted to the 
left as all groups have experienced 
decline in incomes. To gain a more 
intuitive understanding of the 
Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. Note: These are Growth Incidence Curves 
for seasonally adjusted incomes in the first eight Covid months (March-Oct 2020) as compared to the 
eight months preceding Covid (July 2019-Feb 2020) for each percentile. See Appendix Section 2 for details. 







An average household in the bottom 
decile lost I15,700 or just over two months’ 
income. This loss is on a very low base thus 


































5.  Falling incomes, rising hunger and indebtedness
Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. The top panel shows the rural and the 
bottom panel the urban distribution for average monthly per capita seasonally adjusted income before 
Covid (July 2019 to Feb 2020) and in the Covid months (March 2020 to Oct 2020). See Appendix  
Section 2 for details.
Figure 5.5 :  








impact on household incomes, Figure 5.5 shows the 
frequency distribution across income categories 
based on seasonally-adjusted average per-capita 
monthly income in the pre-Covid and the Covid 
months. We find that the percentage of households 
that have an average monthly income below 
I4,000 per capita (for a typical family of four this 
is equivalent to I16,000) increased sharply in the 
Covid months in both rural and urban areas.
Using this distribution, we can estimate the change 
in number and proportion of people below various 
poverty thresholds. (see Appendix Section 2 for 
details of methodology for poverty estimates). The 
official Tendulkar Committee poverty line of I1,240 
per capita per month for rural areas and I1,480 
per capita per month for urban areas (in Jan 2020 
rupees) is very low and has not been updated (other 
than inflation adjustments) for over ten years. It is, 
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therefore, not a very meaningful threshold. Even 
the World Bank’s absolute poverty line of $1.90 per 
day, which is higher than the Tendulkar poverty line, 
has been criticized for its low level and for lacking 
any substantive interpretation (Klasen et al. 2016; 
Lahoti and Reddy 2016). So we consider two other 
thresholds that are high enough to provide for basic 
needs - the recommended national floor minimum 
wage and the minimum monthly salary prescribed 
for government employees. The Expert Committee 
on Determining the Methodology for fixing the 
National Minimum Wage (Ministry of Labour and 
Employment 2019) proposed a wage such that 
the expenditure on minimum recommended food 
intake, essential non-food items (namely clothing, 
fuel and light, house rent, education, medical, 
footwear, and transport) and other non-food items 
for the wage earner and their dependents can be 
met. The recommendation was I375 per day (I104 
per capita per day) for rural areas and I430 (I119 
per capita per day) for urban areas as of July 2018. 
This works out to I2,900 per capita per month 
and I3,344 per capita per month respectively after 
adjusting for inflation in Jan 2020 terms. This is 
consistent with Indian Labor Commission (ILC) 
norms and the Supreme Court guidelines. However, 
the recommendation has not been accepted by the 
Government of India, and as we saw in Chapter 
Two, a substantial fraction of informal workers 
earned less than this minimum even before the 
pandemic. A more aspirational minimum income in 
the Indian context is the one recommended by the 
7th Central Pay Commission (CPC) for government 
employees which works out to I7,000 per capita 
per month.7 This threshold is determined using a 
similar methodology as the national minimum wage 
but the allocations for various expenditures are 
higher and the dependency ratio per income  
earner is lower.
In addition to calculating the 
absolute number and the proportion 
of individuals who fell below these 
two thresholds during the pandemic, 
we also calculate a counterfactual 
scenario based on the observed growth in incomes 
prior to the pandemic. We calculate the growth 
rate of income for each percentile between 2018 
and 2019 and apply the same rate to the pandemic 
year.8 This gives us the ‘business as usual’ scenario, 
had the pandemic not occurred, and had incomes 
continued to grow at the same rate. We provide 
the absolute numbers as well as proportions below 
the line for both the Covid and the counterfactual 
scenarios.
The absolute and proportional changes are shown 
in Figure 5.6 and Appendix Table 12 gives the 
levels from which these changes are obtained. 
We estimate that the number of individuals who 
lie below the national minimum wage threshold 
(adjusted to January 2020 rupees) increased by 
230 million in the Covid months. This amounts to 
an increase of 15 percentage points in rural and 
nearly 20 percentage points in urban areas. Had 
the pandemic not occurred, poverty would have 
declined by 5 percentage points in rural areas and 
1.5 percentage points in urban areas between 2019 
and 2020 and 50 million would have been lifted 
above this line. 
The number of individuals in households with 
income below the 7th CPC level increased by 142 
million as compared to pre-Covid period (over 10 
percentage points). Of course, an overwhelming 
majority of individuals were below the 7th CPC 
even before the pandemic (81 percent in rural areas 
and 62 percent in urban areas). 
The number of individuals who lie below the 
national minimum wage threshold increased 
by 230 million during the pandemic.
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Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. The first panel is the change in number 
of people and bottom panel is the change in proportion of people below different seasonally adjusted 
per-capita income thresholds. The observed change is the change between covid months (March to 
October 2020) and the preceding months (July 2019 to February 2020). The average seasonally adjusted 
monthly per capita real incomes over the two periods are calculated and used to estimate the proportion 
of individuals who live in households earning below these levels. The change without Covid is the 
counterfactual scenario in which household incomes would have grown at the same rate as prior to the 
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Our finding of large increases in poverty during the 
pandemic is in line with other recent estimates. 
The World Bank estimates that global poverty 
(as per the $1.90 a day line) will rise for the first 
time in twenty years with South Asia contributing 
61 percent of this increase (75 million increase in 
South Asia and 119 million across the globe).9 The 
major contribution within South Asia is estimated 
to come from India. The Pew Research Center 
estimates that the middle class in India will shrink 
by 32 million and the low income class by 35 million 
with many of them becoming poor.10 
5.2.3 / Event study analysis by 
income deciles
The foregoing analysis gives us a sense of the 
cumulative impact of the pandemic months, 
across the income distribution. But it is also 
worth knowing the dynamics of fall and recovery 
of incomes over this period, for the poor as well 
as the more well-to-do sections. For this, we 
repeat the event study analysis described above, 
for every decile in the rural and urban areas. 
Here too, the regressive nature of the impact on 
household incomes emerges clearly. Recall that 
the event study method allows us to capture the 
extent of impact of an event (here, the nationwide 
lockdown) on an outcome variable of interest (here, 
household income) controlling for household-level 
characteristics that do not change over this time 
period. This includes observable factors such as 
caste, religion, educational levels and location as 
well as unobserved ones like skills, social networks 
and other factors relevant to resilience during  
the crisis.
We show the percentage drop in incomes relative 
to February 2020 for every income decile in rural 
and urban areas in Figure 5.7. Clearly, there was a 
sharper decline in incomes for the bottom deciles 
than the top deciles. In fact, the bottom 20 percent 
lost their entire monthly income in April. The 
recovery was also sharper for these deciles. But 
it was far from complete by October 2020. The 
pandemic led to the bottom decile’s seasonally-
adjusted incomes in October 2020 dropping by 
15 to 20 per cent below their levels in February 
2020 even after accounting for various household 
characteristics. The situation seems far more grim 
upon comparing the year-on-year change in income. 
For the bottom decile (i.e. the poorest 10 per 
cent of the population), per capita 
incomes in October 2020 were 42  
per cent below their levels in  
October 2019. 
The data for the lowest decile in rural areas is 
relatively more volatile in CMIE-CPHS and even 
prior to the pandemic, between October 2019 and 
February 2020, incomes seem to have fallen by  80 
per cent for the rural poor. So one needs to be 
cautious when interpreting these results. But the 
pattern of regressive impact is evident even if we 
exclude the bottom decile. 
The top decile saw a far smaller decline in incomes 
in April, but their incomes had not recovered from 
the depressed levels even by October. In rural 
areas, the top few deciles have experienced further 
declines in their seasonally-adjusted incomes since 
August. We estimate that even after controlling 
for various household characteristics, top decile’s 
seasonally-adjusted income in October 2020 was 
about 30 and 20 percent below their levels in 
February in rural and urban areas respectively. That 
is, relative to the bottom decile, the top decile 
experienced a weaker recovery. The households 
belonging to the top decile are more likely to 
have individuals who work as permanent salaried 
workers. If they lose jobs, finding jobs with the 
same salary is often difficult and hence their 
recovery might be slower. On the other hand, 
For the poorest 10 per cent, per capita 
incomes in October 2020 were 42 per cent 
below their levels in October 2019.
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household incomes for the bottom deciles are more 
likely to come from casual labor. Casual labor jobs 
are relatively easier to find and hence recovery for 
these households has been somewhat faster.
But it should be emphasised that because the fall 
was so much steeper for the poorer sections, their 
cumulative losses are much higher. And because 
these losses are on a low base, the welfare effects 
are also much more serious for these sections.











Sources and notes: Authors' calculations based on CMIE-CPHS. The graphs plot the proportionate 
change in per capita income estimated separately for rural and urban areas using an event study 
framework for each income decile (D1 to D10). The event study estimates measure the impact of the the 
pandemic and the containment measures on the monthly per-capita household income, controlling for 
various household characteristics. The change in monthly incomes is reported as compared to incomes 
in February 2020. Households are classified into income deciles in each month separately based on 
their per capita incomes in that month. See Appendix Section 2 for the event study model as well as 
seasonality calculations. See Appendix Figure 1 for graphs with confidence intervals.
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5.2.4 / Inequality increased during 
the pandemic
Expectedly, as a result of the differential impact on 
poorer households, inequality increased during the 
pandemic. In rural areas, the share of the poorest 
10 per cent in the total income decreased from an 
already low 3.3 per cent to 3 per cent during the 
Covid months. In urban areas it went from 3.1 per 
cent to 2.8 per cent. Correspondingly, the ratio 
of mean incomes of the top decile to the bottom 
decile increased from 11.9  to 13.6  in rural areas and 
from 11.4 to 12.7 in urban areas. 
These results are in line with results from other 
surveys during this period. We have already seen 
results from various Covid-impact surveys in 
Chapter Four showing that labour earnings losses 
were higher for poorer workers. The LSE-CEP 
survey mentioned in Chapter Four shows  that 
urban workers in the lower income quartiles 
experienced bigger income losses. This resulted 
in an increase in income inequality with those in 
the top quartile of pre-Covid income going from 
64 per cent share of total income to 84 per cent 
post-lockdown. They argue that policy support 
measures have barely addressed the rise in 
inequality, reducing the post-welfare share to 80 
per cent (Bhalotia, Dhingra, and Kondirolli 2020). 
The Dalberg survey of approximately 47,000 low 
income households across 15 states also found that 
households in the lower quintiles were harder hit, 
with the bottom 20 per cent reporting 71 per cent 
loss compared to 51 per cent for the top quintile 
(Dalberg 2020).
It is important to note here that household surveys 
generally fail to capture upper incomes accurately.  
This is due to higher non-response rates among 
these households as well as under-reporting of 
incomes. The mean monthly household income of 
the top 5 per cent in CMIE-CPHS is approximately 
I80,000. So our results are unlikely to capture 
the impact of the pandemic on these households. 
CreditVidya, an organization that uses Artificial 
Intelligence, big data and a sample of 500,000 to 
track consumption among various segments of the 
society, has found that the affluent section of the 
society that earn more than I60,000 per month 
experienced the least drop in incomes and had 
completely recovered by September. The affluent 
section saw their incomes decline by 12 per cent in 
April as compared to February, but were less than 
1 per cent below February levels in September.11 
Another way to estimate the potential impact of 
the crisis on the affluent is to look at the changes in 
the wealth of the richest individuals in the society. 
The IIFL Wealth Hurun India Rich List 2020 saw 
a cumulative wealth growth of 20 per cent or I10 
lakh crores compared to the last year.12 According 
to Oxfam Inequality Virus’ report, Indian billionaires 
increased their wealth by 35 per cent in the 
lockdown.13
5.3 / Coping strategies 
among vulnerable 
households
What are the ways in which poor households have 
responded to cope with this unprecedented crisis? 
In their SWI background paper, based on new 
questions introduced in the CMIE-CPHS interview, 
(Kumar and Kumar 2021) identify a set of positive 
and negative coping strategies. Positive coping 
strategies include use of personal savings and 
sale of liquid assets, and borrowing from formal 
financial institutions or self-help groups. In addition, 
transitioning to formal employment or taking on 
additional work are also considered positive coping 
strategies. Negative coping strategies include 
transitioning to risky, less formal employment, 
reducing consumption and borrowing from informal 
sources at high rates of interest (see Box 5.1 for 
more on this study). To this one can also add the 
increased burden on women’s time as a coping 
mechanism (Box 5.2).
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We have already investigated the transition to 
informal work in detail in Chapter Four. We now 
look at the evidence on borrowing, food security, 
and asset sales. There is  a lot of information 
on these aspects available from several smaller, 
purposive surveys that have been carried out by 
researchers and civil society organisations over the 
past year. A database of reports from these surveys 
is available online.14
Box 5.1 : Negative and positive coping strategies among households  
Kumar and Kumar (2021) draw on data from 
customized Covid impact questions fielded in 
the CMIE-CPHS. Households were interviewed 
between May and August 2020 and were asked 
about their coping strategies retrospectively, i.e. 
pre-lockdown, and their strategies post-lockdown 
at the time of the interview. Using the responses, 
the authors identify the share of households by 
decile groups that resort to the following coping 
strategies, i.e. consumption reduction, use of 
savings, informal borrowing, and supplementing 
existing income. 
Reliance on formal and informal savings emerged 
as the most common coping strategy. Households, 
across all income groups, reported resorting to 
savings, with not much variation in the share of 
households using this strategy across income 
groups. Around 30 per cent of households in the 
lower decile also looked to supplement their 
income from alternate sources, while this strategy 
was hardly employed among the upper deciles. 
The more severe negative coping strategy, i.e. 
reduction in consumption, was predominantly 
seen in poor households. About seven out of ten 
households in the lower income decile had reduced 
consumption after the lockdown. The share of 
households reporting reduction in consumption 
steadily declined with the increase in income, 
indicating that the use of negative coping strategies 
is clearly a function of income and employment. 
Similarly, many poorer households reported 
resorting to borrowing in kind from their social 
networks. In the case of this negative coping 
strategy too, there was a clear decline in the share 
of households resorting to borrowing as household 
incomes increased.  
Pre-existing vulnerabilities including informal sector 
employment, low wages and the lack of access 
to or non-availability of social security measures 
increases the vulnerability of households. In the 
face of such a drastic economic shock, poorer 
households resort to negative coping strategies 
such as reducing consumption or resorting to high-
interest informal borrowings further exacerbating 
their poverty and vulnerability. 
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Box 5.2 : Women are bearing an increased burden of domestic work  
During the pandemic schools and workplaces 
have remained closed or moved online, and many 
families have been forced to spend a lot more time 
at home. As a result women’s work has increased 
manifold and they have had to navigate increased 
domestic work alongside pressures to cope with 
income losses. 
Historically, Indian women have spent far more 
time than men on unpaid care and other domestic 
work. On average, women spend four to five hours 
more on such work compared to men. During the 
lockdown, the average gender gap in the hours 
spent in domestic work initially narrowed, however, 
these ‘green shoots of gender equality within the 
household’ did not develop further. By August, 
men’s time on housework had declined, although 
not to pre-lockdown levels (Deshpande 2020). 
In round two of the India Working Survey (August-
September 2020), respondents were asked about 
the time they spent in cooking, washing/cleaning, 
fetching water, working in the kitchen garden, 
producing goods for household use, childcare and 
elderly care, on the day prior to the survey visit. The 
data show that, expectedly, women did the bulk of 
the work both before and after the lockdown. More 
significantly, whether women were employed or not 
did not make a difference in the number of hours 
spent doing these activities. 
As a result of the pandemic, the burden of domestic 
work increased, but women had to absorb this 
increase without any corresponding relief in hours 
spent in employment. This is evident from the fact 
that (restricting the sample to only those women 
who were employed in both periods),median 
number of hours spent per week in paid work have 
remained the same (42 for women and 49 for men), 
but the hours spent in domestic work have gone 
up substantially (see table). Among women who 
were employed in both periods, the proportion who 
spent more than 2 hours a day cooking went up 
from 20 per cent to almost 62 per cent in Karnataka 
and from 12 to 58 per cent in Rajasthan. Similar 
changes were observed in washing and child care. 
For men, the corresponding numbers were all under 
5 per cent, except child care which increased from 
4 per cent to 20 per cent. Other surveys also report 
a disproportionately greater increase in time spent 
on housework for women compared to men (IMPRI 
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Sources and notes: India Working Survey 2020. The February-March round was a field survey while the 
September round was a phone survey. See Appendix Section 4 for details. Numbers pertain only to 
rural areas for reasons of sample size.
5.3.1 / Decline in food intake
We do not have anything else besides this work. 
We work every day for twelve hours and this
is why we are able to drink and eat.
- Kajal, a construction worker, as interviewed 
   by (Chanchani and Garimella 2021)
For many workers earning minimum wages with 
little or no savings, the stoppage of work during 
the lockdown and slowdown in economic activities 
subsequently, has meant compromising on their 
daily consumption needs. An alarming 90 per 
cent of respondents in CLIPS reported that their 
households had suffered a reduction in food intake 
as a result of the lockdown.15 Even more worryingly, 
20 per cent (going up to 28 per cent in urban areas) 
reported that food intake had not improved even 
six months after the lockdown. Rural households 
were better off, with the food intake of a relatively 
higher share of households (13 per cent) remaining 
unaffected and a lower share (15 per cent) reporting 
no recovery relative to their urban counterparts. 
Taken together, 60 per cent of households were in 
the partial or no recovery categories (Figure 5.8).
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Figure 5.8 : 
Food intake 
was still at 
lockdown 
levels for 




Sources and Notes: Azim Premji University CLIPS. The figure plots the response of survey respondents 
regarding the level of food recovery experienced by their households post the lockdown. The 
respondents could choose one of the following options to document how the lockdown impacted the 
food intake of the households and the level of recovery post the lockdown: Unaffected - Household's 
food intake was not affected by the lockdown; Complete recovery- Household's food intake fell during 
the lockdown, and was back to prelockdown levels during the post lockdown survey months; Partial 
recovery- While the food intake fell during the lockdown and, susequently, improved post lockdown, it 
has still not recovered to the prelockdown levels;  No recovery- Food intake fell during the lockdown 
and there has not been any improvemnt since then. The figure plots the proprotion of repsondents that 
chose each of these options. See Appendix Section 3 for survey details.                                                                
The survey sample consists 
predominantly of informal workers 
and Below Poverty Line households 
(see Appendix Section Three 
for sample details), but even in 
this population relatively poorer 
households were less likely to recover from the 
shock in their food consumption. The average 
monthly per capita income prior to the pandemic 
for those households that remained unaffected was 
I2,891, while it was I2,079 for those whose food 
consumption had still not reached pre-lockdown 
levels.
Nath, Mandela and Gawali (2021) analyse these 
data using a logistic regression model to identify 
the determinants of food insecurity. Focusing on 
those households which experienced a reduction 
in food intake during the lockdown, the study finds 
that poorer households and Muslims households 
were significantly less likely to recover by October.16 
Moreover, if the respondent was employed in 
October their household was significantly more 
likely to experience a complete recovery in food 
consumption. While these findings pertain only 
to the survey sample and cannot be generalised, 
the direct link between unemployment and food 
insecurity that emerges is important to keep in 
mind when estimating the welfare impacts of the 
pandemic.
A Hunger Watch Survey was carried out by the 
Right to Food Campaign in September and October 
2020.17 This was a purposive survey of nearly 4,000 
vulnerable and marginalised individuals across 10 
states and one union territory (average monthly 
An alarming 90 per cent of respondents 
reported that their households had 
suffered a reduction in food intake as a 
result of the lockdown.
10 30 40 20
13 28 44 15
6 34 33 28
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incomes less than I7,000). Once again, similar 
to CLIPS, the survey found that 66 per cent had 
less to eat than prior to the pandemic, even five 
months after the lockdown. Although the pandemic 
disproportionately affected lower-income families, 
even among the relatively richer respondents 
(pre-pandemic incomes greater than I15,000 per 
month), 62 per cent reported that their nutritional 
quality had degraded by September relative to the 
pre-lockdown period. The Right to Food Campaign 
has called for a universalisation of the Public 
Distribution System with at least 10 kg cereal and 
1.5 kg pulses till June 2021. We discuss this further in 
Chapter Eight.
5.3.2 / Increase in household debt 
and sale of assets
A second significant stress indicator for households 
is increased debt or distress sale of assets. Surveys 
find that significant losses of income have forced 
households to sell assets or borrow even for daily 
consumption or health expenditure. According to 
CLIPS, 22 per cent of respondents reported  having 
sold or pawned an asset (Figure 5.9). A higher share 
of those in rural areas (23 per cent) sold or pawned 
an asset compared to those in the urban areas (19 
per cent). This could partly be explained by the fact 
that relatively fewer urban households had assets 
worth selling or pawning to begin with. Among the 
different types of assets sold or pawned, jewellery 
was the most common (35 per cent) followed 
by livestock (25 per cent). The latter was sold or 
pawned by relatively poorer households whose 
average monthly per capita income before the 
lockdown was I1,846. To put this into context, the 
average pre-lockdown per capita monthly income 
of households in the sample was I2,366.
A much larger proportion (43 per cent) of 
respondents reported having to borrow to meet 
expenses. Most respondents depended on informal 
institutions and networks for loans, with friends, 
relatives and local money lenders providing more 
than half of all loans lent out to the respondents. 
Banking institutions and co-operatives provided 
only 15 per cent of all loans in both rural and 
urban areas. Self-help groups (SHGs) also formed 
an important source of support.18 It is worth 
emphasising here that the survey was carried out 
with the help of Civil Society Organisations that 
were engaged in relief work and respondents are 
Sources and notes: Azim Premji University CLIPS. The figure plots the response of the survey 
respondents when asked whether they had to sell or pawn any asset to cover expenses emerging as a 
result of the lockdown. This question was administered between the months of October, November and 
December, 2020 and the reference period in question was since the beginning of the lockdown.
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in the networks of these CSOs. Thus they are 
more likely to have greater access to (or at least 
information about) various kinds of institutional 
support than the average household. Hence these 
results are likely to be a conservative estimate.
The relative importance of informal sources of 
credit as well as SHGs in meeting consumption 
needs during the crisis also emerges from the 
India Working Survey in Karnataka and Rajasthan. 
About 42.6 per cent of respondents reported 
having borrowed from friends or relatives, 31.7 per 
cent from self-help groups, and 14.7 per cent from 
money-lenders. A further 3 per cent borrowed from 
both friends and money-lenders. Less than 2 per 
cent reported borrowing from banks. This could 
partly be explained by the fact that the sample 
is relatively more rural in nature (see Appendix 
Section Four for sample details). 
But significantly, over 90 per cent of respondents 
reported having borrowed money and the median 
loan amount was I15,000 (mean amount of 
I26,300). Worryingly, the average 
amount borrowed from money 
lenders and traders was far higher 
at I29,000 compared to borrowing 
from friends and relatives (I18,000). 
A significant minority reported 
borrowing from multiple sources and 
had debts going up to I45,000. It is worth noting 
that the average income in this sample is I7,800 per 
month. Thus debts ranging from twice to six times 
monthly income were observed.
A particularly disturbing finding from Azim Premji 
University CLIPS is that not only were poorer 
households more likely to borrow, the amount of 
loan borrowed by these households was a much 
higher multiple of their pre-pandemic incomes 
compared to better-off households. Table 5.1 
shows the burden of debt across income quartiles 
based on February household income. The median 
February household income of the bottom quartile 
was I4,000 while that of the top quartile was 
I18,000. The median loan amount in the bottom 
quartile was I12,000 and that in the top quartile 
was I30,000. The poorest households (bottom 
quartile) had debt burdens 3.8 times their monthly 
household income in February. This ratio was only 
1.4 for the top quartile. This increased indebtedness 
among the poorest of the poor is likely to further 
stifle their ability to recover from this crisis.
 
























Sources and notes: Azim Premji University CLIPS (see Appendix Section 3 for details). The table shows 
the burden of debt across the income quartiles based on February household income. Medians are 
reported on account of outliers. Ratios are calculated at the household level and then averaged. Hence 
values arrived at by dividing the median value of loan to median household income will not match with 









Not only were poorer households more likely 
to borrow, the amount of loan borrowed 
by these households was a much higher 
multiple of their pre-pandemic incomes 
compared to better-off households.
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The reliance on loans and selling of assets primarily 
to cover food, health and other daily expenses 
indicates the intensity of the impact on livelihoods. 
Strikingly, in CLIPS, 61 per cent of all those 
respondents who had either taken a loan or sold or 
pawned an asset had done so only to cover such 
basic expenses. A further 23 per cent cited food, 
health and other daily expenses as one of the main 
reasons why they had to sell or borrow (Figure 5.10).
Anecdotal evidence also indicates the extreme 
distress that families were thrown into, forcing 
them to borrow to  meet essential health expenses. 
For Parvesh,  interviewed by Chanchani and 
Garimella  (2021) for their SWI background paper, 
the fall in earnings for her husband and herself 
meant having to resort to borrows to meet the 
health expenses of her young child.
My husband and I are only able to earn 9500 
rupees together now. We have a baby, one year 
old...she is frail and weak. Her medicines alone  
cost us 1000 rupees a month. Tell us, how else 
would we manage? So, we had to take out a loan 
on top of this.
CLIPS also allows us to examine household finances 
taking food insecurity as an indicator of distress. 
More than 45 per cent of those households whose 
food intake was unaffected did not have to sell 
assets or borrow (Table 5.2). On the other hand, 
close to two thirds of the respondents whose 
households had not recovered in food intake had 
to resort to borrowing or selling an asset. When 
it comes to households who did not have any 
asset to sell, we observe that greater the food 
insecurity, higher the share of households that 
took a loan. Thus clearly, a disturbing pattern 
developed during the pandemic wherein workers 
lost work and households had to cut back on food 
and other consumption or borrow/sell assets to 
meet basic needs. Finally, it should be noted that 
household assets often double as business assets 
for self-employed workers. Hence such distress sale 
can have implications for future productivity and 
incomes as well.
High levels of indebtedness can be validated from 
other surveys also. In the Dalberg survey of low-
income households, the median debt accumulated 
as of the end of May was 67 per cent of pre-
lockdown monthly household income, with the 
number reaching 100 per cent of the household 
income for the bottom quintile of low-income 
households (Dalberg 2020). The Gaon Connection 
survey of 6,040 households in 16 states and one 











Sources and notes: Azim Premji University CLIPS. The respondents who had taken a loan or sold/
pawned an asset were asked about the reasons for doing so. This was a multiple choice question and the 
figure above plots the frequency of each reason provided. Given that a respondent might have provided 
more than one reason, the columns do not add up to 100%.
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Sources and notes: Azim Premji University CLIPS (see Appendix Section 3 for details). The table shows 
for each food recovery status, the share of households who had to take a loan and/or sell an asset. The 
rows sum to 100.  
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Union Territory in December 2020 reported that 
23 per cent of households borrowed money during 
the lockdown, 8 per cent sold a valuable possession 
(phone, watch etc.), 7 per cent mortgaged jewellery, 
and 5 per cent sold or mortgaged land.19
5.3.3 / Social networks
Since government-provided social safety nets are 
not adequate, poor households often rely on each 
other for support in difficult times. However, the 
nature of the present crisis is such that the shock 
has impacted everyone simultaneously. Under such 
circumstances, what support can social networks 
provide? The India Working Survey 2020  gathered 
information in the pre-pandemic period (February-
March 2020) on social networks of respondents by 
asking them about people outside their households 
with whom they had  interactions, such as visiting 
each other’s homes or asking for advice. During 
the second round (in August-September 2020) 
respondents were asked if any of the people in this 
network had helped them in their employment or 
business, since the lockdown. Only 18 per cent of 
the respondents said that this was the case. This 
number is surprisingly low given the amount of 
distress the respondents report while comparing 
their incomes to the previous year (around  
88 per cent report that their incomes were lower 
than last year).20
One reason for this could be that most of the 
networks are homogeneous. Almost 60 per cent 
of the respondents have their social networks 
consisting entirely of people of their own sub-
caste (jati). People from a different jati formed at 
least half of the network for less than a quarter of 
respondents. Similarly, 44 percent of respondents 
reported social networks in which all members 
(22 per cent) or the majority (another 22 per 
cent) were engaged in a similar occupation as 
themselves. These kinds of networks with similar 
people may insure against individual shocks 
like illness or accident. But the pandemic likely 
affected everyone from a similar background 
similarly andIn the case of such a coordinated 
general shock, such networks would not provide 
much insurance. The kinds of help that people 
did receive was varied, with personal loans being 
the predominant kind. Examples of other kinds of 
help that was forthcoming are provided by Downs-
Tepper, Krishna and Rains  (2021) in their SWI 2021 
Background paper (Box 5.3).
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Box 5.3 : Experiences of Slum Residents in Bengaluru and Patna  
The impact of the pandemic has been particularly 
severe among the urban poor. Downs-Tepper, 
Krishna and Rains (2021) document the experiences 
of two such communities - slum residents in 
Bengaluru and Patna. Slums are densely populated 
and have inadequate provisioning of basic services 
like water, electricity, and sanitation, making them 
highly vulnerable to infectious diseases. Moreover, 
almost all working residents of slums have jobs in 
the informal economy without social security and 
limited savings and assets to fallback on, making 
them particularly vulnerable to the lockdown and 
its after-effects. 
Slum residents, in general, have faced serious 
economic hardship as a result of the pandemic. 
Drawing on a sample of 40 slum neighbourhoods in 
Bengaluru and Patna, the authors interviewed 120 
key respondents over six times in three months to 
document the health and economic effects of the 
pandemic and the lockdown.   In April 2020 based 
on interviews, the authors estimated that roughly 
50 per cent of household heads in Bengaluru and 
82 per cent in Patna lost their primary source 
of income.  The recovery was only partial till 
November and was faster in Bengaluru than Patna. 
The worst health shocks of the pandemic were 
clustered in a small number of neighbourhoods in 
Bengaluru while it was more widespread in Patna. 
They found no reported Covid-19 sickness in Patna, 
and limited sickness in Bengaluru. While Patna 
slum residents recovered only two-thirds of their 
pre-pandemic levels of income,  the corresponding 
number for Bengaluru was three-fourths. 
In addition, slum residents have spent their small 
savings and have liquidated their meagre assets. 
Many have been pushed into poverty or are just at 
the edge of poverty. The authors argue that any 
further shocks or delayed recovery could push many 
slum households into chronic poverty. 
The authors also noted that it was neighbours and 
community members who provided support rather 
than NGOs or the government, and illustrate the 
point with this account of a working woman in a 
Patna slum.
Nita is a 38-year old widowed mother of two 
children in Patna’s East Lohanipur settlement. 
Before the pandemic, she earned about I7,000 
per month working as a maid in four different 
houses. When the pandemic began, three of the 
four clients asked her not to continue working for 
them, and she struggled to pay her rent of I2,500 
per month as well as to pay for food. Nita does not 
have a ration card needed to access subsidised food 
rations and, though she applied for one during 
the lockdown, she has yet to receive one. Nita did 
not receive any support from political parties or 
NGOs during the lockdown, but her neighbours 
stepped in to support her. They negotiated with 
her landlord to postpone her rent payments and 
helped provide her with some of their rations and 
loans. The local shopkeeper also donated food to 
her. After the lockdown, Nita began working in 
a second home again (in September), and is now 
making around I4,000 per month.”
5.3.4 / Impact on education
Lastly, it is important to note that alongside 
compromised nutritional intake and indebtedness, 
loss of education in the past one year (and 
counting) is also likely to have persistent effects. 
In Round 2 of Azim Premji University CLIPS, 
respondents with children enrolled in schools were 
asked about the status of their child’s schooling. 
They were asked if children were attending physical 
classes, or online classes (conducted by the school 
or for private tuitions). 
 
As of October-November, classes were taking place 
for around 75 percent of children in rural areas and 
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ninety percent of children in urban areas. However, 
only four in ten students were attending online 
classes in urban areas. The number is lower (3 in 10) 
in rural areas perhaps due to the lower number of 
online classes taking place there.  
If children were not attending classes, they were 
asked to select the reasons for the same with the 
options including - schools not functioning, schools 
no longer affordable, or not having smartphone/
internet to attend classes, or other reasons. 
Overall, 43 per cent of children could not attend 
functional classes as they did not have an internet 
connection or a smartphone that would allow them 
to participate in online programmes. Worryingly, 
another 24 per cent were not going for classes as 
their parents could no longer afford to send them 
to these institutions. 
For those with smartphones or who could afford 
one, as Chanchani and Garimella (2021) reveal, the 
internet recharge was an additional expense on an 
already-burdened household budget. For Nasim, a 
street vendor from Muzaffarnagar, continuing the 
schooling of his sons was no longer an option. With 
the pain and sadness in his voice, he says, 
My son was very good in his studies. But my 
financial condition doesn’t allow me to fund his 
studies any longer. I am deeply pained to see him 
roam around selling clothes. But I had no other 
option left, as my debt has increased manifold 
during the lockdown. Once the family condition 
improves, I will ask him to enrol for further  
studies.
- Nasim, reported in Chanchani and  
  Garimella (2021)
The educational impact is likely to be profound and 
long-lasting. In an Azim Premji Foundation survey 
of  1,137 public schools across five states, conducted 
in January 2021, 16,067 children in second to sixth 
standard were assessed on four specific abilities 
each in language and mathematics (Azim Premji 
Foundation 2021). The language abilities included 
describing a picture or an experience orally, reading 
familiar words, reading with comprehension and 
writing simple sentences based on a picture. 
The mathematical abilities included identifying 
single- and two-digit numbers, simple arithmetics, 
describing 2D or 3D shapes, and reading or drawing 
inferences from data.  The findings were alarming. 
Ninety two per cent of children had lost at least 
one language ability from the previous year and 82 
per cent had lost at least one specific mathematical 
ability from the previous year.
We have seen in the preceding pages that 
vulnerable households have experienced larger 
losses in employment and earnings. These have 
the potential to increase hunger and indebtedness 
for a significant proportion of the population 
unless appropriate policy actions are taken. Taken 
together, the household level impacts presented in 
this chapter present a picture that demands urgent 
action. None of these effects (nutritional deficits, 
indebtedness, educational deficits) will disappear in 
the short-run after the pandemic has run its course. 
Rather, their consequences will be felt for years to 
come, unless action is taken now.
5.4 / Conclusion
With this chapter we conclude our analysis of the 
impact of the pandemic on labour markets and 
households. Most of the data we have drawn on 
were collected between April 2020 and December 
2020. While the pandemic is still raging and the 
impacts are likely to persist, we believe that the 
information presented here constitutes a firm basis 
for designing and implementing policy measures 
to support workers and households in these 
extraordinary times. Several policy interventions 
have already been carried out at the Central, State 
and local government levels over the past year. In 
the next chapter we discuss these interventions and 
their effectiveness.
131
5.  Falling incomes, rising hunger and indebtedness
Endnotes
1 Thus the household income share of GDP was 
less than 50 per cent. This divergence between 
per capita incomes as measured by surveys and 
as measured in the national income accounts is 
observed in many countries and has been attributed 
to differences in definition of the ‘household’ 
sector, ability of survey to capture all incomes 
accruing to households and incomes, and the 
division of corporate earnings into dividends, 
employee compensation and retained earnings. For 
example, see various OECD briefs on ‘Growth and 
economic well-being’ (https://www.oecd.org/sdd/
na/Growth-and-economic-well-being-oecd-01-2021.
pdf) and also Nolan, Roser, and Thewissen (2016)
2 See Appendix Section Two for details on seasonal 
adjustments.
3 To estimate the cumulative average income in 
the Covid months only households for which 
income data is reported in all the Covid months 
(March 2020 to October 2020) are used. Similarly, 
for calculating average household income in the 
pre-Covid period (July 2019 to Feb 2020) only 
households who report data in all the eight months 
preceding Covid are used. This is done to eliminate 
the bias that might be introduced due to attrition 
and non-response. This is particularly an issue in 
the lockdown months of April to May 2020, when 
the survey sample declined by more than half. This 
results in a sample size of 50,133  households in the 
March-October 2020 period and 62,194  households 
in the pre-Covid period.
4 The event study regression incorporates 
household fixed effects and error terms clustered 
at the household level. Details of the model can be 
found in Appendix Section 2. 
5 The regression model is (∆y/y)it =  α +  
β(∆M/M)it + Si + εit where y is monthly household 
income, M is the number of footfalls in various 
public areas, S captures state fixed effects, i indexes 
states and t indexes months.] This exercise allows 
us to estimate the average percentage loss in 
income for a given percentage decline in mobility 
across states. We find that a 10 per cent decline in 
mobility was associated with a 7.5 per cent decline 
in income.
6 The relationship is statistically significant. This 
can be assessed visually based on the fact that the 
confidence bands do not overlap with the X axis.
7 The 7th CPC recommended a minimum salary of 
I18,000 per month (I200 per capita per day). We 
adjusted this for inflation using rural and urban 
CPIs and converted it to January 2020 rupees. See 
https://www.finmin.nic.in/seven-cpc
8 Households are classified into percentiles based 
on income in July 2018-February 2019 and growth 
rate in the average monthly seasonally adjusted 
per capita real income between the periods July 
2018-February 2019 and March 2019-October 2019 
is calculated. This growth rate is applied to average 
monthly per capita incomes of each percentile in 
July 2019-February 2020 to get the counterfactual 
incomes.
9 This is the increase in the number of people whose 
consumption will fall below the absolute poverty 
line of $1.9 per capita per day in International 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms (about I2,520 
per month for a family of four).  https://blogs.
worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-
impact-covid-19-global-poverty-effect-new-data
10 Pew defines lower incomes as those earning 
between $2-$10 per capita in 2011 PPP terms 
(between I1,280 and I6,400 per capita per month) 
and middle class as those earning between $10-

















15 The Azim Premji University CLIPS is a purposive 
panel of 2,778 respondents across 12 states in India 
who were interviewed in April-May (during the 
lockdown) and subsequently in October- 
December 2020.
16 This analysis takes into account only those 
households whose respondents were working in 
February and who had experienced a loss in food 
intake during the lockdown, accounting for 29 
per cent of the entire sample. Household-level 
characteristics are regressed on a binary response 
variable which takes the value 1 if the households 
food intake recovered to pre-lockdown levels and 0 
if the household has not completely recovered.
17 https://thewire.in/rights/hunger-watch-survey-
lockdown
18 This could be explained by the nature of the 
sample. Two-thirds of all those respondents who 
had received a loan via an SHG were individuals 
whom we had contacted using the networks of the 
civil society organisation, Pradan. One of Pradan’s 





20 Owing to the small size of the urban sample, all 
analysis here pertains to rural areas.
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The report on social security by the National 
Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised 
Sector (NCEUS 2006) noted that India did not have 
a comprehensive national social security policy for 
the entire labour force. Despite some progress, 
unfortunately, the statement remains 
more or less true fifteen years later. 
As we have seen in Chapter Two, 
employer- or work-linked social 
security and insurance measures are 
rare, covering around 10 per cent of the workforce 
(16 per cent of the non-agricultural workforce). 
Even if the self-employed (own-account and unpaid 
family workers) are excluded from the estimate, 
such provisions are only available to 26 per cent 
of wage earners. Thus only a small minority of 
workers, such as public servants, corporate sector 
employees, or some groups of informal workers  
can hope to emerge relatively unaffected from  
such a crisis.
Concerningly, expenditure on social protection has 
stagnated in recent years. The Asian Development
Bank has estimated that India spent 1.7 per cent of 
GDP on social protection (excluding health) in 2009 
(ADB 2013). The average for lower middle income 
countries of Asia was 3.4 per cent. By 2015, this had 
fallen to 1.3 per cent. For comparison Vietnam spent 
2 per cent, Sri Lanka 5.6 per cent, and China 5.7 per 
cent (ILO 2017, Fig 6.31). 
On the other hand, India does possess a long-
standing commitment to a social development 
agenda as enshrined in the Directive Principles of 
the Constitution, as well as a history of legislative 
and executive action at the Centre and State 
level whose aim has been to reduce poverty and 
India’s social protection 
architecture 
vulnerability. The current government has also 
displayed a strong desire to formalise the  
informal workforce and extend social protection  
to all workers. 
In this chapter we provide a brief overview of these 
programmes and schemes prior to pandemic, so 
that the reader may get a better understanding of 
the strengths and weaknesses of this architecture. 
The next chapter presents information on how the 
programmes were deployed during the crisis and 
how they performed.1
6.1 / Social protection 
programmes - some 
conceptual distinctions
We start with some basic conceptual distinctions 
that are important to understand programme 
effectiveness in the Indian context.
a. Social assistance versus social insurance
A distinction is generally made between 
programmes that address persistent deficiencies 
or deprivations versus those that address 
contingencies. The former, also called promotional 
programmes or social assistance, are intended for 
those who cannot work (for example, children, the 
elderly or the disabled) as well as those who work 
The ‘ration, pension, NREGA’ trinity is a 
cornerstone of India’s social assistance policy.
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but do not earn enough to guarantee a minimum 
level of consumption. Examples include subsidised 
food (such as the Public Distribution System or 
PDS), food for work or other types of employment 
programmes (such as the Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme 
or MGNREGA), as well as various types of pension 
programmes (such as the National Social Assistance 
Programme or NSAP). This ‘ration, pension, 
NREGA’ trinity is a cornerstone of India’s social 
assistance policy. It has historically had the widest 
reach for the informal sector or for Below Poverty 
Line and vulnerable households, at least in the rural 
areas. Its coverage expanded greatly between 2004 
and 2011 (see Table 1 in Drèze and Khera (2017)). 
Programmes intended to provide a safety net 
in case of accidents or contingencies are called 
protective programmes or social insurance. These 
provide a safety net in case of foreseen as well 
as unforeseen contingencies such as retirement, 
motherhood, unemployment, accidental injury and 
death, as well as other health-related contingencies. 
With the development of the post-World War 
Two welfare state, especially in the advanced 
industrialised countries, governments have acted 
to ensure that such social protection is available via 
employment contracts. 
Of course, there are grey areas between social 
assistance and social insurance programmes. For 
example, MGNREGA can be seen as doing a bit of 
both - supplementing incomes for those who do 
not earn enough as a matter of course (assistance) 
as well as offering a fallback for those who lose 
work, such as happened during the Covid  
crisis (insurance). 
b. Work status versus citizenship or domicile
A second important distinction is between 
social programmes where eligibility is based on 
citizenship as opposed to work status. The former 
include programmes like the PDS, MGNREGA, the 
Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), and 
various forms of cash transfers. Such programmes 
have eligibility criteria rooted in domicile, rather 
than a particular type of employer or employment 
arrangement. The latter have employment 
status as eligibility criterion and may include 
programmes and schemes that address adversity 
(ill health, accidents/death and old age) as well 
as deficiency (access to credit/finance especially 
for the self-employed, loans for upgrading skills, 
loans for housing, children’s education and so on. 
Unfortunately, as we saw in Chapter Two, stable 
and unique employer-employee relationships exist 
for less than 10 per cent of the Indian workforce.
But this does not mean that developing countries 
cannot afford decent social protection systems. 
The report on social security by the National 
Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised 
Sector (NCEUS 2006) notes that social security 
evolved in the now developed countries alongside 
stable employment relations (and not after them), 
as a result of strong labour movements as well as 
older patrimonial and community 
beliefs regarding the duty of the 
State or the collective to take care 
of those who could not take care 
of themselves. Further, developing 
countries have made impressive gains 
since decolonisation, demonstrating 
the feasibility of both promotional 
and protective social security arrangements despite 
low levels of income and a large informal sector. 
In India, in recent years, several policies have been 
enacted that bypass the employer and instead set 
up an insurance fund to which the State and the 
worker contribute. Some examples are the Atal 
Pension Yojana and the PM Shram Yogi Man  
Dhan Yojana.
In recent years, several policies have been 
enacted that bypass the employer and 
instead set up an insurance fund to which 
the State and the worker contribute.
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c. Legislative versus executive action
Another key distinction that has implications 
for effectiveness and responsiveness to public 
concerns, especially when it comes to transparency 
and grievance redressal, is that between social 
protection as a legal right versus programmes 
passed by executive order as ‘schemes’ which the 
government of the day may launch, modify, or 
withdraw as it deems appropriate. Social protection 
schemes passed by executive order have a long 
history in India (Kumar 2020). Recently, several 
landmark rights-based legislations have been 
passed, such as the Right to Work, Right to Food, 
Right to Education (RTE), and Right to Information 
(RTI). But the scheme-based approach  
remains popular. 
At least for important basic protections, legal 
entitlements are crucial because they allow citizens 
to hold the State accountable. There are ample 
examples of this from active public campaigns 
around MGNREGA, National Food Security Act 
(NFSA), RTE, and RTI. There are also examples 
of work-related social security for unorganised 
workers ensured via legislation such as the 
Maharashtra Mathadi Workers (1969) Act (discussed 
later in more detail). However, it should be 
emphasised that while legal rights are necessary to 
guarantee entitlements, they are far from sufficient. 
Active civil society movements, labour unions, and 
citizens’ rights groups are needed to ensure that 
rights turn into realised entitlements.
d. Targeting and mode of delivery
With respect to delivery, once again, there are 
two distinctions that should be highlighted. First, 
targeted versus self-targeted or universal measures, 
and second, cash versus in-kind benefits. Both are 
associated with an extensive scholarly, policy, and 
campaign literature. It is outside the scope of the 
present study to delve deeply into these debates. 
We only offer some remarks here to set  
the context.
India’s data poverty makes effective targeting 
of benefits difficult. For example, absence of 
national data on consumption since 2011 has made 
updation of the national poverty lines challenging 
and has left millions out of the NFSA net, with 
tragic consequences during the Covid crisis. Even 
when consumption data are available, Drèze and 
Khera (2017) note that Below-Poverty-Line (BPL) 
targeting has caused exclusion errors and has 
been abandoned in due course in many instances. 
In the case of PDS, targeting varies from state to 
state, depending in part on whether recent socio-
economic data are available at the state level. Due 
to exclusion errors with targeting, a strong demand 
for at least temporary universalisation of PDS 
emerged during the Covid crisis.2 The MGNREGA 
and the mid-day meals programmes work on a 
more practical self-selection principle since those 
willing to do manual labour for a subsistence wage 
belong to poor households and because children 
attending government schools also tend to come 
from poor households. Going forward, efforts at 
generating higher frequency data to allow better 
targeting, as well as self-targeting where possible 
should be policy goals.
The debate on cash or in-kind transfers has also 
given rise to a vast literature.3 Some insights on 
the preference for cash or in-kind transfers come 
from a random survey of PDS functioning among 
1,200 rural households across nine Indian states 
conducted in 2011 (Khera 2014). 
Overall, the proportion of respondents who 
expressed a preference for cash over rations (PDS) 
was only 18 per cent. Where the PDS functioned 
well, people preferred food. They also mistrusted 
cash due to fears of inflation driving down the 
real value of the entitlement. That this fear is real 
is shown clearly by the case of NSAP pensions 
discussed below. There was also a fear that cash 
could be misused, that banking facilities were 
inadequate, and that food prices might increase if 
the PDS were to be dismantled. In states (such as 
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Bihar) where the programme suffered from large 
leakage or quality problems, people were more 
open to substituting it with cash (54 per cent). 
The study concluded that the unpopularity of 
cash transfers (where PDS works well) can only be 
offset by making the transfers much larger than the 
implicit value of food subsidies. However, this may 
not lead to net savings for the government.
Narayanan (2011) notes that unconditional cash 
transfers work well where no specific goal is 
intended, but instead a general safety net is to 
be provided -  for example, old age pensions. On 
the other hand, if the intention is to promote 
a particular developmental goal such as better 
nutrition, greater school attendance  and so forth, 
then either conditional transfers, vouchers or direct 
provisioning of the good or service work better. 
Of these three which is to be preferred usually 
depends on the quantity and quality of the relevant 
infrastructure (physical or digital), digital or formal 
literacy, as well as more subtle factors such as 
familiarity with existing systems or unfamiliarity 
with new ones.
All five aspects of social protection system 
discussed above - nature of the goal (insurance 
or assistance), eligibility (domicile or work 
relationship), legal rights or lack thereof, type of 
targeting and type of entitlements - have strong 
implications for inclusion or exclusion from 
programmes, timeliness of delivery, and extent as 
well as type of corruption or leakages. For example, 
cash transfers suffer from smaller leakages but 
have proved to be far less inclusive than the PDS 
due to lack of banking infrastructure. On the other 
hand, PDS has proved to be more inclusive during 
the crisis, but generally suffers from more leakage 
problems than direct cash transfers, in some cases 
exceeding 50 per cent (Gulati and Saini 2015). 
6.2 / General social 
protection programmes
We now discuss, in brief, the coverage, 
entitlements, and delivery aspects of key 
programmes that proved useful during the 
Covid-19 pandemic. This section deals with general 
programmes that are not conditional on a person’s 
current or past employment status. The next 
section gives an overview of employment-linked or 
work-status targeted programmes.
6.2.1 / The Public Distribution 
System (PDS)
PDS is one of India’s oldest State-run social 
protection programmes dating back to the 1940s. It 
provides subsidised monthly fixed rations of cereal 
(rice or wheat) to eligible households through a 
system of fair-price shops. Depending on the state, 
PDS outlets also provide subsidised pulses (dal or 
chana), oil, sugar, and salt. A few states (such as 
Karnataka) have also attempted to provide millets 
through the system. The PDS has been a significant 
source of minimum food security and preventing 
starvation, even when entitlements have remained 
very basic. Right to Food campaign advocates 
point out that the system is old and therefore 
familiar, and the PDS shop dealer is part of the local 
ecosystem, often part of the village community. 
In 2013, the PDS was made part of the National 
Food Security Act, a part of a series of rights-based 
legislations undertaken between 2004 and 2013.4 
It has two levels of entitlements- priority (BPL) 
households entitled to 5 kg per person per month 
of grain (rice or wheat) at subsidised prices and 
the poorest of the poor (Antyodaya) households, 
entitled to 35 kg of free grains per household per 
month. Seventy five per cent of 
the rural population and 50 per 
cent of the urban population is 
supposed to be covered under 
If the NFSA percentages are applied to 
population numbers for 2020, an estimated 
100 million people are found to be excluded.
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the NFSA. 237 million ration cards and 808 million 
beneficiaries are recorded nationally making it by 
far the largest safety net in the country.5 
Drèze and Khera (2017) note that, over the years, 
many states have moved beyond a Below Poverty 
Line (BPL) approach, toward a more inclusive (even 
near-universal) PDS coverage using their own 
resources (see Tables 1 and 7 in their paper). In some 
cases, such as Tamil Nadu, coverage of subsidised 
grain is universal. But the coming of the NFSA has 
set a national floor. Simultaneously leakages have 
been reduced in many states -including states that 
have not traditionally been associated with good 
governance (such as Chhattisgarh). The NFSA plus 
the state-level extensions are thus the largest social 
assistance programme in India. As we will see in 
the next chapter, this system proved to be crucial 
during 2020, especially in its extended form under 
the PM Garib Kalyan Yojana.
Despite its large coverage, however, it is also 
true that a failure to update population data has 
resulted in an exclusion of vulnerable households. 
Mandated NFSA percentages have been applied 
to 2011 population levels and hence the number of 
households which need assistance now exceeds the 
initial targets. If the NFSA percentages are applied 
to population numbers for 2020, an estimated 
100 million people are found to be excluded.6 In 
Jharkhand, for example, the failure to update the 
population numbers has meant that once the BPL 
and Antyodaya ration card quotas are exhausted, 
the remaining households are either issued Above 
Poverty Line (APL) cards (the ‘white card’) or no 
card at all. Either way, they are not entitled to 
subsidised grains.7 Targeting, in practice, often 
means setting an arbitrary quota and then finding 
people to fill this quota. Deserving households that 
do not make the quota end up on waiting lists. 
Waiting lists also exist to add individuals to existing 
ration cards in cases such as an individual having 
recently acquired an Aadhar card. Hence, relaxing 
the requirement of a ration card was an important 
way this problem was handled during the  
Covid crisis.8
In addition to selecting the right households, 
the second major challenge in programme 
implementation is to ensure that these households 
(and not some other non-deserving ones) actually 
avail of the entitlements. The major development 
here in the past few years has been the move to 
Aadhaar-based biometric authentication (ABBA). 
Without going into the details, the process works 
as follows.9 At least one member of the household 
acquires an Aadhaar number that is linked to their 
biometric identity (thumbprint, photo, iris scan). 
This number is linked (‘seeded’) to the PDS account 
(ration card number). This is supposed to ensure 
that the identity of the person availing the grain at 
the shop can be authenticated and the transaction 
recorded in the system. The aim is to reduce 
identity fraud as well as discourage dealers from 
pilferage to the extent that they think they  
could be held responsible for unaccounted grains  
in the system.
Even though the principal rationale for ABBA 
has been to reduce leakages (inclusion errors), it 
is rather the resulting exclusion errors that have 
made the headlines. Several newspaper reports as 
well as targeted surveys have reported failures of 
authentication resulting in a denial of entitlements 
to genuine beneficiaries (Khera 2017).10 Despite 
these problems, in 2018, the Supreme Court 
allowed governments to continue with the system 
for availing benefits or entitlements under  
welfare programmes.
The issue of ABBA in PDS has attracted the most 
attention because it affects hundreds of millions, 
and exclusion errors in the system can mean 
starvation deaths. Given this, the burden on the 
system to deliver as intended is significant. As 
Aadhaar becomes the basis for delivery of more 
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and more benefits, the accuracy of underlying 
demographic data becomes critical. However, often 
the same IDs that were intended to be replaced by 
the more reliable Aadhaar, have been used to enroll 
people into the system, essentially carrying over the 
errors into the new database (Khera 2017).
In addition to problems of network access or 
other technical failures resulting in authentication 
failures,11 there have also been cases reported of 
failures due to fingerprints not being readable, 
particularly in older workers who have worked with 
their hands their whole life. Further, the problem 
of this design is that the Fair Price Shop dealer, 
who is often responsible for pilferage, is still key to 
the ABBA process.12 He or she can falsely report an 
authentication failure to a customer and divert the 
quota to the open market.
A recent paper by Muralidharan, Neihaus, and 
Sukhtankar (2020) documents the results of a 
large RCT in Jharkhand to measure the trade-off 
between reducing leakages and excluding deserving 
beneficiaries. The authors find that moving to ABBA 
from earlier paper-based authentication did not 
reduce leakages, or when it did do so, this came at 
the cost of increased exclusion errors. 
One more long-standing problem with the PDS 
is worth noting here, viz. the contrast between 
excluded deserving households on the one 
hand and excess grains in storage with the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) on the other. In brief, the 
problem is this. Procurement of grain from farmers 
at Minimum Support Prices (MSP) typically varies 
with the electoral cycle. But the distribution does 
not expand or contract with procurement. It cannot 
contract for obvious reasons of legal entitlements 
under the NFSA. It cannot expand easily for two 
reasons. First, officials fear that temporary increases 
in distribution would have to be made permanent 
and that this may not be sustainable. Second, when 
distribution occurs, in accounting terms it appears 
as a food subsidy and hence becomes part of the 
fiscal deficit. If grain is not distributed, it appears 
as FCI losses and does not show as part of the 
government budget.13 
Finally, we note that, there continue to be calls 
for replacing the in-kind system entirely with cash 
transfers, using an Aadhar-linked direct benefit 
transfer (DBT) programme (Gulati and Saini 2015). 
However, given that the problems with ABBA 
described above will also be present in a DBT 
system, the question of how to avoid 
exclusion errors remains pertinent in 
either cash or in-kind systems.
The problem of exclusion from the 
system either due to lack of a ration 
card or because of authentication 
problems, can have profound 
consequences during a crisis such as 
Covid-19. A recent study by Dvara Research and 
Gram Vaani on exclusion and grievance redressal in 
social protection programmes found that deserving 
households were excluded from free rations being 
provided under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan 
Yojana (PMGKY, discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter) mainly because they did not have a 
ration card, which was an eligibility criterion in the 
relief package (Seth, Ahmed, and Ruthven 2020).14 
This despite the fact that, as noted earlier, states 
did try to waive this requirement for availing free 
rations in the crisis. 
The pandemic has presented an opportunity to 
move beyond these legacy problems and implement 
a universalised PDS that can truly end food 
insecurity in India.
If the government expects the private 
sector to pay decent minimum wages to 
workers, it needs to lead by example by 
paying a living wage in its own public 
workfare programmes.
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6.2.2 / The Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act
MGNREGA is, next to PDS, one of India’s largest 
social protection programmes. Prior to the 
pandemic in 2019-20, 177 crore person-days of 
work were created under the programme with 
an estimated 82 million active job card holders. It 
has been recognized to be ‘unique in the global 
context of social protection policies’ (Carswell and 
De Neve 2014, p.567). Several studies have come 
out examining almost all aspects of its design and 
functioning: employment generated, infrastructure 
created, the impact on wage rates and household 
incomes, impact on local social relations, problems 
with implementation, corruption and so on.15 
The Act provides a guarantee of 100 days of 
employment in a financial year per household to 
adults willing to do public work-related manual 
work at a programme wage. It builds on earlier 
employment programs (such as the Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Act, the Sampoorna 
Gramin Rozgar Yojana, and the National Food For 
Work Program) by legally binding the Government 
of India to provide employment to those who 
demand it, within 15 days of the demand being 
officially made. The Act also includes equal pay for 
men and women, and on-site child-care facilities 
as well as an unemployment allowance if work 
is not provided within 15 days. A key feature of 
MGNREGA is self-targeting, which at least in 
principle gets away from the problems of targeting 
based on consumption levels that have always beset 
the PDS and other programmes. 
However, this does not mean that exclusion or 
rationing of work do not occur under MGNREGA. 
Several problems of implementation as well as 
design remain, relating to unmet demand for 
work, wages rates below state minimum wages, 
delayed or rejected payments, non-payment 
of unemployment allowances, opaque system 
of selecting works and so on.16 Despite some 
devolution of power and responsibilities to the  
local level, the programme is very centralised, 
especially in its financial aspects. The level of fiscal 
support remains short of making it a truly demand-
driven programme as envisioned in the Act.  
Rather, it is effectively driven by the supply of work, 
with work availability drying up as the financial  
year progresses. 
After its upwards revision as part of the PMGKY 
in April 2020 the minimum programme wage for 
MGNREGA works stood at I202, well below the 
national floor minimum wage of I375 suggested by 
a government expert committee (Ministry of Labour 
and Employment 2019). Since 2010-11, MGNREGA 
wages have also been set separately from state 
minimum wages and are outside the purview of the 
statutory national minimum wage floor in the new 
Code on Wages (2020).  If the government expects 
the private sector to pay decent minimum wages 
to workers, it needs to lead by example by paying a 
living wage in its own public workfare programmes. 
Thus, there is a need to increase MGNREGA wages 
and bring them under the purview of the Code 
on Wages. Additionally, it needs to be noted that 
the Act provides for a right to get unemployment 
allowance in case employment is not provided 
within fifteen days of submitting the application 
or from the date when work is sought. However, 
consultations with MGNREGA activists and 
newspaper reports suggest that despite legal 
provisions, unemployment allowance has hardly 
ever been paid to workers, except in instances 
where the judiciary has intervened.
Another significant problem with delivery of 
entitlements under MGNREGA is timely payment 
of wages for completed work (Narayanan, 
Dhorajiwala, and Golani 2019). Significant wage 
payment delays have been reported across many 
states, particularly in the second half of the financial 
year when funds run short compared to work 
demand. Survey evidence shows that rural workers 
often lose interest in the programme because they 
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are not paid several weeks or months after work has 
been finished. Paradoxically, the resulting reduced 
demand on part of workers for MGNREGA work is 
used by officials to argue that programme funding 
is adequate given the demand. The solution to this 
has taken the form of active public campaigns that 
have ensured some accountability, but this also 
means large state-level divergences in performance 
driven by presence or absence of such campaigns 
(for example, see the difference between Rajasthan 
and Karnataka discussed in Chapter Seven).
A recent report by Libtech India highlights last mile 
payment delivery problems in Jharkhand, Rajasthan, 
and Andhra Pradesh (Narayanan, Dhorajiwala, 
and Khambatla 2020). As Jean Drèze notes in his 
Foreword to the report, pensioners and workers in 
rural Jharkhand had ‘the greatest possible difficulties 
in accessing their meagre payments,’ including 
rejections for unknown reasons, unfamiliarity with 
‘Know Your Customer’ requirements, or being 
cheated by intermediaries. This led to a waiting for 
weeks or months for payments due to them within 
days as a matter of legal right.
Prior to 2009, payments for work performed under 
MGNREGA were delivered by local authorities in 
cash. The move from local cash payments to direct 
bank transfers in 2009 reduced local corruption. But 
it increased payment delays and more importantly 
the payment system became centralised and 
inaccessible to workers. While these problems 
should have reduced over time, Jean Drèze  
observes that ‘the modalities of bank payments 
kept changing, creating periodic waves of new 
transition problems for many years.’
The Libtech survey offers valuable insights into 
last-mile problems. For example, 40 per cent 
of respondents who accessed banking services 
via Customer Service Points (CSPs) or Banking 
Correspondents experienced at least one 
failed biometric authentication in their last five 
transactions. Seven per cent reported each of 
their last five transactions failing due to biometric 
authentication problems. Case studies and 
anecdotes reported in newspapers also reveal 
situations where workers are told their withdrawal 
transaction has not succeeded only to find later 
that their wages have been deducted as per system 
records. Twenty five per cent reported being 
informed about wages being credited to their bank 
account which could not be traced when they 
checked their account at the bank. Almost half of 
all workers surveyed had to make multiple visits to 
the bank or payment agency for their wages, often 
having to travel to the block headquarters for this 
purpose. For daily wage workers who earn close 
to subsistence wages, the opportunity cost of this 
time is very large in welfare terms.
‘Rejected payments’ are transactions stuck due 
to technical errors of the payment system, bank 
account problems or data entry errors. The vast 
majority of respondents (77 per cent) did not know 
the reason for the rejection. The authors note that 
unless resolved, all future wage payments to these 
individuals will continue to be rejected. That this 
problem is significant is indicated by the fact that 
over the last five years, about I4,800 crore worth of 
payments have been rejected.
In addition to expanding banking infrastructure, 
a key recommendation of the study is that 
information system design must be worker-
centric and that worker participation in designing 
information systems is critical. An example of this 
is Rajasthan’s new Jan Soochna Portal.17 Further, 
accountability structures need to be in place for 
intermediaries, and agencies such as the Unique 
Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), the 
National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), 
banks, and Customer Service Points (CSPs) as well 
as Banking Correspondents (BCs) should be brought 
within the ambit of social audits.
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6.2.3 / National Social Assistance 
Programme
This programme is the third arm of the ration-
pension-NREGA trinity which forms a safety net for 
the most vulnerable households in Indian society. 
It provides very modest cash assistance of I200 
per month to widows, the disabled, and the elderly 
who live in BPL households.18 These pensions are 
non-contributory. The old-age pension came earlier 
while the widow and disability pensions were 
started in the aftermath of the 2008 economic 
crisis. The Central government assistance amount 
has not changed since 2006–07, significantly 
reducing the real value of an already meagre level  
of support. As a result states have gone 
substantially beyond the Centre in supplementing 
amounts and widening eligibility criteria. For 
example, Telangana provides a pension of I1,200 
per month. Others have reduced disability 
requirements (from 80 per cent to 40 per cent) 
or eliminated the condition that a widow must 
not have an earning son in order to qualify for 
assistance. These are cash transfer schemes that 
operate via bank or post-office accounts.
Although the payments are called pensions, they 
are unconnected to earlier work status. But NSAP 
can still be considered a pension scheme for the 
unorganised sector by virtue of the fact that elderly 
individuals from BPL households are highly likely to 
have been unorganised sector workers during their 
working life. The old age pension coverage is the 
largest among the three, estimated to be 28 million 
in 2019-20. Mehrotra (2016) argues that the method 
used for identifying beneficiaries is flawed and 
results in large inclusion and exclusion errors (see 
chapter 12 of his book). Indeed a survey of NSAP 
beneficiaries in Chhattisgarh showed not only that 
ABBA was leading to exclusion errors, but also 
that pensioners in the village had to travel 9 km to 
collect their pension, that being the nearest point 
with connectivity.19 Problems with ABBA, discussed 
earlier in the case of PDS and MGNREGA, have 
also plagued the NSAP payments (Narayanan, 
Dhorajiwala, and Khambatla 2020).
6.2.4 / Cash transfer programmes
The last type of social safety we consider are 
unconditional cash transfers. In the past few 
years, the widening penetration of bank accounts 
(specially zero balance Jan Dhan accounts), the 
spread of ABBA (with all its faults discussed earlier) 
and mobile connectivity have created a policy 
discourse around the ‘JAM trinity’ (Jan Dhan, 
Aadhar, Mobile) and how this new infrastructure 
can be used to carry out DBT payments (MoF 
2015). Just prior to the crisis, in 2019, the PM-KISAN 
programme was the first national level cash transfer 
programme introduced to provide cash support to 
landholding farmers. But the Covid crisis was the 
first time that such transfers were used on a wide 
scale in India when payments of I500 
per month for three months (April, 
May, and June) were announced for 
all women Jan Dhan account-holders.
The PM Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) 
is a financial inclusion programme 
that was launched in August 2014 with the aim 
of providing banking services to every unbanked 
adult. There are around 400 million accounts. 
Zero-balance accounts are allowed under the 
scheme. Jan Dhan accounts have been used to 
deliver cash benefits under the following social 
security schemes: Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti 
Bima Yojana (PMJJBY), Pradhan Mantri Suraksha 
Bima Yojana (PMSBY), Atal Pension Yojana (APY) 
and Pradhan Mantri Mudra Yojana (PMMY). Rohini 
Pande and colleagues note that as of April 2020, 
205 million women had PMJDY accounts.20 As 
per their estimates, 326 million women live below 
56 per cent of all women and 46 per cent 
of all households are likely to be excluded 
from cash transfers if delivered only 
via Jan Dhan accounts.
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the national poverty line, indicating that more 
than one-third of poor women would be excluded 
from the benefit even if all female-owned PMJDY 
accounts belonged to poor women. And this is not 
the case. Estimates based on the 2018 Financial 
Inclusion Insights (FII) survey show that 75 per cent 
of all PMJDY accounts belong to BPL women, that 
is, 150 million accounts. Thus, more than half of all 
BPL women are not covered under PMJDY. Still, the 
potential coverage of a cash transfer programme 
undertaken via the Jan Dhan accounts, at 150 
million, would be higher than any other programme 
barring PDS, if the cash did reach every BPL 
account holder and they were able to avail of it.
Anmol Somanchi extends the 
analysis of Pande and colleagues 
to estimate Jan Dhan penetration 
at the household level, based on 
individual-level coverage estimates.21 
The idea is to get an estimate of the 
proportion of households that are 
likely to not have even one woman with a PMJDY 
account. This can be calculated by combining FII 
data which gives the probability of poor women 
in rural and urban areas not having an account, 
with National Family Health Survey (NFHS) data 
that gives the distribution of the number of adult 
women in rural and urban households (see Table 2 
in the study). The analysis shows that 56 per cent 
of all women and 46 per cent of all households are 
likely to be excluded from cash transfers if delivered 
via Jan Dhan accounts. As we will see later, the Jan 
Dhan based cash transfers undertaken during the 
pandemic did not have the penetration that was 
needed to reach the most vulnerable households. 
The FII survey finds that 78 per cent of poor female 
respondents have a bank account but only 23 
per cent have a PMJDY account. Thus extending 
transfers to women with non-PMJDY accounts 
would have substantially increased inclusion.
Further, among those who do receive a transfer, 
accessing the cash remains a challenge. We saw 
earlier, the case of old-age pension recipients 
having to walk up to 9 km to avail of their meagre 
pensions under the NSAP. The FII survey finds that 
26 per cent of poor women live more than 5 km 
away from the nearest bank or ATM. Not only that, 
in contrast to the ration-pension-NREGA system 
where lists of beneficiaries are publicly available and 
beneficiaries are usually certain about their status of 
inclusion, not all women know if their accounts are 
PMJDY accounts. Clearly, some of these are initial 
problems since the infrastructure as well as the 
programmes are new. But there is a need to learn 
from the experience of the past decade on DBT, if 
improving programme effectiveness is the goal.
The PM-KISAN scheme is a cash-transfer 
scheme launched in February 2019. It offers an 
income support of I6,000 per year in three equal 
installments to farm families. Initially the eligibility 
criterion was a land holding/ownership of no more 
than 2 hectares. This has been done away with 
and all landholders are now eligible irrespective 
of the size of the holding.22 As of date, a total 
of 102.2 million farmers are registered. Of these 
70.7 million have received all four installments of 
I2,000 delivered thus far.23 The scheme excludes 
agricultural workers who do not own land. This 
programme builds on earlier state-level programmes 
such as Krushak Assistance for Livelihood and 
Income Augmentation (KALIA) in Odisha and 
Raithu Bandhu in Andhra Pradesh.
Taken together, the NASP, PMJDY, PM-KISAN and 
other smaller schemes like the PM Ujjawala Yojana 
are creating a growing infrastructure for providing 
cash assistance.
Either mandatory registration or the 
presence of a strong union or public 
campaign are essential to ensure awareness 
and enrolments under programmes.
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6.3 / Programmes 
linked to employment 
status
We end this chapter with an overview of 
employment-linked social security programmes 
as they relate to the informal workforce. Here by 
‘informal’ we mean those workers who are either 
self-employed or casual wage (no fixed employer) 
or earn regular wages but do not fall within the 
Employee Provident Fund (EPF) or Employee State 
Insurance (ESI) systems. Readers are pointed to 
Asher and Bali (2010) for an overview of the EPF 
system. We discuss some EPF-related measures 
undertaken during the pandemic, in the  
next chapter.
There are three distinct types of challenges in 
ensuring employment-linked social protection. First, 
as shown in Chapter Two, enterprises that employ 
more than 10 workers and therefore fall under the 
ambit of labour laws as well as various other types 
of regulation, often employ casual and temporary 
workers via contractors. These are informal wage 
workers in the organised sector. While some are 
part of the EPF system, many are not. This  
coverage needs to be expanded. 
Second, casual workers in the informal sector who 
are wage earners working with multiple employers 
need to be considered separately. These are daily 
wage construction workers, head-loaders, domestic 
workers and others. Here the welfare board model 
has had mixed success, as we discuss later. 
Finally, self-employed own-account and unpaid 
workers need a different model altogether. Here 
the lack of any employer has been the principal 
stumbling block. Hence, the State has generally 
stepped in directly to provide social assistance in 
the form of PDS, employment guarantee  
and pensions.
6.3.1 / Contributory insurance 
programmes for informal workers
These are new programmes or expansions of 
older programmes since 2015, that extend the 
coverage of life and accident insurance as well 
as old age pension to working adults in the 
unorganised sector. The principal difference from 
the NSAP pensions discussed earlier, is that these 
are programmes where the beneficiary and the 
government both contribute. Enrollment and 
contributions are voluntary and they operate via Jan 
Dhan accounts.
Atal Pension Yojana is for those between 18 and 40 
years. The person contributes until the age of 60 
at which point they can receive the pension. The 
pension amount varies between I1,000 and I5,000 
per month. The central government contributes 
I1,000 per annum or 50 per cent of the annual 
contribution, whichever is lesser. The accidental 
death or disability insurance, PM Suraksha Bima 
Yojana, is available to those between ages 18 
and 70. The premium is I12 per annum to avail 
of accident insurance worth I2,00,000. The life 
insurance programme, PM Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana, 
is available to those between ages 18  
and 50. An amount of I2,00,000 is paid to the 
nominee on the death of the insured. The annual 
premium to be paid by the beneficiary is I330. All 
schemes operate via Jan Dhan accounts and require 
Aadhar linked accounts.
Mehrotra (2020) notes that the total cost to 
the central government of these programmes is 
unclear and the government has only committed 
to meeting these costs for its term in office. Thus, 
these are not legally binding entitlements such 
as PDS or MGNREGA. Further, he argues that 
the international evidence favours mandatory 
programmes over voluntary ones, since enrollment 
tends to remain low in the latter.
A new scheme was launched just before the general 
elections in 2019, the PM Shram Yogi Maandhan 
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Yojana, an old-age contributory pension scheme 
for unorganised workers very similar to the Atal 
Pension Yojana. This is intended for unorganised 
sector workers with monthly incomes up to I15,000 
per month and of an entry age group of 18-40 years. 
Workers enrolling in this pension plan should not be 
covered under the NPS, ESIC or EPFO.24 This is a 
comparatively new scheme and the total enrolment 
so far is only around 4.5 million, a miniscule 
fraction of the informal workforce for whom it is 
intended. As in the case of welfare boards, either 
mandatory registration or the presence of a strong 
union or public campaign are essential to ensure 
awareness and enrolments under such programmes. 
Unfortunately enrollment under this scheme has 
taken a large hit during the pandemic declining 
sharply from 1.6 million in 2019-20 to a mere 
130,000 in 2020-21.25
We do not go into the details on these schemes 
here. The reader is referred to Mehrotra (2020)  
for further information. 
6.3.2 / Welfare boards or funds 26
These are bipartite or tripartite bodies that regulate 
conditions of work and provide social security 
benefits to workers in particular occupations or 
industries. They can be either tax/cess based or 
contribution-based. Tax-based funds exist centrally 
for beedi workers, dock workers, construction 
workers, cinema workers, and certain types of mine 
workers. A dedicated cess is levied on the relevant 
goods or services, and the funds thus raised are 
earmarked for providing benefits to the workers 
registered under the board. But most of these 
funds, including the most well-known Building 
and other construction workers BOCW board 
(discussed in more detail later), do not provide 
social insurance (pension, death and disability 
benefits, maternity benefits). Rather the funds are 
used to support healthcare and education 
expenses, housing etc.
State-level welfare boards have tended to be 
contributory. Kerala has been a leading state in the 
creation of welfare boards, covering around 54 per 
cent of informal workers as early as 2004 (NCEUS 
2006). These include funds for autorickshaw drivers, 
construction workers, and agricultural workers. 
The major benefits provided are provident fund, 
gratuity, monthly pension (old age), disability and 
accident cover, health cover, unemployment relief, 
educational allowance, housing assistance, marriage 
assistance and funeral expenses. Mehrotra (2020) 
observes that contributory funds have not been 
successful due to problems in raising funds. 
We consider two examples in further 
detail, the BOCW and the Mathadi 
(headloaders) Welfare Board, that 
hold lessons for the way ahead.
Examples of relatively well 
functioning contributory state 
welfare boards are the Mathadi 
Boards set up under the Maharashtra 
Mathadi, Hamal, and other 
Manual Workers (Regulation of 
Employment and Welfare) Act 1969. This model 
has been highlighted by the ILO and the National 
Commission on Labour-II as well as the National 
Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised 
Sector (NCEUS) have underlined the importance of 
creating something similar for other unorganised 
sector workers. Our discussion here is based on 
Jatav and Jajoria (2020) as well as a consultation 
with a representative of the Hamal Panchayat, a 
union of headloaders that has played a key role in 
ensuring proper functioning of the welfare fund.27 
Examples of relatively well functioning 
contributory state welfare boards are 
the Mathadi Boards set up under the 
Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal, and other 
Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment 
and Welfare) Act 1969.
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Over the years, the Mathadi Act and the Hamal 
Panchayat union have built a model that provides 
daily wage workers comprehensive social security, 
including provident fund, gratuity, bonus, health 
coverage, life insurance, accident coverage, 
maternity benefits, paid leave, and assistance for 
childrens’ education. There are 14 broad types of 
employment scheduled in the act in connection 
with manual operations including loading, 
unloading, stacking, carrying, weighing, measuring, 
and other similar works. There are 34 registered 
Mathadi Boards in Maharashtra.28
The Act took 11 years to implement after being 
passed in 1969 and two unions, the Rashtriya 
Hamal Panchayat and Mathadi Kamgar Union 
were actively involved in the formulation and 
implementation of the Act. Problems that have 
plagued other boards, such as lack of awareness 
among workers, lack of registration, non-
transparency in funds utilisation etc. have been 
addressed in this case by active involvement of 
workers via the unions. It shows that formalising 
daily wage workers who do not have fixed 
employer-employee relationships is indeed possible. 
But the experience also reveals that creating a 
functional system for providing benefits where 
employers of casual workers bear at least some of 
the costs, is not an easy task. Box 6.1 gives the key 
features of this model.
Box 6.1 : The Maharashtra Mathadi Model
Maharashtra’s Mathadi Kamgar Boards set up 
under the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal, and other 
Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and 
Welfare) Act 1969 are examples of relatively well-
functioning welfare boards. The key features of the 
‘Mathadi model’ are as follows:
1. It does not depend solely on public resources 
because contributions are drawn from workers, 
employers and the government.
2. Both employers and workers have to register 
themselves with the district level Mathadi boards.
3. A Mathadi board at the district level has members 
representing employers, workers, and the state 
government. Further members representing the 
state government cannot be more than one-third of 
the total members representing both the employers 
and unprotected workers.
4. These boards assign workers to employers, define 
the terms of conditions of employment and address 
grievances.
5. The boards pay workers’ wages, after collecting 
earnings and levy from employers. Workers’ 
contributions are deducted before wages are paid.
6. The model closely follows ILO’s tripartite system 
and promotes collective bargaining for wages.
7. There is a provision for an unemployment 
allowance (‘disappointment money’) at the rate of 
minimum wages. These are paid by the assigned 
employer in case they fail to assign work to the 
worker.
8. Unlike many other labour regulations, there is 
no minimum enterprise size (number of workers) 
required to be able to provide benefits.
Hamal Panchayat, the union that has been 
instrumental in the implementation of this 
system, emphasises the importance of mandatory 
registration, making the Board in charge of wages 
and working conditions, the particular nature of 
the work which requires a large number of workers 
to work in close proximity, and a strong union 
movement to ensure provisions are implemented.
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At the other end of the spectrum, in terms of 
effectiveness as a social protection programme, 
is the BoCW. As we saw in Chapter Two, workers 
in the construction sector, which account for 
roughly 12 per cent of the total workforce, and 
predominantly engage in casual work, have been 
severely impacted by the Covid-19 shock. India 
has in place two Central Acts pertaining to the 
regulation of the conditions of work and the 
provision of a measure of social security. These 
are the Building and Other Construction Workers 
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of 
Service) Act (1996); and the Building and Other 
Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act (1996).
The Acts are applicable to every establishment 
that employs ten or more workers in any building 
or construction work, wherein the project is worth 
more than I10 lakh. The Welfare Funds proposed 
in the Act are to be financed by contributions 
from beneficiaries, levy of a cess on construction 
works at a rate ranging between 1 and 2 per cent 
of the construction cost incurred by an employer, 
and non-mandatory grants by the State/Central 
governments. Every construction worker between 
the age of 18 and 60, and who has been engaged in 
construction work for not less than 90 days during 
the preceding 12 months is eligible for registration 
as a beneficiary.
Under these umbrella legislations, all State 
governments are expected to enact their own 
legislations and through their respective State 
Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare 
Boards (constituted under the BOCW Act) utilise 
the cess fund. As per Section 22 of the BOCW 
Act (1996), the cess fund can be used to provide 
assistance to a beneficiary in case of an accident; 
give pension to those who have completed the 
age of 60 years; sanction loans and advances to 
a beneficiary for construction of a house and on 
prescribed terms and conditions pay premia for 
group insurance scheme of the beneficiaries; give 
financial assistance for the education of children 
of the beneficiaries, for medical expenses for 
treatment of major ailments, payment of maternity 
benefits and make provision and improvement of 
such other welfare measures and facilities as may 
be prescribed. Further, the Board may grant a loan 
or subsidy to a local authority or an employer in aid 
of any scheme approved by the respective state 
government for the welfare of building workers in 
any establishment. 
Since registration is voluntary and not mandatory, 
and since the kind of concerted union activity 
seen in the case of the mathadi workers has been 
absent, both registration rates and utilisation 
rate of funds collected have been low. Of 
course, the construction workforce is far larger 
and more dispersed than the mathadi workers, 
who are concentrated in some district towns in 
Maharashtra. While the registration rates in the 
BoCW stand at about 52.5 per cent at a national 
level, there is considerable heterogeneity across 
states, with rates as low as 11 per cent in Assam 
and 18.6 per cent in Bihar (Jha 2020). It has also 
been pointed out that there are problems in 
renewal of registration of workers. For example, 
in Maharashtra, there were about 0.56 million 
registered construction workers in 2016, of which 
only 50 per cent of the total registrations were 
found to be valid. In Delhi, too, the process of new 
registrations and the renewal of old ones is very 
slow (Jha 2020). Other studies have pointed to 
problems of selective registration, non-updation 
of identity cards, enrolment of non-construction 
workers as beneficiaries, and corruption.29
Another challenge pertains to the issue of collection 
of cess at the stipulated rate of 1 per cent of the 
total cost of construction and its proper distribution 
among workers. The Lok Sabha’s 38th Standing 
Committee on Labour noted that there is no proper 
mechanism of collection of cess and its transfer to 
the boards.30 Also, in many cases, there is an under-
assessment of cess. The report of the Committee 
also noted that the utilisation ratio of the cess 
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funds stood at only 39 per cent nationally in 2019. 
Here too, there is considerable heterogeneity across 
states. While states such as Kerala, Karnataka and 
Chhattisgarh spent more than 80 per cent of the 
funds collected, in states such as Maharashtra, 
Delhi and Gujarat which collect the largest amount 
of cess, less than 10 per cent was utilised.
Last, but by no means the least, migrant workers 
are preponderant in the construction industry. This 
raises the issue of portability of their registration 
and benefits. For instance, there is no clarity 
what happens when a worker who is attached to 
a contractor migrates from one state to another 
(Mehrotra, 2020).31 It is also important to note that 
most migrant workers engaged in this sector come 
from poor economic and social backgrounds, lack 
education, and often live in worksites. Organising 
such workers is also extremely challenging, though 
organisations such as Aajeevika Bureau and several 
others, including traditional labour unions, have 
been trying interesting models in this regard.32 
6.4 / Direct Benefit 
Transfer: Issues in 
delivery
Delivery challenges can be divided into two broad 
categories: inadequate coverage of the safety 
net, and failure to deliver specified quantities of 
entitlements or benefits in a timely manner to 
those who are in the net. These typically arise from 
difficulties of identification of beneficiaries (due to 
lack of data for  example) as well as inadequacy of 
the relevant infrastructure (administrative,  
physical, or digital). 
Over the past few years, physical delivery of 
cash and in some cases, in-kind delivery of food 
rations, have been gradually replaced by direct cash 
transfers into Aadhar-linked bank accounts. As of 
January 2020, 429 government schemes relied on 
DBTs (Gupta 2020). These include NSAP payments, 
informal sector insurance schemes, PM KISAN 
(cash transfers for small and marginalized farmer 
families), MGNREGA and PDS among others.
Before 2013, distribution of cash was implemented 
by physical movement through various 
intermediaries to the panchayats, from where it 
was distributed. This system made cash available to 
everyone including those outside formal banking, 
but only at the cost of leakages. The shift to DBT 
(and subsequently to Aadhar-linked DBT) was 
undertaken to reduce leakages, however, this came 
at the cost of increased exclusion due to errors 
in data entry, low penetration of bank branches, 
authentication errors, point-of-sale machine 
problems, and other deficiencies of the  
financial infrastructure. 
Typical problems that result are payment delays, 
rejected payments, authentication failures, and 
large amounts of time invested in accessing 
benefits (such as long or repeated trips to the bank 
to withdraw wages or update passbooks). In this 
respect three recent reports on last mile delivery 
issues are worth flagging for those interested 
in reading further on this issue (Narayanan, 
Dhorajiwala, and Khambatla 2020; Gupta 2020; 
Sharma, Natarajan, and Udhayakumar 2021). For 
last-mile delivery, in particular, availability of 
banking access points, whether in the form of 
branches, ATMs, customer service points (CSPs), 
or village-level entrepreneurs known in this case as 
banking correspondents (BCs), is a key determinant. 
Not surprisingly, the DBT system works much 
better in states where rural bank penetration is high 
to begin with (for example, Andhra Pradesh).33
Work by the social protection initiative at Dvara 
Research has identified the principal points where 
exclusion of true beneficiaries can occur.34 Four 
points are identified: identification of beneficiaries, 
getting identified households or individuals 
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registered or enrolled, successfully linking the 
bank account to Aadhar number that is, becoming 
part of the Aadhar-based Payment Bridge System 
or APBS), and last-mile delivery of cash to the 
beneficiary (Aadhar Enabled Payment System or 
AEPS). Without venturing into the details of these 
processes, we highlight the central concerns that 
will be useful in making recommendations to 
reduce exclusion errors.
Failures between enrollment and successful 
crediting of payments to the beneficiary’s account 
are particularly vexing. These can occur due to 
errors in data entry, such as incorrect bank account 
number, incorrect Aadhar number, incorrect 
mapping of bank information to Aadhar data (such 
as linking Person A’s bank account to Person B’s 
Aadhar number) and so on. The result is a ‘rejected 
payment’ where the account is not credited and the 
reason is not known, or a ‘diverted payment’ where 
the wrong person’s account is credited.35 A peculiar 
problem here is that welfare payments are set up to 
be delivered to the last (most recent) Aadhar-linked 
account. Thus, if a person opens a new Aadhar-
linked bank account, payments automatically get 
diverted to that account. If the person does not 
know this, he or she may continue to check the old 
account and not find payments credited to it.
Failures between successful crediting to the 
account and cash-in-hand constitute the last-mile 
problems of welfare delivery. We have already 
discussed some of these problems earlier in the 
context of MGNREGA payments. Here we only 
reiterate that structural problems of weak banking 
infrastructure result in infrequent updating of 
passbooks, lack of bank updates via SMS etc. 
and contribute to recipient anxiety on whether 
payments have been credited. The results are 
several trips to the bank or Common Service Centre 
(CSC), loss of wages, or in case of older persons, 
undue hardship. Over-reliance on unregulated 
banking correspondents also exposes the most 
vulnerable to fraud.36
The key takeaway is that significant 
improvements in banking 
infrastructure, putting in place 
auditing and grievance redressal 
systems for banking correspondents 
and CSCs, as well as re-orientation 
of MIS from the point of view of 
welfare recipients rather than the 
administrative or bureaucratic system in mind is 
crucial to successful DBT.
6.5 / Conclusion
The foregoing account of India’s key social 
protection programmes for vulnerable  
households and informal workers sets the stage for 
our analysis of how the system is being used and 
how it has performed so far during the pandemic. 
In terms of coverage, PDS, cash transfers, NSAP, 
and MGNREGA are clearly the front-runners and 
formed the backbone of the policy response. 
However, as we will see in the next chapter,  
many other smaller programmes were also  
pressed into service.
Identification of beneficiaries, getting 
identified households registered, successfully 
linking the bank account to Aadhar, and last-
mile delivery of cash to the beneficiary - are 
the points where exclusion can occur.
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7. Effectiveness of the Covid-19 policy response
One measure of the uniqueness and magnitude of 
the current crisis is that nearly all types of social 
protection measures available to the government 
(central and state), whether they are promotional 
or protective, citizenship-based or work-linked, 
legal entitlements or schemes, have been pressed 
into service. PDS, MGNREGA, cash transfers, 
worker welfare boards, provident funds, all have 
proved to be crucial during the past year. But much 
more needs to be done. With the second wave 
of infections going on at the time of writing, we 
believe it is all the more imperative to learn from 
the experience of 2020 and offer immediate  
support measures. 
In this chapter we first place India’s 
fiscal response in a comparative 
international perspective.1 Then, we 
review the evidence on the reach and 
effectiveness of some key systems 
such as the Public Distribution 
System (PDS),  Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Act (MGNREGA), 
National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP), Jan 
Dhan cash transfers, and welfare boards. This is 
necessarily a survey of the landscape rather than 
a deep dive into any one programme or scheme. 
However, we have referred to more detailed 
studies that interested readers can pursue. Next, 
we discuss some state-level schemes and responses 
that were innovative in nature. Lastly, this chapter 
also analyses some information on migrant workers 
- a group that has brought the shortcomings of  
the current social protection architecture into  
sharp focus.
Effectiveness of the 
Covid-19 policy response 
7.1 / Estimating the 
size of India’s fiscal 
response 2
The first fiscal support package, intended to provide 
immediate relief during the lockdown was the  
I1.7 lakh crore Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana 
(PMGKY) announced in March 2020. This built upon 
12 different existing schemes and included in-kind 
transfers, cash transfers, livelihood support benefits 
and insurance support to frontline health workers.3 
This was followed by the Atmanirbhar Bharat set  
of measures announced over a few months,  
starting May, 2020. 
Covid impact surveys (discussed later in this 
chapter) show that the free grains distributed 
via the PDS and expanded fiscal outlay for the 
MGNREGA, and to a lesser extent the Jan Dhan 
cash transfers as well as ex-gratia payments 
under the NSAP provided a vital safety net to 
vulnerable households. These, together with some 
EPF (Employee Provident Fund)-based subsidies, 
constituted the main additional fiscal support. 
The remaining measures such as those based on 
PM-KISAN and the newly constituted PM Rozgar 
Abhiyan front-loaded or redirected spending that 
had already been allocated in the 2020-2021 budget 
and thus do not constitute additional stimulus. 
Thus it seems likely that the direct additional 
fiscal outlay for Covid-related measures in 
2020-21 was around I3 to 3.5 lakh crores or 
around 1.5 to 1.7 per cent of GDP.
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Agrawal et al. (2020) analysed the PMGKY package 
and came to the conclusion that the allocation was 
insufficient and should have been in the range of 
three to 3.75 lakh crore. 
The 2021-22 Union Budget documents allow us 
to calculate the actual extent of fiscal support 
delivered by the Union government last year.4 The 
fiscal deficit jumped from 4.5 per cent to 9.5 per 
cent of GDP, going in absolute terms from I9.33 
lakh crores in 2019-20 to I18.5 lakh crores in 2020-
21. Compared to 2019-20, receipts were lower by 
I1.6 lakh crores (of which revenue receipts were 
lower by I1.3 lakh crores) and expenses were up 
by I7.5 lakh crores (of which revenue expenditure 
was up by I6.5 lakh crores). To arrive at the actual 
net stimulus, we remove the increased interest 
payments (I0.81 lakh crores), payments made to  
FCI to correct for previous years' incorrect 
treatment of its borrowings from the National 
Small Savings Fund (NSSF) (I1.94 lakh crores) and 
increased defence spending (I0.25 lakh crores). 
Taking these numbers into account, we estimate 
that the total additional spending in 2020-21 over 
that incurred in 2019-20 was around I4.5 lakh 
crores. It is difficult to ascertain exactly what part of 
this additional expenditure went to Covid support 
measures. Adding up the spending on expanded 
PDS rations (I1.5 lakh crores), MGNREGA (I40,000 
crores), Jan Dhan transfers (I31,000 crores), NSAP 
payments (I30,000 crores) and a few other smaller 
items, brings us close to a figure of I3 lakh crores.  
Thus it seems likely that the direct additional fiscal 
outlay for Covid-related measures in 2020-21 was 
around I3 to 3.5 lakh crores or around 1.5 to 1.7  
per cent of GDP.5
7.2 / Policy measures 
undertaken during 
the crisis - Reach and 
effectiveness
7.2.1 / Food relief via the Public 
Distribution System
As we saw in Chapter Five, the drastic fall in 
incomes during 2020 forced households to borrow 
as well as sell assets in order to survive. Despite 
these drastic measures, widespread hunger was 
reported. The survey results discussed below show 
that broadly, at the national level, PDS did provide a 
crucial safety net. 
The PMGKY extended free grains to those 
households who held ration cards under the NFSA. 
But there were two challenges. First, as discussed 
in Chapter Six, potentially millions of deserving 
households are not on NFSA lists. Second, 
those individuals who were not residing at their 
permanent domicile at the time of the crisis (such 
as migrant workers), could not easily avail of their 
entitlements. To take care of the former, State 
governments tried to supplement the national 
NFSA list with their own lists of beneficiaries. 
However, exclusions were still common with one 
survey reporting that 60 per cent of all complaints 
regarding the free rations were about households 
not possessing a ration card in the first place (Seth, 
Gupta, and Johri 2021). Those who were state-level 
card holders (but not NFSA card holders) were 
able to receive the extra entitlement depending on 
state-level implementation of the relief package 
(see Appendix Table 15).
To address the second problem (of migrants), the 
Atmanirbhar Bharat package extended subsidised 
grains to 80 million migrants without cards. But 
in the absence of a national migrant register, 
the notification simply allowed for 10 per cent 
additional recipients (80 million is 10 per cent of 
As per the India Working Survey, 
65 per cent of card-holders 
received some additional grains 
as part of PMGKY.
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800 million existing NFSA beneficiaries) and left it 
to states to identify the migrants who needed this. 
We discuss the migrant crisis separately later in  
this chapter.
We now examine some survey evidence on the 
reach of PDS rations. In Azim Premji University 
CLIPS, close to nine out of ten respondents had a 
ration card (94 per cent in rural areas compared to 
82 per cent in urban areas). Households with BPL 
or Antyodaya cards (priority households) constitute 
close to two-thirds of the entire sample in the 
survey (see Appendix 3 for survey sample details). 
Ninety-one per cent of rural and 67 per cent of 
urban households with cards reported receiving at 
least some food via PDS in the month prior to the 
interview (Oct-Nov 2020). Of these, 41 per cent of 
priority households got more than 5 kg of grains per 
person i.e. they had received some free ration under 
the PMGKY and 27 per cent reported receiving the 
full PMGKY free quota. 
The survey data also allow us to 
relate PDS grain availability to 
the households’ food security 
situation. Worryingly, 42 per cent 
of households who reported 
that their consumption was still 
below pre-pandemic levels as of 
November 2020, had received 
at least some free rations and 29 per cent had 
received the full 10 kg quota. The fact that the 
extra grains did not help in completely eliminating 
the consumption shortfall could be explained by 
the severity of the income shock or inadequate 
quantity or type of entitlements. This is captured in 
the testimony of an agricultural workers from Jalna 
district of Maharashtra:
We got a little rice, but we are five people in the 
household. We had to calculate our meals
every day and ate much less to keep the little 
ration going.
- Sanjeev Gambhir, quoted in Chanchani and    
  Garimella (2021)  
A second source of information that we have on the 
reach of PDS is the India Working Survey, which has 
a largely rural sample from Karnataka and Rajasthan 
(See Appendix Section 4 for survey details). The 
reach of PMGKY seems to be better in the former 
than the latter. Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of 
priority (BPL and Antyodaya)  households receiving 
the specified amount of PDS grains per person. As 
can be seen, 40 per cent of households in Karnataka 
reported receiving the full quota of grains made 
available under the relief scheme, compared to 
30 per cent in Rajasthan. Sixty one per cent in 
Rajasthan and 71 per cent in Karnataka received at 
least some free rations, over and above the usual 
quota. This is broadly consistent with the findings 
from CLIPS, and the IWS number for Karnataka 
is not too distant from what was found in CLIPS 
for the same state (61 per cent). Of course, the 
two surveys are not strictly comparable due to 
differences in sampling strategies (IWS is a random 
sample while CLIPS is directed purposively towards  
vulnerable households).
In the Dalberg survey, once again, PDS had the 
widest reach among all social safety nets, covering 
87 per cent of interviewed households, as compared 
to 56 per cent covered under Jan Dhan, 42 per 
cent under MGNREGA and 32 per cent under PM 
KISAN.6 PDS also had the best performance in 
terms of accessibility with 91 per cent of priority 
households reporting that they had availed of 
free rations announced under the PMGKY in May 
(Dalberg 2020).7 As expected (and revealed in other 
surveys) the PDS worked much better in rural areas 
with 83 per cent of priority households receiving 
free grains easily as compared to only 66 per cent  
in urban areas.
Cash transfers have been on average 40 per 
cent of GDP per capita in lower middle-income 
countries. But in India it amounted to only 12 
per cent of GDP per capita.
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In the Rapid Rural Community Response to Covid 
(RCRC) survey , a comparable 88 per cent of 
rural households had received free grains (RCRC 
2020). The corresponding number for the Gaon 
Connection-Lokniti survey is 71 per cent of ration 
card- owning households receiving wheat or rice. 
Significantly, in this survey, of the 17 per cent 
households who did not have ration cards, only 27 
per cent received rations which corroborates the 
findings of the Gram Vaani survey reported earlier in 
this chapter that lack of ration card was a problem 
for vulnerable households (Seth, Gupta, and Johri 
2021). This underlines the necessity of universalising 
PDS (with at least a temporary halt on checking 
identity), to aid households in overcoming the 
income shock of the pandemic.
Lastly, it should be kept in mind that the above 
surveys were carried out at different points in 2020 
from April to November. Thus, apart from sampling 
differences, another reason for the difference in 
reach reported among various surveys could be that 
the scheme functioned well in the months of May 
and June (when the Dalberg survey was conducted), 
but had become less effective by August (IWS) and 
even less so by November (CLIPS). Nevertheless, 
it seems clear that over 90 per cent of households 
with cards received at least regular rations, while 
around 50-70 per cent received at least some 
additional grains during April to November. The 
free rations were discontinued thereafter. But the 
results of the Hunger Watch reported in Chapter 
Five as well as renewed losses in livelihoods that are 
resulting due to new restrictions in place during the 
second wave suggest that the time for food relief 
is not yet past. Hence it is welcome news that free 
PDS rations have been announced once again for 
the months of May and June 2021.8
7.2.2 / Cash transfers 
Alongside in-kind transfers, the PMGKY also 
included cash transfer schemes. Women Jan Dhan 
account holders were promised a monthly cash 
transfer of I500 during the months of April, May 
and June. As we saw in the previous chapter, this is 
around 200 million women. Thus the expenditure 
on cash transfers to Jan Dhan accounts was 
approximately I31,000 crores (this is verified as per 
Sources and notes: India Working Survey 2020 (IWS). Respondents were asked about grains received in 
the month prior to the interview. See Appendix Section 4 for survey sample details.




of PDS grain 
received
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the 2021-22 Union Budget documents). In per capita 
terms, India falls well short of the global average 
on the size of the cash transfer. On average, total 
Covid relief cash transfers have amounted to 32 per 
cent of a month's GDP per capita, varying between 
26 per cent in upper middle-income countries to 
40 per cent for lower middle-income (the group 
India belongs to), to 86 per cent in low income 
countries (Gentilini, Almenfi, and Dale 2020). India’s 
total transfer of I1500 amounted to 12 per cent of a 
month's GDP per capita (approximately I13,000).
Another measure of the inadequacy of cash 
support is that in Azim Premji University CLIPS, 
respondents whose households received Jan Dhan 
transfers, had lost earnings of around I1,200 in 
just the month prior to when the interviews were 
conducted (October-November), let alone the 
interim period between April and October. Further, 
as we saw in Chapter Five, CMIE-CPHS data 
reveal that the poorest 10 per cent of households 
experienced a loss of I15,700 over these months. 
Thus the size of cash support fell well short of the 
size of the income shock for vulnerable households.
Another problem, that emerges from the surveys, 
is that Jan Dhan accounts have a low level of 
penetration. Of course, compared to PDS or even 
NSAP, Jan Dhan is a much newer programme and 
both penetration and use should increase over time. 
However, the fact remains that 48 per cent of rural 
respondent households and 63 per cent of urban 
respondent households in Azim Premji University 
CLIPS did not have a Jan Dhan account. Amongst 
those that did have an account, 70 per cent 
received cash payments (Figure 7.2a). However, 
only 32 per cent of account holding households had 
received all three transfers as of October-November 
2020 (the transfers were scheduled for April, May, 
and June). 35 per cent received two transfers and 21 
per cent received only one transfer (Figure 7.2b).
In IWS (conducted in August-September 2020), 
there were no large rural-urban differences, but 
there were state-level differences in the share of 
households having women-owned accounts- 44 
per cent of households in Karnataka and 68 per 
cent in Rajasthan. Among BPL and Antyodaya 
card holders, penetration was marginally higher 
(45 per cent in Karnataka and 70 per cent in 
Rajasthan). Conditional on having a woman-owned 
Jan Dhan account in the household, 71 per cent 
of respondents in Karnataka and 76 per cent in 
Rajasthan reported receiving transfers. Once again, 
as in CLIPS, around 30 per cent reported receiving 
all three transfers. The full distribution of transfers 
in both states is shown in Figure 7.2c.
In the Dalberg survey, again, 73 per cent of eligible 
low-income households had received cash under 
Jan Dhan but only 56 per cent of low-income 
households reported having Jan Dhan accounts 
in the first place. Rural coverage 
was fully ten percentage points 
higher than urban (59 per cent 
versus 49 per cent). As a part of 
their overall work on the response 
of rural communities to the Covid 
crisis, RCRC conducted a survey 
of 10,992 women Jan Dhan account holders in 51 
districts spread over 10 states. 66 per cent of active 
Jan Dhan account holders had received I500 while 
another 20 per cent did not know. In the Indus 
Action survey, 60 per cent of households reported 
receiving Jan Dhan transfers (Table 3 of report).
Thus taken together, we have multiple, 
independent sources of information on the 
penetration of Jan Dhan accounts as well as 
the receipt of cash transfers. These are broadly 
consistent with each other in showing penetration 
levels of around 50 per cent among poor 
Conditional on having a woman-owned Jan 
Dhan account in the household, 71 per cent of 
respondents in Karnataka and 76 per cent in 
Rajasthan reported receiving transfers. 
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Sources and notes: Azim Premji University CLIPS (October-November 2020) and India Working Survey 
(August-September 2020). Numbers pertain to households who reported having a woman-owned Jan 
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households as well as in the finding 
that around 70 per cent of eligible 
households received at least some 
cash. The former is also consistent 
with the findings from a study by 
Somanchi and others, reported in the 
previous chapter, that 46 per cent of all households 
are likely to be excluded from cash transfers if 
delivered via Jan Dhan accounts.9 Hence, in the 
immediate future, if a second round of transfers is 
undertaken (as we propose it should), it is worth 
considering other avenues of reaching the cash to 
poor households, in addition to Jan Dhan accounts.
The failure in reaching 30 per cent of eligible 
households is concerning, especially given the level 
of distress that prevails during the pandemic. And 
it is possible that this arises from more general 
failures in the Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) system. 
Some clues as to why this may have occurred come 
from a recent study on delivery of social welfare 
entitlements conducted by the community radio 
organization, Gram Vaani, in collaboration with 
Dvara Research (Seth, Gupta, and Johri 2021). The 
study is based on documentation of complaints  
received on community radio.10 It finds that the 
most common type of exclusion in the DBT 
system, accounting for 84 per cent of complaints, 
is failure to credit the beneficiary’s account. The 
report identifies several stages in the system where 
problems may arise which can form the empirical 
basis for reforming the system and ensuring  
better delivery.
Finally, there is the question of the ‘last mile.’ Even 
when cash does reach bank accounts, it may not be 
accessible due to poor banking infrastructure (we 
saw some evidence for this in the previous chapter). 
As per the RCRC survey, nearly 50 per cent of 
households either did not try to withdraw cash (43 
per cent) or were not successful when they tried (6 
per cent). The principal reasons for not withdrawing 
were prohibitions due to lockdown rules (41 per 
cent), health concerns (21 per cent) and crowding in 
banks/ATMs (21 per cent).11
Some surveys have also collected information on 
other central and state cash transfer schemes. 
Around 31 per cent of rural respondents in CLIPS 
owned land and were eligible to receive cash under 
the PM-KISAN scheme. Around half of the General 
category farming households did receive it, but only 
10 per cent of Scheduled Tribe households and 20  
per cent of Scheduled Caste households engaged 
in farming received the transfer. The survey also 
reports the share of households who received at 
least one Covid relief cash transfer from either 
the central or the state government. It finds that 
36 per cent of all urban and 58 per cent of all rural 
vulnerable households received some cash. Muslim 
households were least likely to receive even a 
single cash transfer compared to Hindus and other 
religious groups. Inter-state migrant households 
were once again the worst-off with two–thirds 
of such households not receiving any transfer. In 
the Dalberg survey, the coverage is better with 84 
per cent of low-income households being covered 
under one of four cash transfer schemes (Jan Dhan, 
pension, PM Ujjwala, or PM KISAN) and 81 per cent 
receiving at least some form of cash assistance  
in May. 
To sum up, two main recommendations arise from 
the cash transfer experience during the pandemic. 
First, the financial infrastructure needed to 
reach vulnerable households requires significant 
expansion and second, the size of the cash transfers 
(even if we include the state programmes) fell far 
short of what was needed given the magnitude of 
the shock and must be expanded.
Jan Dhan had penetration levels of around 
50 per cent among poor households and 
around 70 per cent of eligible households 
received at least some cash.
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7.2.3 / Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act
This programme has always been important for the 
rural economy since its inception but it acquired 
enormous significance during the pandemic since 
migrants returned back to their home villages 
and many households lost income due to a fall in 
remittances or a disruption in the farm economy.12 
As part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat package of May 
2020 (a follow up to the PMGKY), an additional 
I40,000 crores were allocated to the programme, 
bringing the total budget to I1 lakh crore, for the 
financial year 2020-21.
The MGNREGA tracker launched by the People’s 
Action for Employment Guarantee (PAEG) shows 
that the programme has emerged as an important 
avenue of employment generation in this moment 
of crisis (PAEG, 2020). The huge demand for 
work is evident from the fact that 35 lakh new job 
cards were made between April- June 2020 and 
till November 2020 over 252 crore person-days of 
work were generated,an increase of 43 per cent 
compared to previous year. Over 10 million (1 crore) 
more households worked in MGNREGA this year as 
compared to last year.
Most of this increase was concentrated in the 
months of May, June, and July. In June 2020, 32.2 
million households were provided employment, a 
50 per cent increase over June 2019. In recognition 
of the value of the programme, the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee of Labour has noted that, 
‘there is no better scheme than the MGNREGS 
to provide sustainable livelihood to the unskilled 
workers, including the inter-state migrant labours.’13 
The committee also recommended an expansion in 
the list of permissible works. 
Narayanan, Oldiges, and Saha (2020) ask whether 
the programme expansion was able to meet the 
surge in demand in districts that account for a 
large share of outmigrants.14 The study combines 
administrative data between 2018 and 2020 with 
district-level data on migration (2011 and 2007-08) 
as well as multidimensional poverty (2015-16) to 
assess whether those districts that have higher 
shares of out-migration and poverty also saw 
proportionate increase in person-days generated 
under MGNREGA. The authors find that the 
top one-third of the high out-migrant districts 
accounted for 55 per cent of new job cards issued, 
which is good news. However, this increase in 
programme beneficiaries was still less compared to 
what was needed given the share of out-migrants 
and the poor in these districts.
As a result, the authors’ emphasise that despite 
the significant increase in employment under 
the programme, there is still considerable unmet 
demand for MGNREGA work. The ‘rationing rate’ 
(percentage of households who demanded work 
but did not get it) in the May to August period was 
22.7 per cent (compared to 15 per cent for the same 
months of 2019). Subsequently, the rationing rate 
came down to 13 per cent as demand also subsided 
(PAEG 2020). However, rationing remains much 
higher than average in major migrant-sending states 
such as Uttar Pradesh (23 per cent) and Jharkhand 
(25 per cent). More significantly, these rates are 
derived from the official programme database 
(Management Information System or MIS) and 
are possibly underestimates of the actual unmet 
demand. This is because demand for work is often 
not recorded at the panchayat level if officials know 
that work cannot be provided due to lack of funds 
or other reasons.15
Estimates of unmet demand for work are also 
available from Covid impact field surveys. The 
Azim Premji University CLIPS showed large unmet 
demand for MGNREGA work even as late as 
October-November 2020. Since April, only 55 per 
cent of those rural respondents who demanded 
work had been able to get it, that is a rationing 
rate of 45 per cent. Further almost everyone (98 
per cent) who got work said they would like to 
work for more days. Thus the concept of ‘unmet 
demand’ needs to be broadened to include not 
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only those who were completely rationed out 
(got no work) but also those who wanted to work 
more days than they got. In this respect, the PAEG 
tracker also shows that, as of November 2020, the 
average days worked per household was only 41 
days as compared to 48 last year. And only 17 lakh 
households had completed 100 days of employment 
this year, compared to 40.6 lakh last year. A much 
larger survey, by Gaon Connection-Lokniti (25,300 
respondents in 179 districts across 20 states and 
three union territories) found a much lower 20 
per cent of households who wanted work actually 
getting it during the months of June and July, i.e a 
very high rationing rate of 80 per cent.16
The India Working Survey (IWS) is another 
window into the working of MGNREGA during 
the pandemic for the states of Karnataka and 
Rajasthan, this time for a random 
sample of rural households (rather 
than chosen purposively as is the 
case with most Covid surveys). First, 
we note that in this sample survey, in 
the baseline period (February 2020), 
there were large variations between 
the two states in MGNREGA awareness and use. 
Thirty-five per cent of rural households were not 
even aware of the programme in Karnataka, while 
this number was only two per cent in Rajasthan. 
Even among poor households (with BPL or 
Antyodaya ration cards) these proportions remained 
the same. Further, the proportion of those who had 
either worked in the programme or had a job card 
was just over 60 per cent in Rajasthan but only 22 
per cent in Karnataka.
The second (phone) round asked the same 
respondents if they were able to get work under 
MGNREGA in the period between April and 
September 2020. As expected from the baseline 
programme performance, the difference during 
the pandemic is stark. In the panel sample (which 
is a little different from the field sample), the 
percentage of respondents having a job card in 
Karnataka was 29 per cent compared to 72 per 
cent in Rajasthan. Among those having job cards, 
less than a quarter got work in Karnataka, whereas 
more than half did in Rajasthan. Amongst those 
who worked, the median number of days worked 
during this period was 15 in Karnataka as against 26 
in Rajasthan. The distribution of the number of days 
worked is shown in Figure 7.3a. When asked how 
many days more would they have liked to work, 
the median response in Karnataka was 30 days, as 
compared to 90 days in Rajasthan. The distribution 
of the number of days of work demanded is  
shown in Figure 7.3b.
It is important to note that while 50 per cent of 
the respondents in Karnataka say that they did 
not have a job card and were not interested in 
working in MGNREGA, this does not necessarily 
mean that they would not work if the scheme 
was functioning well. There is evidence to show 
that continued rationing out of workers from the 
scheme discourages them from demanding work 
(Narayanan et al. 2016).17 For example, in Bihar, 
where the programme has not functioned too well 
historically, the RCRC survey conducted in June-July 
2020 (3,093 households across 12 districts) found 
that a mere 11 per cent of poor rural households 
with incomes less than I2,500, had availed of  
the programme.18
In addition to being a crucial safety net for millions 
of workers, including returning migrants, recent 
work has also shown that during the pandemic, 
MGNREGA was able to increase women’s 
employment in rural areas by 8.6 percentage points. 
Where the programme ran well, it also drew in 
women previously out of the labour force.19 And 
strikingly, stories have even emerged during the 
Azim Premji University CLIPS showed large 
unmet demand for MGNREGA work even 
as late as October-November 2020.
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pandemic of students taking to work under the 
programme in order to pay for examination fees 
and other educational expenses.20
Acknowledging these roles as well as the fact 
that the funding, even in normal times, has been 
inadequate considering the demand for work, it 
was hoped that the 2021-22 Union Budget would 
provide a much needed fillip to the programme. 
However, that has not happened. The allocation 
for MGNREGA stands at I73,000 crore for the 
current financial year – 34 percent less than the 
revised estimates (actual spending) of I1,11,500 
crore for 2020-21. Further, it is only 2 percent more 
than what was actually spent in 2019-20, a normal 
year (I71,600 crore). That is, spending in real terms 
has gone down from what it was in a normal pre-
Covid year, even when the pandemic is not over 
and the effects on the labour market are likely to 
persist for some time to come. An indication of the 
programme’s need at the present juncture is that 
an estimated 25.7 million households worked under 
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MGNREGA in April 2021, the highest for that month 
since 2013.21 There is an urgent need to expand the 
programme and some of the calls made in May last 
year such as the demand for ‘a million worksites’ 
and other suggestions for programme improvement 
remain valid a year later.22
7.2.4 / Building and other 
construction workers  (BOCW) 
welfare fund
Given that most construction workers tend to rely 
on daily wages, in the immediate aftermath of the 
announcement of the lockdown, the Ministry of 
Labour issued an advisory to all States and Union 
Territories to utilize the cess fund of approximately 
I31,000 crore in their respective state construction 
worker welfare funds to transfer funds in the 
bank accounts of construction workers through 
DBT mode. The amount to be granted to the 
construction workers was to be decided by the 
respective State Governments. It is important to 
note that only those construction workers who 
are registered with the Construction Boards could 
receive these funds. There are an estimated  55 
million construction workers in India (as per the 
Periodic Labour Force Survey, 2018-19) of which 35 
million are registered.
However, data released by the Ministry of Labour 
and Employment show that only around 18 million 
workers benefited from cash transfers by state 
governments and approximately I5,000 crores (16 
per cent of the total cess funds of I31,000 crore) 
had been disbursed. As of June 2020, states such as 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand had not done 
any cash transfer for over 4 million construction 
workers registered with them, while the highest 
amount of cash had been given by Uttar Pradesh, 
Odisha and Tamil Nadu. The coverage of the 
construction workers was the lowest in Delhi, 
where only about 5 per cent of the estimated 
workers received cash.23 More recent data on 
disbursals are not available at time of writing.
In Gujarat, the Self Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) 
filed a petition inquiring why the 
cess collected as part of BOCW 
Welfare Board to the tune of I250 
crore was transferred to the ‘Chief 
Minister Welfare scheme for Poor’. 
The petition noted that SEWA as a central trade 
union had organised 27,000 construction workers 
in Gujarat and it urged the Gujarat government to 
register the construction workers with the welfare 
board, renew their registration and disburse money 
to construction workers. It also asked that the 
transfer of I250 crore to the ‘Gujarat Mukhyamantri 
Garib Kalyan Yojana’ implemented by the State 
Government in the wake of Covid-19 pandemic, be 
declared a violation of the Central Construction 
Workers Act.24
Given that a large number of workers have been 
unable to receive benefits for various reasons, the 
Ministry of Labour and Employment is undertaking 
a Mission Mode Project to cover all eligible 
construction workers and provide social security to 
them. Through this project, the government aims to 
fast-track the registration of the excluded workers, 
allow portability of benefits, universalisation 
of social security schemes on health insurance 
through Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM 
-JAY), life and disability cover through Pradhaan 
Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojna (PMJJBY) and 
Pradhaan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojna (PMSBY), 
life-long pension during old age through Pradhaan 
Mantri Shram-Yogi Maandhan Yojna (PM-SYM) and 
provision of transit accommodations in large cities. 
It also proposes to include subsistence allowance, 
such as unemployment benefits, for use during  
the pandemic. 
In the most recent budget, MGNREGA 
spending has gone down in real terms 
from what it was pre-Covid.
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To enable widespread registration of workers, the 
government is also planning to give workers a 
facility to self-register or opt for renewal of their 
registration – through an online or missed call 
facility and self-declaration by submitting Aadhaar 
and bank account details (without the need to 
submit employers’ data). It is also planning to 
offer cash incentives for registration or renewal of 
construction workers. The government will also 
push the States for better utilisation of the cess 
funds meant for construction workers. 
Additionally, given that there is no dynamic all-
India portal and every state has its individual 
database which may or may not be able to transfer 
their data from other databases, the government 
is proposing to issue a migration certificate to all 
workers once they are registered online through 
their mobile number. Under the proposed system, 
once the worker migrates to some other state, the 
data will be uploaded on a national portal and a 
new registration number will be given by the state 
where the worker is going to work.
7.2.5 / Employee Provident 
Fund system
In the foregoing we have focused primarily on 
programmes that pertain to the informal workforce. 
But before concluding this section, we briefly 
take stock of the ways in which the Employee 
Provident Fund (EPF) system was used during the 
crisis. Administrative data from the EPFO show 
that workers dipped into their retirement savings 
in order to tide over the crisis. As part of the relief 
package, the Union government allowed EPFO 
subscribers to withdraw savings not exceeding 
three months’ salary. During the months of April to 
August 2020, the EPFO disbursed I35,445 crores in 
response to 9.4 million claims, settling 32 per cent 
more claims as compared to corresponding  
period last year.25
The EPF system was also used to provide implicit 
wage subsidies to employers under the Atmanirbhar 
Bharat Rozgar Yojana (ABRY). This scheme 
incentivised employers to create jobs by paying 
both employee and employer contributions, or 
24 per cent of wages for new workers. Data as of 
January 2021, indicate that around 4.7 lakh workers 
and employers benefited from this scheme.26  
It should be noted that this use of the EPF system 
to stimulate new employment by subsidising the 
employer contribution to the fund pre-dates  
the pandemic, under the name PM Rozgar 
Protsahan Yojana.
7.3 / State-level 
innovations and 
experiments
The policies and measures discussed thus far were 
all at the Government of India level. But states have 
been at the forefront of the struggle against the 
pandemic. We now briefly discuss some examples 
of innovative or interesting efforts by various state 
governments that go beyond the relief and support 
offered at the Central level. More details on the 
policies mentioned below, as well as additional 
policies can be seen in Appendix Table 15 as well as 
in several online resources available on state-level 
responses.27
Before we look at Covid support, it is worth noting 
that states have consistently been innovators in 
social policy, with several national policies being 
born out of earlier state-level schemes. Prominent 
examples include MGNREGA born out of a scheme 
in Maharashtra, PM-KISAN out of schemes in 
Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, and welfare boards 
in which Kerala has been a leader. Social welfare 
policies of states such as Tamil Nadu (e.g. universal 
PDS) as well as efforts at transparency by states 
like Rajasthan (e.g Jan Soochna Portal) can also be 
mentioned in this respect.
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A recent comprehensive report on state-level policy 
action during the pandemic by Bhan et al (2020) 
focuses on three areas of relief: food, cash transfer 
and labour protection. The report analyses 181 
announcements on food (89), cash transfer (68), and 
labour protections (24) from various sources such 
as PRS Legislative, legal database 
Manupatra, and the citizen-run 
Covid-19 Government Order. 
Three themes are dealt with: how 
beneficiaries were identified, how 
the size and form of entitlements 
was determined and how entitlements  
were delivered.
The pandemic exposed the inadequacies of existing 
databases to identify vulnerable households. 
This meant states had to use multiple databases 
creatively to identify the beneficiaries. The authors 
note several ways of employing and augmenting 
databases to identify beneficiaries. The first is 
to use an existing database to deliver relief—for 
example, the provision of dry rations to the ration 
cardholders. Second, providing relief to those 
adjacent to the database—for example, people 
with a pending application for registration under 
specific schemes. Third, the expansion of an 
existing database by correcting for exclusions. 
Fourth, using an alternate database as a proxy—for 
example, occupational status is used as a proxy for 
vulnerability and addressing possible exclusions 
from specific social protection schemes. Some 
examples of such actions were noted earlier in the 
context of cash transfers. In addition, the Uttar 
Pradesh government announced free rations to 
MGNREGA workers and construction workers, 
thereby using the occupational status to deliver 
rations through the PDS. Fifth, creating new 
databases with expanded criteria—for example, 
the Bihar government ordered district officials to 
list the migrants who do not fall under the NFSA 
coverage or state PDS. They were asked to note 
down the Aadhar number of each beneficiary and 
the mobile number of at least one person per 
household. In another instance, self-identification 
was used as a criterion to provide relief to wage 
earners by the government of Meghalaya. These 
attempts were made to reach the vulnerable 
beyond the existing databases of various  
social schemes. 
Finally, there was the option of doing away with 
identification and providing universal support—for 
example, many states had set up food distribution 
centres where anyone in need could get food. The 
caveat with universal delivery is that generally, 
the relief on offer was not substantial. The 
pressing question is whether relief with substantial 
entitlement should be delivered universally.
7.3.1 / Augmentation of PDS and 
cash transfers
Free-of-cost grains and other essential food items 
have formed the cornerstone of Covid relief policy 
in the sense that the system used to deliver them 
has the widest reach of any social protection 
policy. Here states have gone beyond Central 
support in three crucial ways – expanding the list 
of beneficiaries, expanding the quantity as well as 
types of entitlements, and trying new methods  
of delivery.
As mentioned earlier, several states had expanded 
their lists of PDS beneficiaries beyond the NFSA 
guidelines even before the crisis. Tamil Nadu, for 
example, has had a universal PDS for many years 
(in fact it never moved from an initial universal 
to a targeted version). These states were able to 
reach a larger proportion of households as a result 
of the previous expansion efforts. During the 
crisis, several states expanded the list to include 
households with Above Poverty Line (APL) cards 
States have consistently been innovators in 
social policy, with several national policies 
being born out of earlier state-level schemes.
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as well as non-card holders (see Appendix Table 
15). For example, Gujarat announced that APL card 
holders would receive free grains, sugar and pulses 
in April and May on par with BPL holders. That the 
crisis created a huge demand for subsidised grain 
is indicated by the example of Delhi where the 
state government launched an e-coupon system 
to expand PDS to non-card holders. It expected to 
receive around 10 lakh applications, but instead got 
five times that number, at 54 lakh. Bihar similarly 
expanded its programme to include 2.3 million new 
cards (reaching 10 million new beneficiaries).28
In terms of the entitlements, once again, several 
states have, over the years, expanded the range 
of items provided. For example, Karnataka had 
already included millets in PDS. In this state, during 
the months of April and May, ration kits were 
expanded to include daal (as protein source), soap, 
menstrual hygiene products, and masks.29 Rajasthan 
announced additional entitlements of 15 kg wheat 
and 3 kg of pulses per person for three months and 
3.5 kg atta, 1/2 litre cooking oil, 1/2 kg salt, 1 kg dal, 
and 1 kg rice free of cost for those not covered 
under NFSA. Finally, for delivery, recognising the 
difficulties that households would likely encounter 
in visiting Fair Price Shops, states have also 
experimented with home delivery of food rations.30
We have seen earlier that cash transfers made at 
the national level were inadequate both at the 
extensive margin, leaving out perhaps as many 
as half of all poor households, and the intensive 
margin, falling far short of compensating for the 
decrease in incomes that majority of informal 
workers have experienced. As a result, several states 
augmented the basic Jan Dhan cash transfer with 
transfers of their own to targeted groups such as 
weavers, auto and cab drivers, migrant workers 
stranded in other states, the old and the infirm, 
personal service workers such as barbers, dhobis 
(washermen and women), domestic workers and 
other vulnerable groups.
For example, Delhi announced I5,000 one-time 
transfer to transport service providers, and an 
equivalent amount to those registered with the 
BoCW. Karnataka announced a variety of one-time 
transfers - I1,000 for BoCW workers, I5,000 for 
washermen, barbers, auto and taxi drivers, I2,000 
for handloom weavers, and I2,000 for artists and 
writers. Tamil Nadu announced I1,000 for all ration 
cardholders, I1,000 to construction workers, small 
vendors, and auto drivers registered with their 
respective welfare boards, a I1,000 for members 
of the 14 state welfare boards. The beneficiaries 
include sanitation workers, firecracker workers, 
cine workers, fishermen, and transgender people. 
Overall the aim was to ensure that every poor 
household receives at least I1,000 cash transfer. 
Further the government decided to hand out 
cash directly to the beneficiaries relying on its 
robust network of ration shops (PDS distribution 
centres) instead of relying on direct bank transfers, 
which has several challenges in terms of last-mile 
accessibility, as discussed earlier. Andhra Pradesh 
also experimented with home delivery of cash 
for those who were not able to 
reach banks, ATMs or Common 
Service Points (CSPs). A related 
measure is direct purchase of 
goods from microenterprises, such 
as Karnataka government’s plan to 
purchase saris from struggling weavers.31 
However, no systematic data are available on 
what proportion of the target groups have actually 
received the transfers in any given state. 
In Tamil Nadu cash support was delivered 
through ration shops instead of relying only 
on direct bank transfers.
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7.3.2 / Urban employment 
generation programmes
Of the World Bank’s list of 621 measures across 
173 countries compiled by  Gentilini, Almenfi, and 
Dale (2020), half were cash-based. Most of the rest 
related to food assistance (23 per cent) or waiver/ 
postponement of financial obligations (25 per cent). 
Only 2 per cent related to public works, a clear 
indication of the popularity of cash transfers over 
public works for income support, perhaps in part 
due to concerns over physical distancing during  
the pandemic.
But in India, as we saw earlier, the existence of 
MGNREGA proved to be an essential way in which 
income support could be delivered to vulnerable 
households via self-targeting. In places where 
MGNREGA work was not attractive to returning 
migrants who had been doing relatively more skilled 
jobs in their destination towns and cities, local 
communities also innovated. In Karnataka 3.6 lakh 
returning migrants were listed by panchayats and 
work was created for them in painting of schools 
and other such activities which are typically not 
part of MGNREGA.32
While MGNREGA existed in the rural areas, there 
was no such safety net available to urban informal 
workers.33 Taking this into account, several states 
experimented with such programmes during the 
pandemic. These include Odisha’s Urban Wage 
Employment Initiative (UWEI), Himachal Pradesh’s 
Mukhyamantri Shahri Aajeevika Guarantee Yojana 
and Jharkhand’s Mukhyamantri Shramik Yojana. 
In addition, Kerala’s Ayyankali Urban Employment 
Guarantee Scheme has been running for a few 
years already and can provide some lessons for the 
way forward at the national level (Chathukulam et 
al. 2021). Box 7.1 summarizes the key features of 
the new programmes as well as of the 
Ayyankali scheme.
A national level programme is still 
worth considering because the state-
level schemes, even when they have 
been billed as job guarantees (such as in Himachal, 
Jharkhand, and Kerala), remain quite limited in their 
budgetary allocations and hence are unlikely to 
be true guarantees. Moreover, the state of state 
finances during the pandemic also make it difficult 
for these programmes to be expanded.34 A possible 
shape for a national urban employment guarantee 
programme has also been outlined in Basole et 
al (2019). We discuss this and other proposals for 
urban public works in Chapter Eight.
Several states experimented with  
urban employment programmes during 
the pandemic.
Box 7.1 : State-level urban employment guarantee schemes
Odisha: Urban Wage Employment Initiative (now 
Mukhyamantri Karma Tatpara Abhiyan)
• Date of Operationalisation: 18th April, 2020. 
• Objective: Urban poor largely in the informal 
sector to get immediate wages by execution of 
labour-intensive projects.
• Budget: Rs 100 Crore; 70:30 between wage and 
material cost components.
• State Agency (planning, coordination and 
monitoring): Housing and Urban Development 
Department.
• Local Agency (implementation and operations): 
Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) with SHGs, SHG 
federations and Slum Dwellers Associations.
• Work days provision in a financial year: no 
maximum limit.
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• Eligibility Criteria: Workers of the local area will be 
given preference while work allocation. Workers 
have to at least be from the ULB concerned.
• Implementation architecture and entitlements of 
workers
1. Every ULB has a Ward Level Committee 
to prepare a “List of Projects”. Ward Level 
Committee consists of representatives from 
Government (AE/JE), SHGs, Slum Dwellers 
Association.
2. Suggested list of projects prepared by the Ward 
Level Committee to be finalized by ULB Level 
Committee. This Committee will consist of 
representatives from Government and SHGs.
3. Implementing agency of works will be SHG/
Slum Dwellers Association if the project costs 
less than I1 lakh. If estimated cost is greater 
than I1 lakh, the implementing Agency will be 
the ULB.
4. Assistant Engineer/Junior Engineer is 
responsible for preparing the plan and estimate 
of projects.
5. Final list of projects with plan and estimate 
shall be placed in the Council for administrative 
approval.
6. List of final projects in the public domain.
7. Once a work has the required approvals, Muster 
Rolls will be issued for the work. Muster Rolls 
will be maintained by the implementing agency. 
Wages and Material expenses due will be 
credited to the implementing agency, who in 
turn will credit it to workers and vendors.
8. Implementing agencies will be paid a 
‘supervising charge’ of 7.5 per cent of the 
project cost.
• Payment of Wages: Minimum wages to be notified 
by the Labour or ESI ministry. A DBT will be made 
to the beneficiary’s account on a weekly basis. 
• Types of Jobs: Focus on monsoon preparedness 
and creation of public assets and maintenance in 
ULBs, storm water drainage, rainwater harvesting 
structures in public places, development of new 
water bodies, parks/playgrounds based on local 
needs and vacant government land availability, 
Increase in green cover and beautification, 
sanitation, building community centres and open 
space development which include micro centres 
for SHG, Involving local artisans for beautifying 
cities through wall paintings and murals
• Other components include- a well-defined SOP, 
Workers’ rights around basic worksite facilities in 
terms of clean drinking water, support for child-
care etc. Quality control mechanism through 
technology solutions for geo tagging works, 
performance monitoring, as well as enhanced 
transparency and accountability.
• Update: Original programme ended September 
30th. In January 2021 expanded into Mukhyamantri 
Karma Tatpara Abhiyan described as ‘an urban 
equivalent of NREGS and wages of workers would 
be credited to their bank account through Direct 
Benefit Transfer’.35
Himachal Pradesh: Mukhya Mantri Shahri 
Ajeevika Guarentee Yojana (MMSAGY) 
• Date of Operationalisation: 16th May, 2020.
• Objective: Enhance livelihood security in urban 
areas by providing guaranteed wage employment 
to every household.
• Budget: New funding NOT made available; 
program sanctioned for the current financial year 
(employment to be provided in on-going works/
contracts).
• State Agency (planning, coordination and 
monitoring): Department of Urban Development.
• Local Agency (implementation and operations): 
Urban Local Bodies and Cantonment Boards.
• Work days provision in a financial year: 120 days 
per household (guarantee as well as maximum).
• Eligibility criteria: A local resident of the ULB 
(home-owner or renter) aged below 65 years.
• Implementation architecture and entitlements of 
workers-
1. Beneficiaries will also be provided with skill 
training under DDU-NULM
2. Eligible beneficiaries can apply to be registered 
with their ULB
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3. After due verification, ULB will issue a job card 
within 7 days of registration request
4. Employment to be given to a person seeking it 
within 15 days of him/her demanding it. If not, 
ULB will pay a daily unemployment allowance 
of Rs 75 per day
5. All accounts and information pertaining to the 
scheme will be in the public domain
• Payment of Wages: 
1. Minimum wage notified by the state 
government
2. Equal wages for male and female workers
3. DBT on fortnightly basis not later than 7 days 
after completion of 15 days employment
4. To be paid after due verification of the 
attendance by the Junior Engineer or any other 
official authorized by the ULB
5. In case of an external implementing agency 
contracted for work, payment made to the 
beneficiary will be adjusted/deducted from the 
bills of the implementing agency before making 
its payment 
• Types of Jobs: Any ongoing or new admissible 
work under GoHP and GoI scheme for which 
funds are available at ULBs, Any admissible work 
under 15th FC or 5th State FC for which grant-in-
aid is provided to the ULBs 3. Sanitation works/
services as admissible under SWM Rules 2016 and 
Swachh Bharat Mission
Kerala: Ayyankali Urban Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (AUEGS)
• Date of Operationalisation: 2011
• Objective: Enhancing the livelihood Security 
of people in urban area by guaranteeing wage 
employment to urban household whose adult 
members are willing to do unskilled manual work.
• Budget: I100 Crore (2020-21) vis-à-vis I30 Crore 
allocated for 2019-20 financial year.
• State Agency (planning, coordination and 
monitoring): The Local Self Government 
Department, the State Urban Employment 
Guarantee Council and the State Urban 
Employment Guarantee Mission.
• Local Agency (implementation and operations): 
District Planning Committee, ULBs and Ward 
Sabha/Ward Committees.
• Work days provision in a financial year: 100 days 
per household
• Eligibility Criteria: Resident of the ULB, 18+ years 
of age and willing to do unskilled work.
• Implementation architecture and entitlements of 
workers-
1. Applications for registration received and 
verified by ULB
2. Households registered: Job-cards provided to 
each registered household
3. Households having job cards registering 
demand for work with ULB
4. Dated acknowledgement slip provided for each 
demand for work application
5. Work to be provided within 15 days of demand 
for application being submitted
6. If work not provided within 15 days of being 
sought- applicant eligible for unemployment 
allowance as per Payment of Wages Act
7. Workers to be provided work within a radius of 
5km from residence
8. Worksite facilities to include water, child care 
and first aid facilities
9. Men and Women workers paid equally
10. Wages to be paid within 15 days
• Payment of Wages-
1. All workers (men and women) are entitled to 
the notified wage rate of I271 (increase to I300 
is pending approval)
2. Wages should be paid within a week or fifteen 
days at the most through DBT
3. Funds released to ULB in advance to implement
• Types of Jobs: Solid waste management and 
sanitation works, water conservation and 
water harvesting for enhanced water Security 
(recharge pits, well construction, recharging), 
land development, drought-proofing and flood 
management, afforestation, construction works 
under various state and central housing schemes, 
works around livestock management, fisheries, 
irrigation of canals, micro irrigation and rural 
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road construction, coastal area works such as 
construction of fish drying yards, Anganwadi 
buildings.
• Other components: (A) Strong workers’ rights (B) 
Quality control mechanism both through social 
audits at ward levels as well as monitoring of 
works at ULB, regional, and state level (monitoring 
of 100 per cent, 10 per cent, and  per cent works 
respectively) (C) Well-defined SOP (D) Phase-
wise disbursement of funds to ULBs based on set 
milestones of expenditure
Jharkhand: Mukhya Mantri Shahri Rozgar 
Guarantee Yojana
• Date of Operationalisation: 2nd October, 2020
• Objective: To provide 100 days of guaranteed 
employment to families residing in urban areas 
and willing to do unskilled manual work.
• Budget: Rs 100 crore (2020-21).
• State Agency (planning, coordination and 
monitoring): Urban Development Department
• Local Agency (implementation and operations): 
Urban Local Bodies.
• Work days provision in a financial year: 100 days 
per households.
• Eligibility Criteria: Workers living in urban areas 
since 2015, workers who have been living in shelter 
homes since three years, workers should not be 
having a MGNREGA job card.
• Implementation architecture and entitlements of 
workers- 
1. Implementing agency is Urban Development 
Department and the head of the civic body will 
be the nodal officer
2. Every ward to prepare an “Integrated Annual 
Labour Plan/Scheme” by January of every year
3. It will be the responsibility of the implementing 
agency to provide information related to 
ongoing schemes in wards and person-days of 
work required per scheme with the ward
4. Shelf of works to be provided for every ward. 
This shall have to be discussed and endorsed by 
the Ward Sabha
5. Once the works are approved by the Ward 
Sabha, it will have to be endorsed by the civic 
body concerned
6. One “Community Resource Person” will be 
appointed for 2 wards to demand registration 
of work, provide information pertaining to work 
allocation, and receive grievances by workers.
7. A transaction based MIS will govern the 
implementation of the programme, and it shall 
be public
8. Ward will be responsible for identifying all 
eligible families/workers and ensure that they 
are provided with a job card, bank account and 
to help them in accessing benefits from other 
schemes that they are eligible for
9. Workers can demand for work, individually and 
as a group, in writing or orally and have a right 
to receive a dated acknowledgement slip
10. All worksites should have the following 
facilities: water, first-aid, creche, shade
11. Work should be provided within the ward that 
the worker resides in. If not the same ward, 
the worker has to be allocated to work at a 
worksite within 2km of the place of residence 
and travel allowance up to 10% of the wage is 
payable
• Payment of Wages-
1. Workers are entitled to state minimum wage 
to be credited to their bank accounts within 15 
days of completion of work.
2. Unemployment allowance to workers for not 
receiving work within 15 days of demanding it.
3. If wages are delayed, the worker is entitled 
to compensation which is recovered from the 
official found to be the cause of delay.
• Types of Jobs: Cleaning of drains, roads, parks, 
market, bus stands, public toilets, rain water 
harvesting activities, afforestation, construction 
repair, road repair, painting, laying of cables, 
restoration of footpaths and cycle paths, 
protecting drinking water source, surveying work, 
caregiving for ill and elderly, caregiving in shelter 
homes, juvenile justice homes and women’s cells.
We thank Rakshita Swamy for compiling the 
information provided in this box.
171
7. Effectiveness of the Covid-19 policy response
7.4 / Private sector 
relief efforts
The unprecedented scale of the Covid crisis has 
meant that private citizens and organisations have 
stepped up alongside public institutions, to offer 
relief and support. In this report while we focus 
primarily on public policy, it is important to take 
note of private sector efforts.
Official data on spending by the private sector 
towards Covid-relief are not available at one place. 
This is an attempt to highlight key efforts, curated 
from various sources. The private sector was 
incentivised by the government to spend towards 
Covid relief by making such spending eligible for 
mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
spending (2 per cent of annual profits).
From data available via Invest India36 (September 
2020) and Sattva Consulting37  (a CSR consulting 
firm; September 2020), total CSR spending in 2019-
20 was approximately I18,600 crores (by around 
20,000 companies), of which the private sector 
contributed 80 per cent and Central Public Sector 
Enterprises (CPSEs) contributed the remaining 20 
per cent. Two-thirds of this was contributed by 
around 300 companies. Based on a survey of 39 
organisations and secondary data on around 300 
others, Sattva estimates that more than 50 per cent 
of estimated CSR spending for 2020-21, projected 
at I15,000 crores, has been diverted to Covid relief. 
Of this more than two-thirds has gone towards 
the PM-CARES fund (more than four-fifths to 
PM-CARES in the case of CPSEs). An analysis of 
announcements by Sattva of top 300 companies 
(groups) points to I5,300 crores of commitment 
to PM-CARES and I2,500 crores to other forms of 
COVID relief. 
While there is an overlap in spending and it is 
difficult to separate philanthropic initiatives 
from efforts carried out via the CSR route, it is 
worth mentioning the contributions of leading 
businesspersons in areas requiring immediate 
as well as medium term attention. According to 
the EdelGive Hurun India Philanthropy List 2020 
(released in November 2020) which analysed annual 
reports and announcements made in 2020 of 
contributions by the top business owners in India 
pegs the contribution of top ten donors towards 
philanthropic initiatives of close to Rs. 10,300 
crores.38
The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) 
through its newsletters and blogs has published 
aggregated and detailed data on relief work 
carried out collectively by itself and affiliated 
organisations.39 The industry body claims to have 
helped around 80 lakh beneficiaries through the 
efforts of its corporate members. Sixty six lakh 
hygiene materials were provided which included 
around 24 lakh masks, 13 lakh gloves, 1.4 lakh 
PPEs and 28 lakh sanitizers and soaps. They also 
provided food related support to 70 lakh people 
which included 24 lakh cooked meals, 20 lakh 
ration kits and distribution of 1700 tonnes of food 
grain. Beneficiaries included daily wage earners, 
migrants, people with disabilities, marginal farmers, 
elderly, children, women workers and nomadic 
tribes etc. Similar work was carried out by other 
industry bodies such as FICCI40 and NASSCOM 
Foundation.41  Qualitatively speaking, in addition 
to food related relief, the private sector also 
funded setting up of Covid-19 testing kiosks,42 
patient help-desks at various hospitals, helpline for 
counselling the impacted43 and skills training for the 
unemployed.
In addition to CSR spending by corporates, some 
others have formed collaboratives to pool funds and 
expertise for Covid relief. One such collaborative 
is the Action Covid-19 Team (ACT) with a 
commitment of I100 crores of relief spending by a 
few venture capital and private equity firms in India. 
Various well-funded and early stage disruptive/ 
platform businesses such as Zomato44 have also 
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been reported in various sections of the media to 
have run crowdfunding platforms on their websites 
for their associates (gig workers) but little is known 
about their direct funding of relief efforts.
7.5 / Migrant workers 
as a test-case for social 
protection systems
As India struggles with the second wave of Covid 
infections in April 2021, we are seeing disturbing 
echoes of events from the national lockdown in 
April and May 2020 which are seared on the public 
consciousness; workers and their families walking 
thousands of kilometers in the summer heat, trying 
to reach their rural destinations in the hope of 
surviving without an income. In fact, every stage of 
the pandemic has been characterized by different 
types of distress faced by migrant workers. In the 
first two stages of the lockdown the primary need 
of stranded migrants was food and some money 
to buy basic essentials. While they were struggling 
to meet food and cash needs, their woes were 
compounded by the chaos created by the lack of 
clear and consistent policy vis-a-vis travel back to 
home states. Eventually, for those who were able to 
return to their villages, MGNREGA works did offer 
a temporary reprieve but both the number of days 
that work was available as well as the wage rate 
left a lot to be desired. By July and August workers 
started returning back to destination cities resulting 
in a second wave of migration within a few months. 
7.5.1 / Multiple 
vulnerabilities
Due to the specific combination of 
vulnerabilities they face, migrant 
workers have proved to be a hard 
case for effective social protection 
policy. Conventionally migration 
is categorized into three broad groups- permanent, 
semi-permanent or long-term circular migration, 
and short-term seasonal or circular migration 
(Srivastava and Sasikumar 2005; Srivastava 2011a; 
2011b). Migration can result in the permanent 
relocation of an individual or household and this 
is referred to as permanent migration. Since such 
workers and households usually have domicile 
papers and status as full citizens in the destination 
state, their situation is not as precarious when it 
comes to social protection. Semi-permanent or 
long term circular migrants, on the other hand, 
are those who migrate leaving their families, and 
land and property in the area of origin, often with 
the intention of returning to the area of origin. As 
compared to permanent migrants, semi-permanent 
migrants lack a strong civic identity and citizenship 
status at destination. They also participate in the 
labour market in less favourable ways than non-
migrants because of debt-interlocking, involvement 
in subcontracting chains, greater isolation, 
fragmentation, and segmentation. They have 
much weaker social networks than non-migrants 
(although these are usually the most important 
resource that they do have).
Seasonal or short duration circular migrants are 
those who migrate for temporary periods, either 
moving from place to place or to a fixed destination, 
returning to their place of origin after brief periods, 
at the most, after a few months (De 2020). Most 
reside at work-sites or in the open, while a small 
percentage live in crowded tenanted places. 
Seasonal migrants usually belong to poorer and 
landless groups than long term circular migrants. 
India Human Development Surveys (IHDS) data 
show that almost half of all short duration circular 
Class, caste, ethnic or linguistic identity, and 
lack of stable residence as well as political voice 
render casual wage migrants in industries such 
as construction, the most precarious and hard 
to reach with social protection policies.
173
7. Effectiveness of the Covid-19 policy response
migrants enter the migrant labour market through 
contractors/middlemen from whom they have 
taken an advance and are therefore more likely to 
be involved in debt-interlocked migration cycles.
Seasonal migrants are the most vulnerable and 
their conditions of work and living (two thirds 
of seasonal migrants live on worksites) severely 
constrain their ability to access social protection. 
Not only do they find it difficult to establish their 
bonafides and identity in the destination areas, but 
their entitlements and claims even in their areas 
of origin are much weaker. This includes lack of 
access to the PDS and, in many cases, even to the 
banking system (Srivastava 2020). The combination 
of vulnerabilities (class, caste, ethnic or linguistic 
identity, and lack of stable residence as well as 
political voice) render casual wage migrants in 
industries such as construction, the most precarious 
and hard to reach with social protection policies.
7.5.2 / Estimating the migrant 
workforce
There are no precise statistics on the number 
of migrant workers in India or on the number of 
migrants who went back to their villages. Though 
official estimates place the number of ‘reverse 
migrants’ at 10 million, the actual number is likely 
to be much higher. Not only the extent of reverse 
migration, but also the number of migrant workers 
in general, is uncertain. The Government of India 
stated in its affidavit to the Supreme Court on 31st 
March 2020 that India had 41.4 million migrant 
workers. This figure comes from the 2011 Census 
and accounts for only those who had given 
employment as a reason for the change in their 
usual place of residence. But this is likely to be 
an underestimate because as per the same 2011 
census, among the 450 million internal migrants, 195 
million were workers. In addition, many migrants 
(particularly women) do not give employment as 
a reason for migration; they instead cite other 
associational reasons like moving with family (e.g. 
due to marriage). The Census is also not designed 
to measure short-term circular migration. 
A second source of data on the number of migrant 
workers are the NSS Employment-Unemployment 
and Migration Surveys in 1999-00 (55th Round) 
and 2007-08 (64th Round), but even these may 
not capture the magnitude of short term seasonal 
or circular migrants (Srivastava, 2011a, 2012a). 
Srivastava (2020) estimates short-term circular and 
vulnerable long-term circular migrants in the urban 
workforce at 44 million and 67 million respectively 
(2017-18). Thus the total vulnerable migrant 
workforce is estimated at 111 million in 2017-18. As a 
percentage of all vulnerable workers in urban areas, 
this works out to 65 percent of the total vulnerable 
urban workforce in urban areas. These figures not 
only highlight the significant presence of circular 
migrants in the urban economy but also the fact 
that these workers account for a disproportionately 
large share of the urban vulnerable workforce.
In this context of the uncertainty around numbers, 
we note that the Ministry of Labour has recently 
commissioned five special surveys to be conducted 
by the Labour Bureau, one of which is focused on 
migrant workers.45 The lack of data on migrant 
workers clearly emerged as a confounding factor in 
delivering relief and rehabilitation services with the 
Centre itself clearly admitting the non-availability 
of any data on the number of migrants across the 
country.46 As Gulzar, a SWAN fellow notes in their 
interview with us:
We are called mazdoor because we work. There 
should be a registry of the labour, so if someone 
has left from Jharkhand to go to Goa, then 
Goa should know that these people are coming. 
Because if something happens to us, no one takes 
any responsibility. Wherever anyone goes, it should 
be noted in the registry. So, if something happens 
to me, I should be able to fill out a form which will 
reach my home state and then it can be resolved. 
So, if the contractor mistreats someone then 
action can be taken against them. There should be 
some laws that protect us when we are not in our 
home state.
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7.5.3 / Impact of the pandemic and 
reach of protection measures
Circular migrants are likely to have borne the 
harshest impact of the Covid-19 shock. Several 
Covid impact surveys have gathered data on 
migrant workers. In addition three reports released 
by the Stranded Workers Action Network (SWAN), 
are a valuable source of information on the 
situation facing these workers during the lockdown 
in April and May 2020. One such report, ‘To Leave 
or not to Leave: Lockdown, Migrant Workers and 
their Journeys Home’, carries the findings of a 
phone survey of 1,963 migrant workers, who had 
reached out to SWAN for assistance in April and 
May. It was found that 67 per cent of migrants were 
still stuck in the same place since the lockdown 
was announced. Of those who were stuck, 55 
per cent (out of 1,166 persons) want to go home 
immediately. The figure was lower (33 per cent) 
when the same set of workers were asked this 
question earlier at the end of April, indicating that 
their situation grew worse over time. 75 per cent of 
workers said they were still stuck in places they had 
migrated to for work, and they did not have any 
employment. 
Out of 1,559 workers, about 80 per cent had taken 
loans during the lockdown period and about 15 
per cent had borrowed more than I8,000. SWAN 
data show that 84 per cent of the migrant workers 
surveyed did not get their wages. And another 12 
per cent received only partial wages. Many lost 
worksite shelters, and those residing in rented 
accommodation were evicted because of failure  
to pay rent.
Sima Kumari, a SWAN fellow, highlights the basic 
demands of migrant workers in an her interview 
with us:
81% migrants lost employment in the 
lockdown compared to 64% non-migrants. 
31% reported not being able to access rations 
compared to 15% non-migrants.
Workers should get some accommodation, food 
services near their workplace. Only that can ensure 
that people will stay where they are. If they close 
the factory where we work, where will we go? So, 
they should be allowed to stay where they are, and 
they should also look after the workers’ health in 
case they fall sick
In terms of access to relief, the SWAN report, ‘32 
Days and Counting: Covid-19 Lockdown, Migrant 
Workers, and the Inadequacy of Welfare Measures 
in India’ found that even a month after the Finance 
Minister announced free rations (5 kg of grain and 
1 kg of dal per person) for migrants, the level of 
distress remained high. About 50 per cent of the 
workers had rations left for less than one day. It 
increased to about 54 percent for a few days after 
April 14 but has been steady around the halfway 
mark throughout the period. About 72 percent 
of the workers said their rations would finish in 
two days. Four out of five workers who reached 
out to SWAN did not have access to government 
rations while 68 per cent did have access to cooked 
food. Further, 64 per cent reported have less than 
I100 left with them. More than 97 percent (out of 
10,383) had not received any cash relief from the 
government. As noted, entitlements 
were not portable, and migrant 
workers were not entitled to PDS 
grain in their places of work even 
if their names were on ration cards 
back home.47
The first round of Azim Premji University CLIPS 
interviewed about 755 migrants during the months 
of April and May 2020. More than half (57 per cent) 
were intra-state migrants, i.e. working in their 
native state, but in a different district, and the 
majority (65 per cent) were working in urban areas. 
These migrants workers were more likely to have 
lost employment during the lockdown. Eighty-one 
per cent migrants lost employment compared to 
64 per cent employment loss among non-migrants. 
Notably, more than double the proportion of 
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migrants reported not being able to access rations 
during the lockdown compared to non-migrants 
(31 per cent as compared to 15 per cent for non-
migrants). Urban migrants access to rations was 
even more difficult with 42 per cent not able to 
access rations during the lockdown. Only 27 per 
cent of migrants had got the first Jan Dhan transfer 
at time of interview, whereas 34 per cent of non-
migrants had got it. 
Kerala affords an example of migrant-sensitive 
policy wherein the provision of food and health 
care was de-linked from registration or identity. 
With the announcement of the lockdown in Kerala, 
‘camps’ were set up for those guest workers (the 
Kerala terms for migrant workers) who had lost 
their jobs and income. The camps tied up with 
the local community kitchen organisations, led 
primarily by the state-led women’s self help group 
Kudumbashree to provide food and water to the 
workers. Besides addressing the basic needs of the 
approximately four lakh workers housed in around 
20,000 camps across the state, workers were  
also provided with some recreational facilities in  
the camps. 
Kerala’s response to the immediate needs of the 
migrant workers benefited from a pre-existing 
infrastructure directed towards migrant workers 
in the state and the active role of community 
institutions. After the floods and landslides that 
devastated large parts of the state in 2018 and 2019, 
the government had undertaken an assessment 
to understand the ways in which migrant workers 
had been excluded from relief and rehabilitation 
measures. This assessment went a long way in 
informing the responses during the pandemic 
including disseminating public announcements in 
multilingual messages, having health responses 
(tests and vaccinations) targeted specifically 
towards the migrants, and working closely with 
local self government institutions. Despite 
this, there is more that can be done to improve 
responses targeted towards the migrant population 
including better coordination with employers and 
contractors and further development of existing 
registration of such workers (Peter, Sanghvi,  
and Narendran 2020).  
 
Over the last few years gradual reforms have been 
carried out with the aim of eventually having “one 
nation, one ration card.” It should be noted that 
seven states — Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan and Tripura — provide 
‘intra-portability’, allowing people to avail their 
quota from any fair-price shop located within the 
state. And as of January 2020, in addition to these 
seven, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and 
Telangana, together have been piloting inter-state 
portability. This means that subsidised grains can 
be availed by a person who has a ration card based 
in any of these 11 states in any of the other states. 
This can considerably reduce the exclusion of 
migrant workers from availing in-kind transfers. 
7.6 / Conclusion
The foregoing evidence reveals a classic ‘glass half 
full’ scenario when it comes to the performance of 
social protection policies during the pandemic. PDS, 
MGNREGA, NSAP, and Jan Dhan, which together 
account for almost the entirety of the Government 
of India’s additional fiscal response, formed a 
crucial safety net and prevented extreme distress. 
But the net excluded roughly half the vulnerable 
households along with extremely precarious groups 
such as inter-state migrant workers in casual wage 
work who suffered the most. If India is not to let 
its people down so badly again in the future, a 
much stronger and more comprehensive system of 
social protection must be put in place over the next 
few years. We conclude this report with the next 
chapter which proposes some policy measures for 
the road ahead.
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Endnotes
1 The chapter draws extensively on Kapoor and 
Basole (2020).




3 See Agarwal et al (2020) for details on as well 
as shortcomings of PMGKY: https://www.
idfcinstitute.org/site/assets/files/15623/final_
white_paper_pmgky-2-1.pdf
4 In addition to the fiscal measures, there were 
significant monetary measures, such as the 
Emergency Credit Loan Guarantee Scheme (ECLGS) 
for MSMEs and the RBI’s liquidity response. The 
estimated size of all the measures combined was 
around I30 lakh crores or 15 percent of GDP. 
Here we focus mainly on the fiscal measures, the 





analysis-aatma-nirbhar-bharat-abhiyaan for more 
details on the entire Atmanirbhar Bharat package.
5 The size of India’s fiscal response as recorded in 
the International Monetary Fund’s Covid-19 policy 
tracker is much higher at 3.2 per cent of GDP. This 
includes capital expenditures announced in the 
2020-21 budget as well as longer term spending 
such as the Production Linked Incentives (PLI) 




7 On average 9.8 kgs of rice/wheat and 0.9 kgs of 
pulses per member were received. However, only 
49 per cent received pulses along with cereals. And 
this also varied widely across states being as high as 
95 per cent in Karnataka and Kerala (where pulses 
have been a part of the PDS prior to the crisis) and 









10 The report describes it thus: “During the 
COVID-19 lockdown in India, more than 1 million 
users called into the platforms during the first two 
months of the lockdown itself, and over 20,000 
voice reports were left by the people, describing 
their experiences or reporting grievances or asking 
for assistance to access social protection schemes. 
The primary data of audio recordings used to fulfil 
this research objective was obtained through Gram 
Vaani’s community media platforms.” (p. 15).
11 https://www.rcrc.in/
12 We do not focus on the effect on agricultural 
supply chains and the farm economy in general. The 




food-commodities-in-india/, (Ramakumar 2020; 
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17 The relative functioning of MGNREGA in these 
two states has been similar in the past years as well. 
Dutta et al. (2012) document the implementation 
of MGNREGA in different states using NSSO data 
from 2009-10. They found that Karnataka had 
a rationing rate (share of rural households who 
wanted work but did not get it) of 65 per cent in 








































29 Consultation with Uma Mahadevan Principal 
Secretary, Panchayat Raj, Dept. of Rural 
Development and Panchayat Raj, Government 
of Karnataka, and Head of the Covid Task Force 
consisting of government and civil society 
members.
30 For e.g. see the controversy over Delhi’s 





32 Consultation with Uma Mahadevan Principal 
Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development, 
Government of Karnataka, and Head of the Covid 
Task Force consisting of government and civil 
society members.
33 There were news reports of an urban employment 
guarantee programme being under discussion at the 


















State of Working India 2021
38 According to this report (available here: https://
www.hurunindia.net/edelgive-hurun-india-
philanthropy-l ), Azim Premji Foundation (and other 
related institutions as well as Mr. Azim Premji in his 
personal capacity) contributed approximately Rs 
8,000 crores (with education as the primary cause 
supported; within this Rs 1,125 directly towards 
Covid relief). Other prominent contributors include 
Mr. Shiv Nadar (Rs. 795 crores) followed by Mr. 
Mukesh Ambani (Rs. 458 crores).
39 https://www.ciicovid19update.in/blog.  Affiliated 
and other organisations include: Young Indians, 
CII Foundation, Indian Women Network, CII 
Membership, Society of Indian Automobile 
Manufacturers and Automotive Component 














45 A large sample survey of 300,000 households is 









47 It is worth noting here that even during normal 
times, inter-state migrants have not been able to 
avail of subsidised grains in their destination states. 
And even for intra-state migrants, it is often not 
possible to avail of their entitlement where they 
work. Not only that but within-town migration 
can be a problem for the system as well, since the 
urban poor often move to different locations in a 
city, and may end up several kilometers from their 
regular fair-price shop. An extension of this problem 
is faced by intra-state migrants. These are typically 
urban problems. Hence the system generally works 
much better in rural areas where mobility is less and 
local-level institutions function better.
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As India contends with a much more serious second 
wave of the Coronavirus, it is imperative that we 
learn lessons from the first wave. A policy roadmap 
is needed to address the short-run challenge of 
supporting vulnerable livelihoods over the next 
few months, as well as the medium-run objective 
of reviving employment and incomes over the next 
few years. 
In the foregoing chapters we have outlined the 
nature and extent of the impact of one year of the 
pandemic on employment, incomes, and household 
welfare. We have also discussed the existing social 
security architecture and how it has been deployed 
during the past few months. Based on this analysis, 
in this final chapter, we propose a set of short-run 
(few months) and medium-run (few years)  
policy measures.1 
Before we begin, let us hear from three workers 
who are also Fellows working with the Stranded 
Workers Action Network (SWAN). There is a 
general demand to allow work to continue while 
following safety and distancing protocols so that 
livelihoods are not threatened. And, in the event 
of a lockdown where work is stopped, there is a 
demand for compensation in terms of food and the 
provision of a health safety net.
My entire district is closed. There are signs of 
lockdown here. Everyone is scared, you can see the 
worry on everyone’s faces, what will we do, how 
we will live, what will we eat. We have not yet 
recovered from the previous lockdown, we have 
not been able to pay the debts from the previous 
lockdown, what are we to do? While maintaining 
Policy recommendations 
for the short and 
medium term
distance, while keeping safe one can go somewhere 
and work, if the safety of travel and provision of 
food and water is given by the government then 
we will not bear the brunt of the lockdown as 
much. Workers should get some accommodation, 
food services near their workplace. Only that can 
ensure that people will stay where they are. If they 
close the factory where we work, where will we go? 
So, they should be allowed to stay where they are, 
and they should also look after the workers’ health 
in case they fall sick. 
- Sima Kumari
I am quite sure there will be a lockdown. If they 
do announce a lockdown, they should let us work, 
then we don’t have to worry about our sustenance. 
If they do announce a lockdown, they should tell 
people that you can go home at least a week in 
advance. 
- Gulzar
I think there will definitely be a lockdown. Ideally, 
there should not be a lockdown, last time we faced 
so much difficulty. For some people it is okay, they 
can stay at home, what about poor people; they 
face so many problems. Let us socially distance  
and continue to work, so that my income is taken 
care of.
 - Raunaq Parveen
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8.1 / Making up for the 
first wave and meeting 
the challenge of the 
second wave
Fiscal support is urgently needed now for two 
reasons - compensating for the losses sustained 
during the first year of the pandemic and offering 
a safety net for the months (or years) to come. We 
have seen that the bottom decile of households 
lost over two months of income completely during 
2020. In addition, a majority of workers sustained a 
loss in earnings, either due to job losses or due to 
a shift to relatively more precarious and informal 
forms of work. As a result 230 million additional 
individuals slipped below the poverty line defined 
by the national floor minimum wage (I375 a day). 
We also presented evidence from Covid impact 
surveys, showing large increases in indebtedness as 
well as distress sale of assets and reduction in food 
intake that persisted at least into November 2020. 
More recent evidence from the RCRC survey also 
points to continued nutritional distress into  
January 2021.2
In addition to these short term impacts, Covid-19 
is expected to have sustained long term impacts 
on poverty and inequality. It is worth recalling that 
India was already a highly unequal country before 
the pandemic hit. As per the World Inequality 
Database (WID) the share of the top 10 per cent 
in India’s national income was 56 per cent, much 
higher than in comparable countries like Indonesia 
(41 per cent), Vietnam (42 per cent) and even 
China (41 per cent).3 Research on prior pandemics 
has shown that inequality increases significantly 
in the aftermath and the recovery among poorer 
households is slower because they are forced to 
sell productive assets and/or become indebted to 
survive the crisis.4 Unless decisive policy action is 
taken, India will likely experience widening income 
disparities since it has been much more severely 
affected, both in terms of the disease burden and 
the extent of economic contraction.
The pandemic could also lead to long-term increase 
in inequality through its impact on nutrition and 
education. Data from the National Family Health 
Survey 2019-20 (NFHS-5) reveal that important 
child nutrition indicators saw no improvement 
between 2015-16 and 2019-20. In seven out of ten 
major states, where the survey was conducted, 
proportion of underweight children increased, and 
stunting increased in six states.5 The increased food 
insecurity during 2020 reported in several Covid 
impact surveys (discussed in Chapter Five) can have 
long- term negative impacts on children’s cognitive 
and physical development, productive capacity 
and health. Similarly, lack of access to online 
learning resources among the majority of children, 
as documented by the Azim Premji Foundation 
survey discussed in Chapter Five, is expected to 
lead to decrease in learning levels and widening 
educational inequalities (Azim Premji  
Foundation 2021).
8.1.1 / Policy Measures in the short 
and medium-run to strengthen 
vulnerable households
Taking all these findings into account, there is a 
need to re-launch support measures that were 
undertaken in 2020 and that came to an end with 
the culmination of the financial year. As discussed 
earlier, the Union Budget for 2021-22 did not make 
any provisions for expanded PDS, MGNREGA, 
cash transfers or other relief measures (Basole 
2021a). But seeing the current situation, the Union 
government announced, on April 23, 2021, that 
the PM Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana, providing an 
additional five kgs of grain free of cost to priority 
households, will be restarted for the months of May 
and June.6 Much more can be done, however, in the 
immediate future including:
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• Extending free rations under the PDS beyond 
June 2021 until the pandemic is brought under 
control.
• Cash transfer of I5,000 for three months to as 
many households as can be reached with the 
existing digital infrastructure, including but not 
limited to Jan Dhan accounts.
• Expansion of MGNREGA entitlement to 150 
days and revising programme wages upwards 
to state minimum wages. Expanding the 
programme budget to at least I1.75 lakh crores.7
• Launching a pilot urban employment 
programme in the worst hit districts, possibly 
focused on women workers.
• Increasing the central contribution in old-age 
pensions to at least I500.
• Automatically enrolling all MGNREGA workers 
who do construction work for a stipulated 
period as registered workers under the Building 
and Other Construction Workers (BoCW) Act 
so that workers can access the social security 
benefits available to the latter.
• A Covid hardship allowance to 2.5 million 
Anganwadi and ASHA workers of I30,000 (5,000 
per month for six months). 
The above measures, of course, have implications 
for the fiscal deficit and the debt-GDP ratio which 
are currently at historic highs. We discuss this 
issue in the final section of this chapter. We now 
elaborate the first four points mentioned above.
a. Strengthening PDS
As we saw in Chapter Seven, the PDS has provided 
crucial support during the Covid crisis to prevent 
widespread hunger and starvation. Conversely, 
those who have been left out of the system, either 
because of targeting problems or due to lack of 
portability of benefits, have suffered greatly. Two 
clear policy priorities have emerged from the crisis, 
allowing inter-state portability of entitlements and 
at least a temporary universalisation of the system 
by eliminating targeting.
The argument for allowing beneficiaries to avail of 
their entitlements wherever they work or reside 
currently, and not only in the towns or villages 
where they are domiciled, is clear and has been 
emphatically underlined by the migrant worker 
crisis. This process is underway with the One 
Nation One Ration Card policy which now includes 
17 states.8 But a more significant step in the 
direction of improving food security is a move from 
a targeted to a universal programme. This demand, 
though of old provenance, has been renewed with 
force in the current juncture.9 As we observed in 
Chapter Six, nearly 90 million poor households 
are estimated to be left out of the NFSA list. As a 
result, during the pandemic, several states extended 
their beneficiaries list as well as commodities 
provided, beyond the scope of the NFSA. A leading 
example here is Tamil Nadu, which has a universal 
system and also provides pulses in addition  
to cereals.
The principal objections to a uniform universal 
system (where entitlements remain the same 
regardless of the level of household income) are 
its overall cost and the subsidy 
accruing to households who do 
not need it. On the other hand, 
a targeted system in a data-poor 
ecosystem such as India’s can 
cause significant exclusion errors. 
The practical solution to this 
dilemma has been to move to a 
‘quasi-universal’ PDS where 80 per cent or more of 
the population is covered even if the official poverty 
numbers are far lower (e.g. Andhra Pradesh). 
Another possible solution is a differentiated 
Two clear policy priorities have emerged 
from the crisis, allowing inter-state 
portability of entitlements and at least 
a temporary universalisation of PDS by 
eliminating targeting.
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universal system in which all households are part 
of the system but receive different entitlements in 
a graduated fashion (e.g. Pondicherry). The option 
to self-exclude or opt out of the entitlements is 
also worth considering, as has been tried recently 
for the LPG subsidy.10 Such a system can sidestep 
the problems of arbitrary thresholds that end up 
excluding deserving households entirely.
b. Enhancing Direct Income Support
Cash transfers, via Jan Dhan accounts, were an 
important part of the PMGKY package. But as we 
have shown in this report, the coverage was low 
and the quantum was vastly inadequate compared 
to the magnitude of the shock. Larger transfers 
delivered to a larger proportion of vulnerable 
households, are urgently needed.
As noted in previous chapters, the case for larger 
cash transfers is also strengthened by looking at 
what has happened in other developing countries. 
For India, with a per capita GDP of approximately 
I13,000 per month, a cash transfer of I6,000 would 
be equivalent with what has been undertaken in 
other lower-middle income countries. While this 
would not compensate households for the entirety 
of lost income, it is still better than what has been 
done so far.
There are, of course, several challenges in the 
implementation of direct cash transfers as we 
have discussed earlier (Drèze and Khera 2020). The 
most urgent need is to expand the net. In addition 
to increasing enrollment under the PM Jan Dhan 
Yojana, the use of databases from existing programs 
is a strategy worth exploring given the urgency. 
These can include MGNREGA rolls, pension 
schemes, Ujjawala databases, ration cards, and 
possibly even ID cards or licenses such as those 
issued to drivers or street-vendors. Bank accounts 
will already be verified and linked to Aadhar for 
many of these beneficiaries. 
It is worth remembering that 
there are many who may have 
had incomes that place them 
well above any poverty line, but 
who have lost employment or 
have witnessed a sharp decline 
in their incomes. They too will 
need income support till economic 
activity resumes some degree of 
normalcy. Some may have drawn 
upon PF savings or other formal mechanisms to 
tide over the crisis, but this option is not available 
to all such workers. Identifying such individuals is 
no doubt a large task, but creative ways of reaching 
out to them need to be thought through quickly. 
The principle is to ensure as wide an infrastructure 
as possible to deliver cash relief.
c. Strengthening MGNREGA
We have seen in previous sections, that MGNREGA 
has proved to be a vital safety net in rural areas, in 
particular for migrants returning to their homes. 
An important aspect of the programme is that it 
overcomes the problem of targeting and reaching 
the relevant population through its self-targeting 
mechanism of beneficiary selection. Going forward, 
with mobility restrictions back in force, many firms 
still facing bankruptcies, and reverse migration once 
again occurring on a large scale, strengthening the 
functioning of MGNREGA and introducing an urban 
employment guarantee programme should both 
be made policy priorities. Physical distancing forms 
and other precautions will, of course, need to be 
put in place for worksites to function safely.
In addition to increasing enrollment 
under the PM Jan Dhan Yojana, the use 
of databases from existing programs 
(MGNREGA rolls, pension schemes, Ujjawala 
databases, ration cards, vendor ID card, 
licenses) must be explored to deliver cash.
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Expansion of MGNREGA can be thought of in 
different ways - as an increase in the per household 
entitlement from 100 to 150 days per year, an 
increase in the programme wages, linking the 
availability of number of working days to individuals 
and not households, increasing the number of 
worksites (e.g. one in each panchayat11) and so on. 
All of these entail an increase in the programme 
budget, by some estimates to at least  
I1.75 lakh crores.12
Concomitantly, there is a need for expanding the 
list of permissible works, hiring more gram rozgar 
sevaks (employment assistants), simplifying the 
implementation process and mobilising para-
teachers for work application drives. In particular, 
it has been pointed out that at present, unlike in 
the past, where workers could directly come to the 
worksite and enrol, now no one can be employed 
unless his or her name has been entered in 
advance in the e-muster rolls. Without assistance, 
most workers find it difficult to submit work 
applications.13 To simplify the process, it would be 
useful to allow workers to enroll at worksites as 
opposed to entering their names in e-muster rolls 
in advance. It might also be worth considering 
the option of a return to cash payment for the 
duration of the crisis to ensure timely and reliable 
payment of wages. This is especially relevant 
given the limited coverage of bank infrastructure 
in rural areas and the difficulties faced by workers 
in reaching bank accounts, discussed in earlier 
chapters.
Another important issue that merits attention 
pertains to wage rates paid under MGNREGA. 
The MGNREGA Act allows for determining wages 
in two ways. Workers are either paid the state 
minimum wage for agricultural labourers or the 
central government notifies separate wage rates for 
MGNREGA. Till 2008, MNREGA wages were fixed 
by the former alternative. However, it was argued 
that as the entire wage burden of the Act is borne 
by the Centre, state governments have an incentive 
to inflate minimum wages. Consequently, in 2009, 
the government shifted to the second option 
and MGNREGA wage rates were set separately 
from minimum wages. And, it is largely the case 
that programme wages have been set lower than 
minimum wages of the state. Aggarwal and Paikra 
(2020) find that wage rates of at least 17 of the 21 
major states are lower than the state minimum 
wage for agriculture and the shortfall is in the 
range of 33 per cent of the minimum wage. This 
is the case even after the increase in MGNREGA 
wages to I202 announced in the PMGKY package 
in April 2020. In this regard, it is worth revisiting 
the recommendations of the  Mahendra Dev 
Committee (Ministry of Rural Development 2015) 
which was constituted by the Central Government 
to advise on the matter of programme wage 
revision. The report of the Committee noted 
that the baseline for wage indexation should be 
the current minimum wage rate for agricultural 
labourers, or the current MGNREGA wage rate, 
whichever is higher.
Finally, as the response to the pandemic has 
highlighted the importance of decentralised 
governance, the decentralized nature of the 
MGNREGA needs to be further strengthened. 
This is particularly important in the backdrop of 
the fact that, over the last few years, financial 
resources for the programme have been capped. 
Consequently, several state governments have 
begun to implement MGNREGA as a supply-driven 
scheme, instead of running it like a demand-based 
guarantee as conceptualized by the Act. As noted 
in Chapter Seven, the programme allocation stands 
at I73,000 crore for the current financial year which 
is only two per cent more than what was actually 
spent in 2019-20, a normal year (I71,600 crore). This 
was inadequate even without the second wave, and 
is all the more so now.
d. Introducing Urban Employment  
Guarantee (UEG)
The pandemic revealed that India’s rural safety 
net is far more effective than its urban net. Both 
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PDS and Jan Dhan have a wider penetration in 
rural areas and MGNREGA only exists in the 
countryside. Three states have introduced limited 
urban wage employment programmes since April 
2020, to provide informal workers with a safety net 
during the pandemic. These are Odisha, Himachal 
Pradesh and Jharkhand. Kerala already had a small 
functioning programme since 2011 (see Chapter 
Seven for details). Another proposal for an urban 
public works programme, called the Decentralised 
Urban Employment and Training (DUET) scheme 
has been proposed by Jean Drèze.14 Here we 
present a brief outline of a possible programme 
drawing on Basole et al. (2019). We also flag some 
important issues that arise when we consider 
the urban labour market (a detailed discussion is 
outside the scope of this report).15 
The UEG proposed in Basole et al. (2019) is a 
national level, demand-driven, public works 
programme which provides a statutory right 
to employment at specified wage rates for a 
given number of days, with a grievance redressal 
and social accountability structure similar to 
MGNREGA. It is targeted towards small and 
medium-sized towns and aims to provide a legal 
right to employment while improving the quality of 
urban infrastructure and services, restoring urban 
commons and ecology, skilling youth, and increasing 
the financial and human capacity of Urban Local 
Bodies. In addition to 100 days of employment on 
traditional public works projects, a large variety 
of works that require a range of education and 
skills are proposed. These include building and 
maintenance of roads, footpaths, and bridges; 
creation, rejuvenation, and monitoring of urban 
commons like water bodies, forest land, wetlands, 
and parks; provisioning of care for children and the 
elderly; and monitoring, evaluation, and surveying 
of environmental quality as well as apprenticeship 
in municipal offices, public schools, and health 
centres. The last two types of work are specifically 
proposed for educated youth to gain skills and real-
world experience in the form of 150 contiguous days 
of training and apprenticeship. The relevant Urban 
Local Body (ULB), such as the Nagar Panchayat, 
Municipal Council, or Municipal Corporation is 
envisioned to be the principal authority responsible 
for administering this programme. This involves 
identifying projects, preparing annual works plans 
and implementing the programme in a participatory 
manner by involving the ward committees and  
ward sabhas. The programme needs a set of 
dedicated staff starting from the level of the Ward. 
The disproportionately high impact 
that the Covid crisis has had on 
the livelihoods and earnings of 
the urban poor prompted the civil 
society group People’s Action for 
Employment Guarantee (PAEG) to 
undertake a public campaign for the 
introduction of a UEG. A few key issues that have 
arisen during the consultations are:
• Eligibility criteria for workers to be a part of the 
programme: should the programme be open to 
migrant workers or only local urban residents? 
• Coverage of the UEG in terms of geography: 
should it be limited to smaller towns where 
underemployment is more likely to be a problem 
than the metros?
• Nature of works: Can the types of works 
be expanded taking into account the more 
diversified nature of the urban economy?
• Role of Urban Local Bodies: unlike Panchayati 
Raj Institutions, the ULB system is not as 
responsive to local needs. Ward committees 
often do not exist and municipal elections do 
not command the attention that panchayat 
elections in villages do.
MGNREGA allocation stands at I73,000 crore 
for 2021-22, only two per cent more than what 
was actually spent in 2019-20, a normal year. 
This was inadequate even without the second 
wave, and all the more so now.
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• Role of private contractors: public works in 
most towns and cities are undertaken via private 
contractors. ULBs rarely have the capacity to 
undertake works on their own. MGNREGA 
prohibits contractors from operating, but is this 
feasible in the urban programme?
Given the complexity of the above issues, it is 
worth considering the introduction of a pilot 
programme where these can be worked through.  
A programme could be started in a phased manner 
with the worst affected urban districts. It could 
also be envisioned as a programme for women 
workers only. If, eventually, around half of all urban 
casual workers across the country are covered, we 
estimate that a programme offering a wage of  
I275 per day and 100 days per year of work  
would cost around I54,000 crores.
8.2 / A National 
Employment Policy
Difficult as it is to see right now, the pandemic 
will, one day, be behind us, and the task of 
rebuilding the economy will have to be taken up 
in earnest. The legacy problems of weak structural 
transformation and slow employment generation, 
discussed in Chapter Two, will remain with us. 
Over the past few decades, the inability of the 
Indian economy to create an adequate number of 
non-farm jobs in the formal or organised sector 
has been the topic of much research (Kannan and 
Raveendran 2009; Kapoor and Krishnapriya 2017; 
Azim Premji University et al. 2018; Mehrotra 2018). 
In the past decade, the employment elasticity 
of output reached a low of 0.1 per cent. This is 
partly due to the fact that, the sectors that have 
driven growth (such as finance and IT-BPO) are 
not large employers, and large employers (with 
the exception of construction) have not shown 
rapid output growth (e.g. informal retail, textiles, 
transport).16 In the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis, 
the employment challenge will acquire even  
more urgency.
A comprehensive National Employment Policy 
is the need of our times. Such a policy will need 
to bring together various supply and demand-
side dimensions of the labour market and speak 
coherently to existing trade and industrial policy 
regimes. Here we offer a conceptual framework 
within which such a policy could be imagined.
8.2.1 / Framework for the 
policy
Table 8.1 lays out the framework. 
A first broad distinction is made 
between demand-side of the labour 
market, i.e. policy interventions 
aimed at raising the demand for 
labour and improving the quality of work, versus 
measures on the supply-side that aim to improve 
the quantity and quality of supply of labour. Under 
both heads, a further distinction can be made 
between direct job creation by governments on 
the one hand and promoting as well as regulating 
private sector employment on the other hand.
The dimensions along which interventions can be 
made are discussed under two heads -quantity of 
employment and quality of employment. On the 
quantity aspect, three sub-dimensions are identified 
- increasing the scale of production, creating 
employment in labour surplus (migrant-sending) 
states, and improving participation of women in 
paid work. On the quality aspect, again, three  
A UEG programme could be started in a 
phased manner with the worst affected urban 
districts and with women workers only. We 
estimate that a national programme covering 
half of all urban casual wage workers would 
cost around I54,000 crores.
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sub-dimensions are discussed – raising productivity, 
promoting wage growth, and providing  
social security.
Table 8.1 also lists key policy interventions under 
each category. Needless to say, these are only 
indicative and not exhaustive. Some of them are 
elaborated in this section.
A few key dichotomies have traditionally structured 
policy thinking on growth and employment. These 
include, public sector versus private sector, import 
protection versus export promotion, domestic 
demand versus export demand, manufacturing 
versus services, and labour flexibility versus 
job quality. To the extent that the same public 
resources cannot be devoted to two goals 
simultaneously, these choices and trade-offs are 
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real. But complementarities also 
exist, as we discuss below.
a. The importance of public 
employment
A well-understood example is the 
crowding-in of private investment on the back 
of public investment. This can happen via the 
supply-side of the product market by improving 
infrastructure as well as by shoring up aggregate 
demand. In the first case, public employment 
produces public goods and services that enhance 
the productivity of private investment and enables 
growth as well as job creation in the private sector. 
Typical examples are irrigation, roads, and power 
supply, but also human capital generation (health 
and education) and enterprise support – all of 
which require public sector workers to produce and 
deliver the goods and services. The Covid crisis has 
highlighted the necessity of adequate, good quality 
public health infrastructure.
Infrastructural goods and services, particularly at 
the local and regional levels remain a key bottleneck 
on the supply-side of the product market. Public 
investment in the building and maintenance of such 
infrastructure is thus necessary from the point of 
view of alleviating bottlenecks. Such investment is 
also a key demand-side intervention in the labour 
market because it directly creates jobs as well as 
stimulates private job creation by enabling firm 
growth. MSME entrepreneurs, in particular, often 
emphasise that if quality infrastructure in the 
form of power, roads, internet and so on, were to 
be made available, the need for subsidies would 
be considerably reduced.17 Furthermore, firms 
attracted by subsidies and tax holidays can just as 
easily leave after these have run out, while those 
attracted by good infrastructure are more likely  
to stay.
The public demand for labour results in the 
production of vital public goods and services such 
as infrastructure, governance, public safety, and 
law and order without which no economy can 
prosper. Such public action also acts on the supply 
side of the labour market via provisioning of health, 
education, nutrition and food security that result 
in a healthy and educated workforce. Despite 
important advances in health and education 
infrastructure, the levels of public investment in 
these sectors remain well below other comparable 
developing countries. Due to decades of under-
investment in local infrastructure and governance, 
as well as last mile delivery problems in the 
provision of quality basic healthcare and education, 
India remains plagued by high out-of-pocket 
expenditure on these vital services  
(Abraham et al. 2019).
On the supply-side of the labour markets, another 
well-studied and long-standing weakness is 
the continued low participation of women in 
paid employment. Even when under-reporting 
of women’s work is addressed with the use of 
detailed questionnaires relying on self-reported 
responses (see Appendix to Chapter Three), India’s 
female labour force participation rate (LFPR) 
is a low 40 per cent. Factors such as continued 
asymmetric burden of housework, cultural norms 
around women’s work, as well as unsafe working 
environment and lack of mobility are key factors, as 
is the lack of employment opportunities for women. 
It is worth stressing this last point, because, in the 
absence of a strong increase in labour demand, 
an increased supply of labour in the form of 
women entering the labour force will only increase 
unemployment and/or drive down wages. Public 
employment has a key role to play in all of the 
above (e.g. delivering childcare and old-age care 
services, creating public safety, public transport, 
and labour demand for women’s work). 
Public employment produces public goods 
and services that enhance the productivity 
of private investment and enables growth as 
well as job creation in the private sector.
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b. Promoting private sector employment
While the public demand for labour for production 
of public goods is necessary, it can by no means 
be a sufficient solution to the challenge of decent 
work and employment. The private sector plays a 
far bigger role in quantitative terms. Historically, 
small and medium sized firms have played a crucial 
role in creating non-farm jobs in most countries 
that have managed a structural 
transformation from agrarian to 
industrialised economies. In India, 
the supply-side constraints on firm 
growth (mainly lack of infrastructure 
and enabling regulatory climate) 
have had profound consequences 
for labour demand in the economy and the scale of 
production remains small or even micro, with the 
average firm employing less than three workers, 
and the majority employing no workers other 
than the owner and their family members (Basole 
and Chandy 2019). The proliferation of dwarf 
firms creates conditions for continued informality 
(precarity), lack of regulation and low productivity. 
The lack of adequate non-farm jobs has contributed 
to the crisis in the agrarian economy, which in turn 
has compounded the problem of low  
aggregate demand.
Coming to sectoral considerations, rather than 
focusing on the manufacturing-services dichotomy, 
the more substantive point, from a job creation 
perspective, is the tradability or non-tradability 
of goods and services. Tradable services like IT-
BPO and other business support activities, as well 
as hospitality and tourism can play an important 
role in the process of structural change because 
they enjoy a far bigger potential market. With 
rapid advances in information and communication 
technology, more and more services are becoming 
tradable. Of course, the debate over whether 
such service-led growth can result in a structural 
transformation of the economy, is far from 
settled (Ghani and O’Connell 2014; Amirapu and 
Subramanian 2015; Dasgupta and Singh 2005). The 
key question is, do service industries possess the 
attributes necessary to drive structural change, 
the way manufacturing industries have done in the 
past? These attributes are the ability to achieve high 
levels and growth rates of productivity, domestic 
as well as international convergence, expansion of 
a sector in its use of inputs, comparative advantage 
and exportability.18
c. Openness and industrial policy
After decades of being out of fashion, the 
phrase ‘industrial policy’ is once again finding 
favour in international policy circles. At the same 
time, the Covid-19 crisis has inspired a vigorous 
debate in policy circles as well as in the public 
domain on whether India should remain on the 
path of achieving greater openness in trade and 
financial flows or embrace some form of import 
substitution and de-globalisation in the pursuit of 
‘atmanirbharta’ or self-reliance. Taken together 
with de-globalisation in the advanced industrial 
economies, there is a sense that there may be a 
return to the export pessimism and the dirigiste 
policy climate of the 1950s through the 1970s 
(Chatterjee and Subramanian 2020).
However, there is little controversy that the pre-
1991 industrial and trade policy regime was flawed 
in serious ways and failed to deliver efficiency gains 
(Chibber 2006). The political alliance between the 
bureaucracy and the corporate sector (public and 
private) ensured monopoly rents for a few but 
did not serve either consumers or the majority of 
workers who were left out of the formal system for 
want of adequate job opportunities.
The relevant question is not ‘should India return 
to the pre-1991 policy regime’, but rather, what 
lessons can be learned from the policy failures 
and success of both the periods.
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Hence, the relevant question is not ‘should India 
return to the pre-1991 policy regime’, but rather, 
what lessons can be learned from the policy failures 
and success of both the periods (1950 to 1991 and 
1991 to today). A detailed answer to this question is 
outside the scope of this report. But we emphasise 
that this answer, rather than polemical pro- or  
anti-1991 reform rhetoric, will hold important 
insights for the future.
Substituting imports and promoting exports 
can go together, as the experiences of the East 
Asian economies like Korea  and Taiwan have 
shown (Amsden 2001; Wade 1988; Chang 2007). 
What is needed is a coherent trade-industrial 
policy framework with what Alice Amsden has 
called ‘control system’ that ensure performance 
standards in exchange for subsidies, avoidance of 
impediments such as inverted duty structures, a 
favourable external climate for trade, a reduction in 
the compliance burden particularly for MSMEs, and 
investment in crucial public goods. This is easier 
said than done given that hard political economy 
considerations give rise to cross-purposes and 
conflicted policy.
As regards protection from imports and stimulating 
exports, the standard liberal prescription is to prefer 
subsidies to tariff changes, and exchange rate 
interventions to subsidies; to minimize bureaucratic 
discretion, and focus on creating a learning culture 
that improves efficiency over time (on the latter 
see Noman and Stiglitz (2017). While these are 
good principles, once again the actual experience 
of later industrialisers like Korea, Taiwan, China or 
even Vietnam, is a great deal messier. Governments 
have indeed picked winners and losers. The 
systems of reciprocity and the ‘carrot-and-stick’ 
approach followed by developmental states of 
East Asia has been well-documented. The fact 
that the government needs to discipline not only 
workers but also capital-owners, stands out clearly. 
Capital must not remain locked in non-performing 
firms, and there must be consequences to lack of 
performance. But equally crucial as the knowledge 
of how to help, is to know how and when to get 
out of the way.
Closer home, India’s IT-BPO story is at least 
partially a story of the success of the balance 
between active industrial policy and a permissive 
regulatory climate. As Mehrotra (2021) argues, 
it was directed public policy that created the 
infrastructure that enabled the integration of Indian 
IT firms to global standards before the general 
telecom revolution took off in India. Second, 
government policy enabled the industry to import 
duty-free hardware and software, and incentivised 
exports. Finally, and most often emphasized, the 
industry benefited from highly subsidised human 
capital created by public investments in scientific 
and technical education. All these offer insights to 
the potential for industrial policy.
Recently, Chatterjee and Subramanian (2020) 
have intervened in the ‘atmanirbharta debate’ and 
argued that India’s growth has been export-led to 
a much greater degree than generally appreciated, 
and hence export pessimism is unwarranted. The 
related debate over which to focus on – India’s 
domestic market or the world market, has also led 
to too many dead-ends. The truth of course, is 
that both are important. Only when Indian firms 
become competitive in the world market (export-
orientation) will they be able to deliver quality 
goods to the Indian consumer and eventually 
compete with foreign firms for the local market 
(since protection will not last forever). But there is 
a trade-off too. From a welfare perspective, a weak 
domestic market points to stagnating standards 
of living. Export promotion can help to an extent, 
via job creation and rising incomes, but it cannot 
substitute for active public policy that strengthens 
purchasing power in the domestic market.
d. Job creation versus job quality
Last, but not least, there is the dichotomy of the 
quantity versus the quality of employment being 
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generated. Here the relevant parameters are 
wage level and growth, non-wage benefits, social 
security, and right to collective action (the list is 
not exhaustive). Labour flexibility needed for job 
creation, and good quality of work, have been 
looked upon as inherently opposed entities. To 
an extent the trade-off is obvious and real. But 
complementarities also exist. For example, if we 
can move from a dual labour market where 10 per 
cent of the workforce receives multiple benefits and 
protections whereas 90 per cent receives hardly any 
at all, to a single one, where every worker receives 
a non-negotiable social protection floor, this would 
improve the overall quality of work while also 
improving labour flexibility.
Such a process does create winners and losers 
since it means a reduction in job security for some 
workers, and is therefore politically fraught. But this 
can be more than compensated for by an increase 
in quality of work for others, who are many times 
the former in number, and in welfare terms much 
worse off. We must beware, however, of taking a 
path wherein existing protections are taken away 
for some workers and no improvements are made 
for others, resulting in a net loss of social security. 
Such a lose-lose reform can deliver flexibility in 
the short-run but only at the cost of hardship for 
those who can least afford it. In the long-run, lack 
of competitiveness resulting from organisational 
problems, institutional corruption, and lack of 
infrastructure cannot be made up by making  
labour more precarious.
The long standing policy objective of a universal 
social security floor has acquired a special 
significance in the context of the pandemic. While 
it cannot be part of the immediate or short-term 
support package, it can and should form a key 
element of a new National Employment Policy. 
Rather than viewing the social safety net as 
providing a subsistence level of assistance to the 
poor, it must be seen as a way to ensure a dignified 
existence to workers, who in most cases, have spent 
their entire lives working in difficult conditions. 
(Drèze and Khera 2017) note that the transition 
to the modern welfare state in the advanced 
industrialised societies was associated with a 
rejection of the poor law mindset. Concomitantly, 
a social consensus was built to 
accept higher and progressive taxes 
to finance social assistance. While 
this cannot be achieved all at once, 
progress can be made by starting 
with a programme for universal social 
security for all workers.
One possible approach to this 
objective is the formation of 
national and state-level welfare boards for 
unorganised sector workers as proposed in the 
2008 Unorganised Sector Social Security Act. The 
most recent version of this idea is found in the 
Social Security Code Bill that was debated in the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Labour. 
Unfortunately, this idea did not find its way into the 
Act passed by Parliament last year.
The deliberations surrounding the Social Security 
Code (2019) in the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee, make for interesting reading in this 
context. Various stakeholders and domain experts 
stressed the imperative need for Universalisation 
of Social Security to cover the last worker. The 
principal objection to the language in the Code 
is that provisions continue to be framed as 
recommendations instead of being mandatory. 
We should move from a scheme-based to 
a legal entitlement-based approach that 
provides a universal social protection floor 
for the unorganised sector as envisaged 
in the second draft version of the Social 
Security Code Bill.
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Second, there is no clarity on the overarching 
funding structure for unorganised sector social 
security where no formal employer-employee 
relationships exist. Petitioners have also noted that 
the relevant sections of the Code that deal with 
unorganised sector social security (Clause 109) only 
list welfare schemes which the Central and State 
Governments may undertake through executive 
action. Many of these schemes (such as provision of 
central and state welfare boards) were also in the 
Unorganized Worker Social Security Act (UWSSA) 
2008. But coverage has not expanded much in 
the intervening 12 years with only six percent of 
unorganized workers being covered.
The main suggestion here is to move from 
a scheme-based to legal entitlement- based 
approach that provides a rights-based universal 
social protection floor for the unorganised sector 
as envisaged in the second draft version of the 
Social Security Code Bill (which was withdrawn for 
unknown reasons after soliciting public comments 
in 2018). We discuss a few key features of such a 
social security architecture. The reader is referred 
to Mehrotra (2020) for details.
i. National system of central and state-level boards
A merging of disparate central and state boards 
has been proposed several times (including in 
the 2008 Act). The goal is a National Board for 
Unorganised Workers. The 2008 Act provides for 
the constitution of a National Social Security Board, 
chaired by the Labour Minister as well as State 
Boards, with representation of both workers and 
employers in the unorganised sector. But the crucial 
consideration here is that such a merger should 
not roll back the achievements of existing boards 
that are operating well, such as the Mathadi board 
discussed in Chapter Six. Rather the new system 
should build on the best operating boards.
ii. Contributory structure
The contributory structure of the social security 
system needs to be sensitive to the huge diversity 
in employment relations as well as incomes. Those 
below the poverty line should not be expected to 
contribute until incomes rise beyond a threshold. 
At the other end, organized sector workers already 
form a part of the contributory system of social 
security (ESIC and EPFO), where both employer 
and employee contribute. Unorganized workers 
who are from households above the poverty line 
can be expected to contribute towards their 
social security alongside the government (both 
State and Centre). The public contribution can 
decrease as we move towards workers with higher 
incomes. Employers should also be brought into the 
contributory structure, even in case of unorganised 
sector workers.
iii. Benefits
The key benefits associated with social insurance, 
viz. pension, death/disability benefits, and 
maternity benefits, must be covered. Currently, not 
all welfare boards provide all these benefits.
iv. Database and registration
The central challenge in ensuring effective social 
protection coverage for informal workers is that 
the vast majority are either self-employed or casual 
wage labour, or even if regular wage, then working 
in establishments with less than ten workers who 
are not required to register formally. A registration 
of establishments as well as a registration of 
workers are thus both required. There are an 
estimated 65 million establishments in India 
(registered and unregistered) as per ASI, NSSO, and 
Economic Census data. Of these 43 million are not 
registered under any Act. The digital infrastructure 
needed for a national database of unorganised 
workers exists now with increasing Aadhar 
penetration. The 2008 Act provides for an identity 
card for unorganised workers (those working in 
enterprises employing less than 10 workers) by the 
district administration.
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8.2.2 / Select policy interventions
We now outline a few interventions in more detail. 
For each intervention, we draw attention to the 
dimensions along which it is expected to act 
(quantity, quality, supply-side, demand-side etc).
a. Udyog Sahayak Enterprise Network (USENET) 
for micro-enterprise19
A key aspect of increasing labour demand in 
the private sector is enabling the scale-up of 
microenterprises. Muralidharan, Paul, and Basole 
(2021) have proposed a national entrepreneurial 
system to improve ease of doing business (EDB) 
and assist scale-up of micro-enterprises. Micro 
and Small Enterprises (MSEs) can 
create a large number of jobs, across 
India, for workers with a wide range 
of skills and education, provided 
they can scale-up their operations. 
Out of a total of just over 63 million 
enterprises in the MSME sector, 62 
million are informal micro and very small enterprises 
(MSEs). Of these, single worker firms (own-account) 
are 40 million, firms with 2 to 5 workers – are 22 
million and firms with more than 5 but less than 10 
are estimated at 1 million. 107.6 million workers (97 
per cent of all employment in the MSME sector) are 
in the micro and small segment.
While fostering start-ups remains important to 
the economy, an equally if not more important 
policy aim should be to enable scale-up of existing 
MSEs. Scaling up at the micro level is not a matter 
of easing compliances or regulatory burden, since 
these firms are not registered with any entity as 
firms. Rather we have to look at avenues such 
as integration with digital platforms, securing of 
licenses (so that businesses can stop paying bribes), 
better access to formal finance and government 
schemes, and so on.
Thus, the MSME sector is extremely diverse 
and policy interventions need to be carefully 
tailored by firm size since the challenges faced 
are very different at different scales. For small and 
medium firms who are likely to have more than 
20 workers and a turnover greater than 5 crores, 
the policy focus ought to be on improving ease of 
doing business via simplification, rationalisation, 
and digitisation of compliances. But for 
microenterprises which have less than 20 but more 
than 5 workers, with turnover greater than 50 lakhs, 
the emphasis should be on enabling growth by 
easing them into the formal system. The key here 
is that entrepreneurs should not be incentivised 
to stay tiny and expand via creation of more micro 
informal firms. Rather, they should see value  
in formalising.
For nano-enterprises with less than 5 workers and 
turnover of a few lakhs per annum (survivalist 
enterprises), the emphasis should be on skilling 
workers and placing them into larger firms as 
well as on enabling growth in-situ. The relevant 
policy levers here are matching informal workers 
to potential formal employers, better access to 
formal finance, better information on government 
schemes, licensing to prevent harassment by local 
officials, digitisation for market access and so on.
This can be done by creating a support system 
which will make MSEs go digital, find markets, 
secure credit, avail of government schemes, and 
meet compliances. The proposed Udyog Sahayak 
Enterprise Network (USENET) is that support 
system. The authors propose the creation of 18 lakh 
Udyog Sahayak Enterprises (USEs) to be created 
over 5 years as part of USENET project: 5 lakh in 
Year 1, 6 lakh more by Year 3 and 7 lakh more by 
Year 5 - with the aim of scaling up these MSEs and 
also improving the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) for 
millions of MSEs.
While fostering start-ups remains important 
to the economy, an equally if not more 
important policy aim should be to enable 
scale-up of existing micro-enterprises.
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USENET is an entrepreneurship model, with the 
Government of India catalysing the enablement of 
the factors that would lead to self-sustenance of 
the USEs. It is envisaged as a service/transaction 
oriented model with a large bouquet of services 
made available to the MSEs at their doorstep 
such as digitisation and formalisation, availing of 
government loans, subsidies or other benefits, 
ensuring compliance with local, regional, and 
national regulation, aiding partnership with digital 
marketing platforms and digital payment  
platforms, etc.
USEs will be supported by a National Digital 
Ecosystem for MSMEs (NDEM) that will be built on 
the principle of technology as a public good. It will 
operate with the help of a single window access to 
enterprise support services and schemes of Central 
and State governments.
Udyog Sahayaks Entrepreneurs will be educated 
youth with 12th pass or graduate degrees who 
will be trained by the existing skilling ecosystem 
of the Skill Ministry. Thus the programme creates 
sustainable livelihoods for 18 lakh educated youth, 
in addition to enabling MSE growth and indirect job 
creation and consequent economic growth.
The support system provided by USENET will 
free up the micro-entrepreneur’s time to focus on 
enterprise growth. The resulting increase in value-
added growth can create more jobs. Moreover, if 
the USENET system is able to assist firms in finding 
and hiring workers, employment elasticity in this 
sector can also increase.
The revenue model is that each USE works with a 
fixed set of client MSEs. Each Micro entrepreneur 
pays a modest monthly fee to the USE for their 
services of which 50 per cent can be reimbursed 
by the government. This reimbursement will be 
withdrawn after six years. USE will also get paid 
commission for providing banking services like a 
Banking Correspondent (BC) and will also get a 
commission from the private parties for enabling 
MSEs use their digital products. At the end of 5 
years, income of the Udyog Sahayak entrepreneur 
is expected to be I1,33,000 per year. Lessons 
from Common Service Centre (village level 
entrepreneur), BC, and Anganwadi models indicates 
that a sustainable flow of income of at least I12,000 
per month is key to the success of the model.
Each USE will require a capex of I1,14, 000 of which 
50 per cent is a grant from the government. Eighty 
per cent of working capital requirements will come 
in the form of a MUDRA loan. Youth will invest 
50 per cent of the initial investment required and 
also 20 per cent of the margin money required for 
working capital loan from MUDRA bank. In the 
proposed model, the total government pay-out in 
Year 1 is I4,200 crores, and average over 5 years 
is I6,000 crores per year. Government spending 
per job created falls from I84,000 in Year One to 
I27,000 is Year Two to I3,000 in Year Ten.
The authors estimate that an additional 1 crore (10.3 
million) jobs can be created over five years going up 
to nearly 6 crores (56.9 million) over 10 years. Based 
on GVA per worker observed in this sector, and 
assuming a 12 per cent nominal rate of growth in 
GVA, these jobs represent an additional economic 
value of I2,16,000 crores at the end of five years 
and over I19 lakh crores at the end of ten years. 
At the end of five years, government investment 
shows a return of 712 per cent over 5 years and 
nearly 30 times over ten years.
b. Universal basic services20
A key public sector intervention that operates on 
the demand side as well as the supply side of the 
labour market, is effective spending on health and 
education. On the demand side, such spending 
creates employment in the delivery of these crucial 
services. On the supply side, it improves the quality 
of the labour force. Abraham et al (2019) propose 
the creation of a Universal Basic Services (UBS) 
programme that will expand the current public 
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system of delivering key services creating millions of 
good jobs in the process.
India continues to under-invest public resources on 
health and education relative not only to its richer 
peers such as Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa 
(BRICS countries), but also compared to some of 
its South Asian neighbours as well as sub-Saharan 
African countries. Since 2000, public expenditure on 
health and education as a percentage of GDP has 
stagnated. As a result, as demand for these services 
has increased, out-of-pocket expenditure has risen 
and is now higher in India than in many other 
countries of the world, many of which are poorer 
or have grown slower. There have been calls to 
increase the health budget from around 1 per cent 
to 3 per cent of GDP, and the education budget 
from 4 to 6 per cent of GDP. This will make enough 
resources available to eliminate existing shortfalls, 
expand capacity, and create decent jobs for millions 
of workers across the education and 
health spectrum.
The Covid crisis has demonstrated 
how much we rely on front-line 
health as well as education workers 
to rapidly adapt to circumstances, 
and in the case of the former, put 
lives at risk. This includes Accredited Social Health 
Assistants (ASHA) who are considered volunteers 
and are paid far below the minimum wage (see Box 
8.1). It is imperative that these frontline workers 
are adequately compensated for the immense 
amount of work they do under difficult conditions. 
A long-standing demand in this respect is a monthly 
honorarium of I12,000.21
While the human capital returns to such investment 
are obvious and proven multiple times over in many 
countries, a relatively under-emphasised aspect of 
such an expansion of public service provisioning is 
that it can generate a large number of good quality 
jobs requiring a range of skills and education levels. 
These jobs are hard to mechanise because they 
involve human interaction and are also hard to 
substitute with imports. If Anganwadi and ASHA 
workers are regularised and paid a salary, such 
investment has the potential to be repaid many 
times over, not only due to increased demand 
and multiplier effects, but also because such 
investments will increase productivity, and more 
importantly the quality of life in India’s villages  
and cities.
Abraham et al (2019) also show based on state-level 
analyses, that states with relatively higher public 
spending per capita also tend to have lower out-of-
pocket expenses in private health facilities. They 
identify states that have performed relatively well in 
delivering public services controlling for per capita 
income, as well as states which provide public 
education that delivers outcomes on par with the 
private system and at a fraction of the cost to  
the household.
On the employment front, they find that a modest 
expansion of the current system, that consists 
of filling vacancies and eliminating shortfall in 
infrastructure in the health and education systems, 
can create more than 2 million jobs, which is around 
15 per cent of the current workforce in these two 
sectors. Regularising the employment of anganwadi 
workers, ASHAs, helpers, and other contractual 
employees in the public health and education 
system can create good jobs for another  
3 million workers.
It is imperative that ASHA and Anganwadi 
workers are adequately compensated for 
the immense amount of work they do under 
difficult conditions.
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Box 8.1 : India’s frontline workers
The SWI 2021 background paper by Sinha, Gupta, 
and Shriyan (2021) presents powerful testimonies 
from women frontline workers and quantitative 
data based on surveys conducted in Bihar and 
Telangana. The paper is based on data collected 
as part of a larger study on women workers in 
frontline public employment before the pandemic 
as well as data collected through phone surveys 
during lockdown. 
The Integrated Child Development Programme 
(ICDS), a scheme of the Ministry of Women and 
Child Development, Government of India, was 
launched in 1975. It has since been universalised 
and its implementation got a fillip with Supreme 
Court orders in 2006. ICDS offers (a) supplementary 
nutrition (b) pre-school non-formal education (c) 
nutrition and health education (d) immunisation 
(e) health check-up and (f) referral services. These 
services are provided through Anganwadi centres 
(AWC) across the country. At present, there are 
about 1.4 million AWCs employing nearly 1.28 
million Anganwadi Workers (AWWs) and about 
1.16 million Anganwadi Helpers (AWHs). From 
2005, under the National Rural Health Mission 
(NRHM), Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA) 
workers have been recruited to act as the link 
between communities and the primary health care 
system.  According to a response in the parliament1 
in March, 2020, there are about 1.1 million ASHA 
workers in India selected from the local community 
they belong to. Importantly, all the AWWs, AWHs 
and ASHA workers are women. 
Taken together AWW, AWH and ASHA workers 
form the triad of frontline workers who play 
complex multiple roles from being nutrition 
counsellors, community mobilisers, preschool 
teachers to being the face of the healthcare 
systems in rural India. For example Rama  
(AWW, Telangana), describing her work says,
We do surveys based on areas. Based on my 
population, I have to take a survey of the number 
and details of pregnant women, details of 
newborn, details of children from seven months to 
three years, details of adolescent girls, deliveries 
and deaths. I have to also give them food. Post-
registration till delivery these pregnant women 
have to come to the centre for food. We serve food 
here at the centre. All this comes under Arogya 
Laxmi program, wherein we give them lunch every 
afternoon at the centre. We give children between 
seven months and three years, ration to take home 
and Balamrutham powder at their homes. We also 
maintain a record of deaths. There is a register for 
children. We make children do preschool activities. 
They gave us a mobile last year to update reports 
on it every day. In that we have to update it based 
on our daily door to door surveys. We have to also 
give them advice and suggestions on what foods to 
eat and how to eat. We also make note on high-
risk pregnancies and advise them to go for regular 
check-ups. Before lockdown, I used to work from 
nine to four at the anganwadi centre. Then four to 
six pm, I do house visits. Morning, before going to 
the centre sometimes, I finish my house visits. It’s 
proper full day work! (sighs) Medikonda is a very 
big Gram Panchayat. It has a population of 6,500.
Despite the monumental role played by AWCs in 
community development, nearly a quarter of them 
do not have drinking water facilities and about 36 
per cent of them do not have toilets.2 Moreover 
the work and the contributions of AWWs and 
AWHs have largely remained invisible. They are not 
regular, salaried employees of the government. As 
per norms of the Seventh Central Pay Commission, 
the minimum monthly wages for a government 
employee must be I18,000. But, for instance, the 
AWWs, on average, are paid an honorarium (not a 
salary) of  I5,000 per month and the honorarium of 
AWHs are even lower. As volunteers, they are out 
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of the ambit of minimum wage laws of the country. 
ASHA workers are entitled to task-based incentives 
whose nature and amount vary from state to state. 
On average, they earn about I6,000 per month and 
put in about 10 hours of work a day. The abysmally 
low wages and practically non-existent social 
security has meant that many ASHA workers have 
been regularly going on strike demanding higher 
wages and better working conditions. These have 
been the precarious circumstances of such a large 
female frontline workforce before the pandemic.
The pandemic worsened their insecurity, exposing 
them to higher risks and vulnerabilities without 
any recognition of dignified employment and fair 
remuneration. Immediately after the lockdown, 
these women frontline workers became the 
primary agency for COVID relief work in rural India. 
Overnight, in addition to their pre-existing set of 
tasks, the frontline workers were now in-charge 
of additional work such as curbing the infection 
spread, conducting door-to-door surveys, assisting 
with contact tracing, testing and spreading 
awareness. 
The study outlines two major dimensions of 
hardships each of which have further subdivisions 
of hardship categories. First, all the frontline 
workers are unequivocally overworked. Second, 
they are undervalued which is not only exemplified 
by workers getting subsistence wages but also 
illustrated through several of them facing multiple 
forms of indignities. The woes of underpayment 
get further compounded by irregular payment 
cycles and routine delays in receiving payments. 
For example, nearly one in five respondents had 
not received the previous month’s salaries. Given 
the hard work put in by them, such delays in wage 
payments have a discouraging effect on the workers 
to pursue this line of work. For example,  Sameena 
(AWW, Bihar) said, 
                  
We do important work for the community, meet 
with a lot of women, that feels nice. Sometimes 
when there are delays in payments and things, it 
becomes a problem. Right now, we haven’t been 
paid a salary for the last eight months. Even during 
lockdown we didn’t get paid. The extra money 
we were supposed to get has also not come. We 
brought it up in the meetings. Let’s see what they 
do. What’s worse is I still have not got paid for 
some months in 2016.
On most occasions, reimbursements for travel 
expenses get delayed by six months and on many 
occasions, even the paltry travel allowance of 
I200 per month is seldom paid. These get further 
magnified as the frontline workers receive scant 
support and training for their work owing to 
massive vacancies in block level functionaries. In 
response to a Right to Information (RTI) query, 
the authors point out that 30 per cent of the block 
level offices of ICDS are vacant.  As per official 
norms, there should be one supervisor for every 25 
AWCs. However, there is a 37 per cent shortfall of 
Anganwadi supervisors. 
The story is not much different for ASHA workers 
and several positions of ASHA Facilitators continue 
to be vacant. During the pandemic, ASHA workers 
were entitled to an incentive of I1,000 per 
month for COVID related work but none of the 
respondents in the two states surveyed by the 
authors received that amount at the time of the 
survey in July-August, 2020. Overall, about 42 per 
cent reported ‘more work than usual’ during the 
pandemic and this was in addition to the increased 
work on the home front. 
Based on telephonic survey of respondents in 
Delhi and Bihar, Thorat et al. (2021), in their SWI 
2021 Background Paper find that Anganwadi or 
ASHA workers were not available to assist young 
children, pregnant women, and nursing mothers 
in their health and nutritional needs. Rather, many 
of these workers were now engaged in gathering 
data about household members. On speaking with 
an ASHA worker in Sasaram district of Bihar, the 
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authors found that the workers received no specific 
instructions from higher authorities for the care of 
new-born children, pregnant women, or lactating 
mothers under such extraordinary circumstances. 
She also responded negatively when asked if they 
took any special care or any other measures to 
ensure safe delivery for pregnant women. She 
further added that they worked in such a condition 
without proper masks, gloves, sanitisers, or other 
essential equipment.
AWWs, AWHs and ASHA workers are the most 
fundamental force working to improve nutrition 
parameters among rural children and women. 
It is therefore imperative to improve their work 
conditions, regularise their employment, increase 
their salaries and improve social protection 
measures. In addition, there is an urgent need to 
not just fill vacant positions but recruit more AWWs 
and AWHs per village. This will have the twin effect 
of aggressively working towards improving nutrition 






c. A multisectoral focus on culture, heritage,  
and tourism22
India’s multi-century, multi-cultural heritage in art, 
architecture, agriculture and light manufacturing 
is globally recognised. This cultural legacy 
transcends sectoral boundaries. Agricultural 
products, manufactured commodities (food and 
beverages, textiles, garments, leather, metal, wood, 
gems and jewellery) and services (tourism, arts, 
heritage building restoration and maintenance) 
come together to produce this immense heritage. 
With respect to employment there are two big 
challenges here. First, increasing productivity and 
reforming institutions in existing clusters to ensure 
an improvement in livelihoods for artisans and 
other workers. Second, creating or reviving clusters 
to generate new employment. Several potential 
tourism opportunities lie unexploited all across 
the country, and many manufacturing clusters 
are declining. Despite policy attention afforded 
to it since Independence, it is fair to say that the 
sector is still not adequately leveraged particularly 
given its immense potential to create productive, 
decent, and well-paying jobs. Thus, a concerted and 
coordinated policy focus on Culture, Heritage and 
Tourism (CHAT) can reap rich rewards.
The CHAT sector is dominated by MSMEs, it is 
labour-intensive, skill-intensive, and it is present 
in every part of the country, unlike large-scale 
manufacturing and modern services which are 
geographically concentrated. At the time of 
writing, more than 400 distinct Geographical 
Indications have been awarded to agricultural and 
manufactured goods, and thousands more can be 
added to the list. The ‘handicrafts’ sector consists 
of hundreds more clusters (large and small) and 
employs an estimated seven million people (though 
estimates vary widely). Artisanal industrial clusters 
in textiles, leather, footwear, food, metals, and 
many other areas, continue to employ millions of 
workers and contribute to exports despite facing 
severe infrastructural constraints, lack of lobbying 
power, and legacy issues such as exploitative value 
chains and trust deficits.
The export potential is also large. India’s share of 
global handmade exports was a mere 1.2 per cent 
in 2012, as against China’s 30 per cent. Countries 
such as Korea have been successful in developing 
their tourism sector around cultural heritage. 
Similar examples abound in south-east Asia (e.g. 
Laos and Vietnam). Despite its rich history, India’s 
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performance in cultural tourism has been far behind 
what even much smaller countries have been able 
to achieve. Inbound tourism as well as domestic 
tourism, to a large extent, has been restricted to a 
handful of sites and states.
The tourism industry has, of course, been 
devastated by the Covid-19 pandemic. But,no 
doubt, it will revive in due course. In the meantime, 
a coordinated CHAT policy can be developed with 
the following core components:
1. A clear multi-sectoral focus that recognises 
the links between local manufacturing and 
architectural heritage, tourism, and other 
services (such as hotels and restaurants, retail) to 
offer the consumer a complete experience. Such 
linkages and spillovers are already exploited 
informally as evidenced by myriad local shops 
selling artefacts that greet the tourist in most 
large locations. But a policy focus will enable up-
scaling and formalisation.
2. A bottom-up approach to capacity building, skill 
and technology upgradation and infrastructural 
support driven by consultations with workers 
and producers. There is a vast store of 
production and entrepreneurial talent in the 
informal economy that can be leveraged (see 
next section).
3. Strong collaboration between Central, State and 
local governments. The latter’s role, together 
with local producers’ associations in enabling 
cluster growth is well-documented.
In addition to dispersed development that this 
sector can deliver, it can also enable a long-
standing policy aim, that of generating non-farm 
employment in rural areas. India’s One District, 
One Product schemes (inspired by One Village One 
Product in Japan and One Tambon One Product in 
Thailand) is a good beginning, but in fact, a district 
often has more than one product with potential 
to be developed for national and international 
markets. Chinese ‘market platforms’ connecting 
traditional clusters to domestic and global markets 
are examples to look at in this regard. Closer home, 
organisations such as SEWA have been carrying out 
interesting experiments in village and eco-tourism 
by partnering with digital platforms such as Airbnb.
There is also a large policy and academic literature 
that catalogues why previous policy attempts 
have failed to introduce dynamism in and scale-up 
clusters. This can form an input into the designing 
of the new comprehensive policy. The following 
employment-intensive sectors are likely to receive a 
boost if such a concerted policy is undertaken: light 
manufacturing – food products, textiles, garments, 
leather and footwear, gems and jewelry, metal 
products, construction (including heritage structure 
restoration), and services - food and beverages, 
hotels, tourism and transport.
8.3 / The fiscal situation 
and the road ahead
We conclude this report by returning to the 
question of a fiscal support package and 
implications for the debt-GDP ratio. In the short-
run, the measures discussed towards the beginning 
of this chapter will certainly result in an increase in 
both. For example, the extension of the PM Garib 
Kalyan Anna Yojana that has been announced for 
the months of May and June 2021 is expected to 
cost I26,000 crores. This means that an extension 
till the end of the year (a further six months) would 
cost an additional I78,000 crores. Bringing the 
MGNREGA budget to I1.75 lakh crores means an 
additional I1 lakh crores of spending beyond the 
current programme allocation. This taken together 
with the proposed cash transfers (approximately 
another I3.1 lakh crores), an urban employment 
guarantee programme (around I50,000 corres), a 
Covid hardship allowance to frontline Anganwadi 
and ASHA workers (I5,000 for six months to 
2.5 million workers or I7,500 crores), and an 
augmentation of the Central government’s portion 
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of the NSAP pensions23 comes to 
a total of approximately I5.5 lakh 
crores or 2.7 per cent of GDP. This 
is larger than the amount spent in 
2020 on Covid support measures (as 
seen in Chapter Seven).24 It can go a long way in 
providing much needed support to households and 
compensating them for large losses in income that 
have occurred and are likely to occur in the next 
few months.
Thus far, given how badly the economy has 
been impacted, India’s response has been on 
the conservative side. In last year’s Atmanirbhar 
Bharat policy package, the primary instrument of 
counter-cyclical strategy was monetary, via liquidity 
expansion and expanded credit. It accounted for 
the bulk of the 30 lakh crore package, as discussed 
in chapter 7 (end note 4). However, in the current 
situation of high levels of joblessness, depressed 
demand, MSME bankruptcies, not to mention the 
legacy problems in the banking sector and NBFCs, 
it is unlikely that monetary policy will be effective.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, it must be kept in 
mind that the Indian economy was in the middle 
of a severe slowdown even prior to the pandemic. 
Under these circumstances, a strong fiscal push  
is required. 
Taking a conservative approach today can lead to 
an extended weak recovery and a worsening of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio purely due to slower growth 
even if no additional spending is undertaken. In 
this context it should be kept in mind the GDP 
data capture the informal economy badly, thereby 
overstating the recovery. A slower recovery will 
also depress tax revenues in the future. The states, 
who are at the forefront of the pandemic response 
in terms of containment as well as welfare, are 
severely strained in their finances.25 In addition 
the vaccine rollout efforts also seem to have 
been transferred to the states.26  There are thus 
compelling reasons for the Union government to 
undertake additional spending now.
The central concern against increasing public 
spending is the debt-GDP ratio and debt 
sustainability. How binding are these constraints 
presently? At a time when all countries are 
registering a rise in their debt-GDP ratios, the 
level of debt ratio should not be an immediate 
constraint. In the case of G-20 countries, the extent 
of change in the ratio during the pandemic has 
been more or less proportional to the initial level, 
leaving the relative rankings mostly unchanged. 
Thus India ranks ninth among G-20 countries in 
terms of debt-GDP ratio for both these years. 
In the Indian context, as we explain below, the 
key concern is actually an ‘impossible trinity’, 
viz. continuing with corporate tax concessions, 
maintaining fiscal prudence and compensating 
income losses of vulnerable households.27
However, eventually, debt sustainability does 
become a concern if the ratio continues to rise over 
time. In his SWI 2021 background paper, Dasgupta 
(2021) outlines two ways in which a chosen level of 
public expenditure can be financed while keeping 
the debt-GDP ratio constant. The first, expectedly, 
is to raise revenues. While this may seem a distant 
possibility under current conditions, it is worth 
recalling that even as corporate profits have grown 
during the pandemic year,28 there has been a sharp 
reduction in corporate tax to GDP ratio during 
the same time. This is a continuation of the trend 
in the last decade, starting from a level of 3.7 per 
cent in 2011-12 to 2.7 per cent in 2019-20 to one per 
cent at the end of 2020. The paper shows that if 
the corporate tax-GDP ratio is increased from the 
present level of one per cent back to three per cent 
in 2021-22, then an additional amount of I2.9 lakh 
crores of capital expenditures and I8 lakh crores of 
primary revenue expenditures can be financed over 
and above the 2020-21 level.29
There are compelling reasons for 
the Union government to undertake 
additional spending now.
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The second mechanism proposed in the study is to 
increase expenditures and deficits in a manner that 
the level of GDP rises in proportion to the increase 
in debt. This is only possible if the quality of 
expenditure is such that multipliers are sufficiently 
high and additional deficits generate demand 
and output to the necessary extent. Using RBI’s 
estimated expenditure multipliers, Dasgupta shows 
that increasing corporate tax-GDP ratio as well as 
the capital expenditure-GDP ratio can achieve a 
targeted level of non-capital primary expenditure 
for 2021-22 of I17.9 lakh crores, which includes a 
pandemic-related fiscal support of I3 lakh crores.
We are living through a once-in-a-century crisis 
with severe pain being inflicted on our society’s 
weakest sections. There is an urgent need to ensure 
that pain is distributed according to capacity to 
bear it. The immediate task is to repair household 
balance sheets and revive growth. This requires 
public spending because the private sector either 
cannot invest due to insolvency problems or does 
not want to invest due to already existing excess 
capacity and weak demand. Good quality public 
spending will revive demand, create employment 
and generate the tax revenue necessary to keep 
the debt-GDP under control. On the other hand, 
focusing on the fiscal deficit or debt risks keeping 
demand low and prolonging the pandemic- 
induced recession.
We hope that the findings and arguments in 
this report contribute to the difficult journey of 
economic revival that lies ahead for India.
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and garments and knitwear, which did create jobs 
(Basole and Narayan 2019).
17 Consultations with MSME owners. Also see  
IDFC (2019).
18 See Gupta and Basole (2020) for an application of 
this to the IT-BPO industry.
19 Based on a report submitted by T. Muralidharan, 
Bino Paul, and Amit Basole as part of an Expert 
Group advising Group of Ministers (GoM) on 
Employment and Skills, September-October 2020.




22 This section draws on a paper in progress by 
Gaurav Gupta and Amit Basole on Creating 
Employment in India’s Cultural Economy: Heritage, 
Tourism, and Small-scale Manufacturing.
23 NSAP currently covers about 34 million 
beneficiaries, of which the majority are the 
elderly (around 22 per cent of the national elderly 
population is covered). Even by very conservative 
estimates, the Centre’s contribution should 
be increased to at least I500 per month. This 
would mean a total allocation of I20,000 crores, 
as opposed to around 9,000 crores last year. If 
coverage is also expanded based on NFSA lists to 
vulnerable individuals, allocation would have to go 
up accordingly.
24 This would bring the total spending over two 
years on Covid relief to around 4.5 per cent of 
GDP. This is consistent with what other developing 
economies in Asia such as Vietnam and Indonesia 



















29 There have been other proposals to raise revenue 
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Appendix
Section 1 / Tables and Figures
Appendix tables 1 through 15 referred to in the main 
text are available here. 
Section 2 / Construction of 
CMIE-CPHS datasets 
The Consumer Pyramids Households Survey 
(CPHS)  is a nationally representative survey of  
households conducted since 2014 by the Centre 
for Monitoring the Indian Economy.  The survey 
is conducted in ‘waves’, with each wave lasting 
four months. The first wave, therefore, goes from 
January to April, the second from May to August 
and the last wave from September to December. 
During a wave, approximately 1,70,000 households 
are approached and information on 8,00,000 
individuals collected.  These same households are 
interviewed again in the second and third wave. 
Further, the sample of households within each 
month of a wave remains unchanged across waves. 
So, if a household is interviewed in the first month 
of wave one, it will be interviewed next in the first 
month of the second wave, and again, in the first 
month of the third wave.    
The survey collects demographic information on 
the individuals in the household, their employment 
status and other employment-related information, 
information on individual and  household  incomes 
from various sources, consumption expenditure 
on different items, and assets acquired and intent 
to acquire. The People of India module of the 
survey contains individual-level demographic 
information, employment status including type of 
employment, industry of employment, occupation 
type and so on. In more recent years, the survey 
also collects information on the time spent on 
particular activities by an individual. The earnings 
from employment, and household level income are 
contained in a separate module - Member Income 
and Household Income.1 
While the People of India and Member Income 
modules are at the individual level (containing 
information on employment status and earnings 
and other incomes), the Household Income 
module is at the household level with information 
on households’ income from various sources, 
including the aggregate income from members’ 
earnings. Though separate, all these modules may 
be combined together using the appropriate unique 
household-level or member-level identifier. 
Estimates from CMIE-CPHS are representative at 
the state or national level using the appropriate 
weights.2 For all individual level analysis at the 
all-India level in this report, the weight used is the 
wave-level member weight for individuals above 
15 years of age at the country-level with correction 
for non-response. For any household level analysis 
using monthly income data, the weights used are 
the month-level household weights at the country-
level with correction for non-response.  For all 
state-level analysis, the appropriate state-level 
weights with correction for non-response are used. 
2.1 / People of India 
This section discusses the details of how the  
People of India module has been used and the 
construction of the various panels used in the 
analyses in the report. 
For every wave in CMIE-CPHS, a typical sample 
consists of approximately 1,70,000 households and 
8,30,000 individuals. In each wave, the employment 
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status of the individual at the time of the survey is 
collected. Therefore, this gives us information on 
an individual’s employment status at three points in 
the year. Within this sample, during normal, i.e. pre-
Covid times when the survey was conducted in the 
field, there is still some level of non-response. Table 
16 shows the share of responses and non-responses 
by households in the 2019 and 2020 waves
During a normal wave, CMIE-CPHS has a response 
rate of around 85 per cent. During the month of 
April 2020, owing to the economic lockdown and 
mobility restrictions, the CMIE-CPHS transitioned 
from a door-to-door survey to a phone survey 
resulting in a significant reduction in sample size.3  
In the initial waves, with the transition to the phone 
survey, response rate declined substantially but this 
has increased subsequently, and is at 70 percent in 
the last wave of 2020. 
In the employment analysis in this report, we have 
relied primarily on two kinds of samples, (i) a panel 
tracking individuals pre-Covid from the December 
2019 sample (i.e. only one month of wave 3), and 
following them over the subsequent waves in April 
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(ii) a panel comprising of individuals in the last pre-
Covid wave, i.e. wave 3 of 2019 namely September, 
October, November, December 2019 and tracking 
them a year later, in wave 3 of 2020. 
The remaining discussion in this section details the 
construction of each of these datasets. 
(i) Trajectory sample 
This sample is used for the employment trajectories 
analysis presented in Chapter Three. The sample 
is constructed by first taking those individuals who 
were employed in the month of December 2019, 
i.e, the last month of wave 3. The next interview 
for these individuals would have occurred in the 
last month of wave 1 of 2020, i.e. April,  and then in 
August in wave 2 of 2020, and finally in December 
of 2020. Such a panel allows us to track workers 
prior to the lockdown, examine the impact on 
their employment  during the lockdown and their 
recovery in later months. This panel allows us to 
understand first, the immediate impact of the 
pandemic on the pre-Covid workforce and  
second, their employment recovery in the 
subsequent months.
Table 17 shows the distribution of these workers 
in terms of their information available in the 
subsequent waves. In December 2019, the 
workforce sample in CMIE-CPHS People of India 
comprised 45,671 individuals. In April 2020, with 
the sudden transition to phone survey,there is 
the expected drop in the sample with information 
on nearly two-thirds of the December workforce 
no longer available. As Table 17 shows, for the 
45,671 workers in December 2019, employment 
information is available only for 14,460 (about 30 
percent). This improves by the end of 2020 and 
about three-quarters of the December workforce 
has data available. 
However, the construction of this trajectory panel 
is anchored on having been in the workforce in 
December 2019 and having information available 
in April 2020 and December 2020. Therefore, the 
size of the final trajectory panel is 11,008. Table 18 
shows the distribution of the employment status 
of these workers in the subsequent waves under 
consideration.
The CMIE-CPHS is conducted at the wave level, 
but the trajectory sample takes individuals from one 
month in a wave and follows them over subsequent 
waves. To what extent is the sample from a month 
in a wave representative of the overall sample and 
what weight are used when using month-level data? 































































Since we use the data only for one month for each 
of these waves, the appropriate weights to use for 
this estimation would be the corresponding month-
level weights, correcting for the observation that 
might be lost due to attrition. However, the People 
of India database provides only the wave-level 
weights, which is the frequency at which the data is 
released.4 For the purpose of this exercise, we have 
to rely on the wave-level weights offered with the 
People of India to generate month-level estimates. 
We show that estimates calculated by applying 
attrition-corrected wave-level weights on a monthly 
sample are broadly representative. We first show 
that the distribution of the monthly sample across 
various demographies, after applying the wave-
level weights, are similar to their distribution in 
the overall wave. Second, we take the month-level 
estimates of unemployment rate and labour force 
participation rate that are published by the CMIE 
and compare our weighted month level estimates 
to show that these are similar.  
First, a monthly sample in the CMIE is well-
representative of the wave sample. We find that 
each month of the wave has a similar distribution 
of the sample across states and regions. Further, 
the distribution of individuals across other 
characteristics is also similar between the samples 
at the wave- and the month-level. The distribution 
is also quite similar in the sub-sample that we used 
to construct the panel to study the trajectory of 
employment (Appendix Table 19).  Therefore, this 
provides one justification that with the use of 
attrition-corrected weights, the month-level panel 
sample, despite being a sub-sample of the wave 
population, can be used to derive national level 
estimates.
Next, we show below that using these wave 
weights on monthly data closely approximates 
CMIE’s own monthly estimates (which uses 
monthly weights). In Table 20 we compare our 
estimates of Unemployment Rate and Workforce 
Participation Rate using country weights corrected 
for attrition and non-response with the publicly 
available estimates provided by the CMIE using 
month-level weights.
Table 20 shows that estimates at the month-level 
using CMIE-CPHS wave level weights are broadly 
similar to the month-level estimates provided 
by the CMIE using their own internally available 
month-level weights. 
(ii) Employment transitions analysis sample: Wave 
3 (September-October-November-December) 
2019 and 2020 panel
All employment analysis in Chapter Four of the 
report uses the last pre-Covid wave, i.e. the last 
wave of 2019 and follows these same individuals 
a year later in the same wave in 2020. Like in the 
earlier dataset creation, we begin with the pre-
Covid (wave 3, 2019) workforce. Information for 
these 4.8 lakh individuals is combined with their 
information in wave 3 of 2020. Table 21 shows the 
details of the working age population from wave 3 
of 2019 and their status in the same wave a  
year later. 
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CMIE Estimates (using 
monthly weights)
Estimates using wave-level 
country weights with non-
response correction
Sources and notes: CMIE-CPHS, various waves
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Sources and notes: CMIE-CPHS. Employment status is categorised as “Not applicable” if the individual is 


















































































Employment status in 2020
Employment status in 2019
Information is available in 2020 wave 3 for about 75  
per cent of the 2019 wave 3 workforce. This sample 
of 1,29,975 individuals is the sample that is used 
when looking at employment transitions (across 
employment arrangements and industries) and 
the movement into informality for the permanent 
salaried. 
To ensure that seasonal factors are being 
considered, and to better understand the Covid 
effect, we compare all findings in the 2019-2020 
panel with their corresponding findings in 2018-
2019, the baseline year. To construct the baseline 
panel, we follow the same process as above. Table 
21 provides the details of the baseline sample 
2.2 / Income Pyramids
As mentioned earlier, the Household Income and 
Member income modules (called Income Pyramids) 
contain information on individual and household 
level earnings and income. This data, like in the 
People of India, is collected in three waves each 
year, i.e. each household is visited three times 
in a year. In each visit, information on income 
from various sources are asked for the previous 
four months. So in total, CMIE-CPHS provides 
income information for every month and for every 
individual. For individuals, information is provided 
for their total income, wage income, income from 
pension, dividend, interest payment, and fixed 
deposits/provident funds. At the household level 
income is additionally also reported under the 
headings of household business income, household 
income from rent, self-production, private and 
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government transfers, sale of assets, lotteries, and 
gambling. A point to note is that losses in business 
are not included in the business owner’s income 
and treated as part of the business accounts. 
Consequently, CMIE-CPHS does not report 
negative incomes.
All income information, unless otherwise stated, 
is in real terms. Real incomes are calculated using 
state-level monthly consumer price index (CPI) 
for rural and urban sectors, sourced from Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI).5 All incomes are reported in 
constant Jan 2020 prices for all the analysis. For the 
months and states for which CPI was unavailable, 
it was replaced with the corresponding month’s 
all-India CPI figure. Also, since state-level CPI was 
unavailable for the period of February to April 
2020, all-India CPI was used for these months. 
Additionally, since no CPI information was available 
for May 2020 in the aforementioned source, 
the imputed all-India CPI for May was sourced 
from a Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation (MOSPI) document dated 13th  
July 2020.
The income data is used in the report to look at 
the impact on workers’ earnings and household 
incomes. For the analysis of impact on workers’ 
earnings, we use a sample that merges People of 
India information with income data, as detailed 
in (i) below.  To understand the household level 
impacts, we use an event study method (described 
in section (ii)). Finally,  to understand how data on 
income from  CMIE-CPHS compares with official 
statistics from PLFS, we have undertaken a detailed 
initial analysis comparing the two data sources on 
broad parameters. This is detailed in section (iii). 
(i) Employment and earnings analysis:  September-
October 2019 and 2020 panel.
The labour earnings analysis presented in Chapter 
Four relies on a smaller sample than in the 
employment analysis. This is the September and 
October 2019 sample followed into September-
October 2020 creating a panel of individuals with 
their employment information at two points in 
time. This sample from People of India is merged 
with the Member income data for the months of 
September and October 2019 and 2020. So, for an 
individual whose employment status was collected 
in September 2019, we take the corresponding 
individual income reported for that month. 
Note that individual and household incomes in 
CMIE are collected with a lag with individuals 
being asked about their income in the four months 
before the interview, as mentioned earlier. So, 
an individual who is interviewed in April is asked 
about their incomes in the four months prior - 
December, January, February and March. Therefore, 
the information on income in September would 
have been collected between October and January, 
depending on when the household was contacted. 
So, the September and October incomes would 
have been asked to the households in our sample 
(i.e. those belonging to the September-October 
2019 or 2020 wave) in the next January and February 
respectively. Thus incomes, in this case, have a four-
month lag in recall as compared to employment 
status which pertains to the time of interview. The 
same applies to household incomes against the 
members’ employment status.
The Member Income module contains information 
on members’ earnings from wages, salaries for every 
month till October 2020 (at the time of writing). 
In the report, individual earnings for salaried and 
casual workers is based on this variable - members’ 
earnings from wages and salaries. However, for self-
employed workers, we use additional information. 
In the Household Income module, information 
on income from business is also collected. For 
any household, the income from business is 
apportioned equally between all self-employed 
members in that household. This amount is then 
added to the member’s income from wages and 
salaries, if any, to arrive at the total earnings of 
self-employed members. This is the final variable 
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used to represent workers’ earnings.  The sample 
comprises of individuals who are employed in both 
periods and for whom income information was 
available. The final sample for the analysis was 
3,03,105 individuals in the 2019-2020 period, and 
2,97,843 for  the baseline 2018-2019 period. This is 
the sample used to examine the impact on workers’ 
earnings and  the decomposition of earnings in 
terms of employment and income loss. 
(ii) Household income analysis
The household income analysis presented in 
Chapter Five covers the months between July 
2019 to October 2020. The variable used is per-
capita household income. Total household income 
comes from the household module of the income 
data and is defined as follows - ‘the summation 
of total income of every earning member and 
the income of the household collectively, which 
cannot be attributed to any individual member. This 
includes income received from all sources such as 
rent, income earned from self production, private 
transfers, wages, overtime, bonus, etc.’6 Household 
income data is then merged with CMIE-CPHS 
People of India module to get information on the 
size of the household. Per-capita household income 
is created using household size and total household 
income variables.
For the analysis of the impact on incomes, we rely 
primarily on three metrics - comparing average 
monthly income losses, cumulative losses over 
pre-Covid and Covid period, and estimates from 
an event study model. For everything except the 
average monthly losses, we have used seasonally 
adjusted incomes.  
Seasonality adjustment factors for each month are 
estimated by calculating the average deviation in 
monthly incomes from the trendline during the 
2017-2019 period. We estimate incomes for each 
individual month by first taking a moving average 
of the monthly incomes of the surrounding ten 
months (five months prior to the month under 
consideration; five months post). The actual 
observed income in the month is then divided by 
the estimated moving average to get a ratio of the 
deviation from the trendline. This is done for every 
month’s data between June 2017 and September 
2019. The month-specific seasonality adjustment 
factor is then derived by taking an average of all the 
ratios for a given month over the two year period. 
This adjustment is done separately for rural and 
urban sectors. We then apply this seasonality factor 
for monthly incomes in 2020 to get the seasonally 
adjusted incomes. 
For example, the corresponding ratio of rural 
income for January 2019 is estimated by taking 
an average of monthly incomes five months prior 
to the month (August 2018 to December 2018), 
five months after the month (February 2019 to 
June 2019). Similarly, the ratio for January 2018 is 
estimated. January 2019 and January 2018 ratios are 
then averaged to get an seasonality adjustment 
factor for January. This factor is then applied to 
January 2020 incomes. We find that incomes are 
more seasonal in rural areas because of lump-sum 
incomes obtained by farmers when they sell their 
harvest than in urban areas. Typically rural incomes 
for the months of April and October are higher. 
Other alternate methods to determine seasonality 
of incomes like X-13-ARIMA will be explored in 
future research.7 
Only households for which income data is reported 
in the survey in all the pre-Covid months (July 
2019-Feb 2020) are used to estimate the pre-Covid 
average monthly income and define the pre-
covid percentiles, as well as to estimate income 
distribution. And similarly, only households for 
which income data is reported in all the Covid 
months (March 2020-October 2020) are used to 
estimate the average monthly per-capita income 
and define the percentiles in this period, and the 
income distribution.
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For the event study analysis in the report, we look 
at household income between October 2019 and 
October 2020. We estimate the following event 
study model to capture the effect of the pandemic 
on per capita household income and individual 
incomes.
yit= ∑
           ��.𝟙[τ=t-e] + �i + �it
wherein,
yit = seasonally adjusted per capita household 
income for household i in month t in constant Rs. 
τ = indexed event time (time relative to the month 
of lockdown – March 2020)
�i = household fixed effects
�it = error term (clustered at the household level)
t = month
e = base month (March 2020)
For the poverty analysis we estimate the number 
of individuals who live in households whose per 
capita income is below the variously defined 
thresholds using CMIE Income Pyramids data. We 
convert the defined thresholds into Jan 2020 terms 
using Consumer Price Index (CPI) for rural and 
urban areas. CMIE CPHS weights for household 
income are at the household level. Since poverty 
is estimated at the individual level, we convert the 
household-level poverty estimates to the individual 
level using per-capita equivalency scale. We do 
this by multiplying the household sample weights 
provided by CMIE with the size of the household to 
get household size-adjusted weights. We chose not 
to use CMIE provided individual weights as they 
are derived based on demographic characteristics 
which are not taken into account in per capita 
equivalence scales. We then apply the CPI-adjusted 
thresholds to household per capita income and 
estimate the proportion of individuals who live in 
households with incomes below the thresholds. 
We then use population estimates for 2020 (based 
on Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (2019)) to 
convert these proportions into absolute terms .
2.3 / Comparing CMIE-CPHS and  
PLFS income data
CMIE-CPHS is the only nationally representative 
data available for 2020 that maps both the pre-
Covid and post-Covid periods.  However, it is 
important to understand how similar or different 
income estimates from the CMIE-CPHS are 
from other nationally representative and official 
sources of data on income. The last publically 
available, nationally representative government 
survey data with information on labour earnings 
(including earnings from self-employment) is the 
Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 2018-19. We 
compare the estimates for incomes between the 
two datasets on broad parameters to establish the 
extent of comparability between the two.
For the purpose of our analysis, we construct a 
variable for members’ incomes using the method 
detailed earlier, i.e. combining wage earnings 
and apportioned earnings from business for self-
employed workers. This is combined with the 
individual’s employment status. Employment 
information is not available at the month level, 
but rather at the wave level, at three points in the 
year.  This means that we use income information 
pertaining to the three months for which 
employment data is available.  
Thus PLFS has information on every individual’s 
employment status and income once a year, 
while CMIE-CPHS has income and employment 
information for each individual three times a year. 
We consider the CMIE-CPHS as a pooled sample, 
whereby the three observations pertaining to the 
same individual collected at three points in the 
year are considered as three separate entities. 
This is equivalent to combining the three waves 
and treating the sample as a pooled sample rather 
than a panel. The pooled sample is similar to a 
random sample where we pick one observation 
per individual in terms of the distribution of 
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In the PLFS, self-employed workers  are asked 
about their income in the last 30 days, and regular 
wage and salaried workers are asked about their 
income in the last month. For casual wage workers, 
earnings per day for the seven days preceding the 
date of survey is asked.  The total  weekly earnings 
of casual wage workers are multiplied with four to 
arrive at their monthly earnings. And so, we have  
all earnings for all workers in PLFS at the monthly 
level. 
We use the latest round of PLFS (2018-19) and 
compare it to the corresponding  data from CMIE-
CPHS. PLFS 2018-19 was conducted over the 
months of July 2018 to June 2019. For CMIE-CPHS 
we use income information from the closest three 
waves - last wave of 2018 (September-December), 
first wave of 2019 (January-April), and second wave 
of 2019 (May-August).
Below we report findings from both PLFS and 
CMIE-CPHS income data. For CMIE-CPHS, results 
are reported for data including zero incomes as well 
as for data excluding zero incomes. This is done 
to address the high proportion of zero incomes 
reported in CMIE-CPHS income module. The 
data reports zero incomes for 12 per cent of the 
employed sample over the period of study. This 
is distributed over different employment types 
as follows - 13 per cent for self-employed, and 11 
per cent each for daily wage workers and regular 
wage workers. Accordingly, we examine income 
distribution including as well as excluding zero 
incomes in CMIE-CPHS.
All-India
When zero incomes are included in the average, 
the real monthly income in PLFS is I11,225, and 
for CMIE-CPHS it is I14,531. If zero incomes are 
excluded, the corresponding numbers are I11,307 
and I17,354. Across the entire income distribution, 
CMIE-CPHS absolute numbers exceed that of 
PLFS. For the income distribution inclusive of 
zeroes, the 10th percentile of the CMIE-CPHS 
distribution is zero (Appendix Table 13). With zero 
incomes, the median income in PLFS is I8,038, 
while that in CPHS is I10,215. Without zeros, the 
corresponding numbers are I8,095 and  I12,155 
(Appendix Table 14).
Income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient is 0.52 for CMIE-CPHS and 0.44 for 
PLFS data, for the income distribution including 
zero incomes. For the income distribution without 
zeroes, the Gini coefficient is 0.42 for CMIE-CPHS, 
and remains 0.44 for PLFS. 
Rural-Urban
Inequality in urban areas, according to official 
national statistics, has historically been higher 
than in rural areas. The Gini estimates from PLFS 
confirms this. However, for CMIE-CPHS, the 
Gini coefficient for incomes in the rural sector 
exceeds that for the urban sector (See Table 13 
in Data Appendix ) . This holds for both income 
distributions - with and without zeroes. However, 
if we remove the incomes of self-employed 
individuals in the rural area, the pattern becomes 
the same as that in PLFS, with the urban Gini 
coefficient being higher than in rural areas.8 
The inequality in earnings when zero incomes are 
included is higher in CMIE-CPHS than in PLFS. This 
is mostly driven by inequality differences within the 
rural distribution since the gap narrowed when we 
removed farmers from the rural sample. There are 
many possibilities for the difference in estimates 
across the two databases. Unlike PLFS, CPHS does 
not have a category of unpaid workers involved in 
household enterprise or family farm. These workers 
are classified as self-employed and assigned a 
share of the household enterprise or farm income. 
Additionally, losses in business are not included in 
the business owner’s income and treated as part of 
the business accounts. So CPHS does not report 
negative incomes.
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Section 3 / Azim Premji University 
Covid-19 Livelihoods Phone  
Survey (CLIPS)
The Azim Premji University Covid-19 Livelihoods 
Survey was conducted in collaboration with 
various civil society organisations  to understand 
the economic impact of the lockdown on the 
livelihoods of informal workers. The CSOs for 
the first round of the survey were Aga Khan Rural 
Support Programme, Centre for Advocacy and 
Research (CFAR), Gauri Media Trust, Paschim 
Banga Khet Majoor Samiti, Pradan, Samalochana, 
Self Employed Women’s Association, Srijan and 
Vaagdhara. Six out of these nine organisations, 
namely,  Centre for Advocacy and Research (CFAR), 
Gauri Media Trust, Paschim Banga Khet Majoor 
Samiti, Pradan, Samalochana and Self Employed 
Women’s Association were part of the second 
round of the survey. Respondents were contacted 
over phone via the networks of the collaborating 
civil society organisations in two separate rounds of 
the survey .
The first round of the survey was conducted 
between April 13th  and May 23rd, 2020 
interviewing 4,942 respondents across 12 states 
in India. The broad objective of the first round 
was to understand (and quantify) the extent of 
the lockdown’s impact on the employment and 
earnings of these informal workers. During the first 
round, the month of February 2020 was used as the 
baseline month to capture the respondent’s primary 
work activity and earnings, prior to the pandemic. 
We then captured information about the work and 
earnings of the respondent during the period of 
lockdown, beginning from March 24, till the date 
of survey. A comparison of the work and earning 
estimates over these two periods allowed us to 
identify the immediate impact of the lockdown on 
their livelihoods.
The second round of the survey took place 
between October 7 and December 23, where we 
re-interviewed 2,778 of the 4,942 respondents 
from the first round. The objective of resurveying 
the same respondents, six months later, was to 
understand what had been the nature of recovery 
since the unlocking of the economy and how 
effective  state intervention had been in mitigating 
the economic shock brought on by the crisis. In 
this second round of the survey, respondents were 
asked about their work and earnings in either 
September, October or November depending on 
the month of the interview. 
The data dashboards and other materials from both 
rounds are available online.9
Combining the data collected during the two 
rounds of the survey, a panel dataset of 2,778 
individuals was constructed wherein employment 
and household information about the same 
individual was captured for three different time 
points. The first being the month of February, the 
second being the months of April and May and the 
third being the months of September, October 
and November (since the reference period of the 
second round was the last thirty days). These three 
time points have been referred to as pre-lockdown, 
lockdown and post lockdown respectively. 
The sample of respondents in this study is 
purposive and non-random. We relied upon the 
phone databases of communities that our partner 
civil society organisations operate with. An 
alternative sampling strategy that we could have 
pursued was a random digit dialing (RDD) frame. 
However, given that our focus was on vulnerable 
communities working in the informal sector, we 
decided against pursuing random digit dialing as 
it does not offer the flexibility to focus on only 
one segment of the population. Additionally, the 
response rates of RDDs in developing economies 
are usually low - anywhere between 15 to 20 per 
cent.10 Attempting to carry out the survey using an 
RDD method would have required a considerable 
expansion of time and resources. Utilising the 
phone numbers provided by our CSOs, we managed 
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to achieve a higher response rate of around 74 
per cent.11  Even though using the CSO database 
makes our sample non-random, we have tried to 
ensure that our sample is both geographically and  
occupationally diverse. Overall our respondents 
were from 131 districts covering 12 states. Given 
the purposive nature of sampling, the findings 
presented here pertain only to the sample and are 
not representative of the larger population. The 
estimates are unweighted.
As stated above, owing to the lockdown and 
keeping in mind social distancing protocols, both 
rounds of the survey were carried out over the 
phone. SurveyCTO software’s mobile application 
was used for data collection and all enumerators 
were trained in the software.  Enumerators were 
CSO staff members and were trained via video-
conferencing. Multiple online groups were created 
to provide continuous support to enumerators at 
all times during the survey. The survey instrument 
was translated into regional languages including 
Hindi, Kannada, Gujarati, Bengali, Marathi, Odia 
and Telugu. 
Overall, the sample of 2,778 respondents whom 
we re-interviewed during the second round largely 
consists of those working in the informal economy. 
It includes farmers, agricultural labourers, self 
employed women, NREGA workers, construction 
workers, domestic help and street vendors. Table 22 
presents the sample’s descriptive statistics. Nearly 6 
in 10 respondents were women. Urban respondents 
comprised 40 per cent  of our sample. The average 
age of our respondents was around 39 years. There 
was a fair representation of those from socially 
marginalised backgrounds with SC and ST workers 
forming more than half of the sample. Around 84 
per cent of our sample were Hindus. In terms of 
employment categories, the sample is dominated 
by casual wage workers who constitute half of the 
sample. Self-employed (excluding unpaid labour) 
form 1/4th of the sample while the share of regular 
wage workers was around 19 per cent. The majority 
of our sample hailed from low income households 
Appendix Table 22 : Azim Premji University 
Livelihoods Survey (Round 2) sample 
demographics
Number of Respondents (N)
Female workers (%)
Urban workers (%)















Educational Status of workers (%)
Not literate




Diploma/ Graduate and above




























whose average monthly household income prior 
to the lockdown (i.e. in the month of February) 
was around I10,100.12 To put this into context, the 
average monthly household income as reported by 
respondents of  nationally representative surveys 
such as the CMIE for the same time period is 
around I20,600.
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Section 4 / India Working Survey
The India Working Survey (IWS) is a random sample 
survey of two states - Karnataka and Rajasthan. 
It is a collaborative project between researchers 
at Azim Premji University, the Indian Institute of 
Management, Bangalore (IIMB), and the University 
of Western Australia. It is supported by the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the 
Initiative for What Works to Advance Women 
and Girls in the Economy (IWWAGE) along with 
IIMB and Azim Premji University. The field survey 
was conducted by IFMR-LEAD during February 
and March 2020. The primary objective of this 
survey was to examine the impact of social 
identities on labour market outcomes in India. It 
aimed to capture the extent to which people’s job 
experiences have been affected by their religion/
gender/caste status as well as understand the role 
social networks play in influencing the kind of work 
people do.
Interviews were conducted till mid-March when  
the Covid pandemic struck and all field operations 
had to be stopped midway. In August-September, 
2020, the survey resumed in the form of a second 
(or re-visit) round conducted by a team of 
supervisors and enumerators based at Azim Premji 
University. All those respondents who had been 
interviewed in the first round were approached 
again with the objective of studying the impact 
of the lockdown on their livelihoods. Owing to 
Covid-19 restrictions on movement and keeping 
in mind social distancing protocols, this revisit 
round was entirely carried out over the phone. The 
response rate for the phone survey was around 57 
percent. In the phone survey, the respondents were 
asked about their employment status during two 
time periods - i)  April i.e. during the lockdown, 
and ii) in the preceding week of the survey. During 
the earlier field survey, respondents were asked 
about their employment status in the preceding 
week, roughly covering the months of February and 
March, 2020. Combining the information from the 
phone survey with the data collected during the 
field survey allows us to provide context for the 
impact as well as the subsequent recovery or lack 
thereof observed among these respondents over 
the months of August and September by which 
time most lockdown restrictions had been lifted.
4.1 / Sampling design and descriptive 
statistics 
For the field survey, a stratified multistage design 
was followed leading to a representative sample at 
the state level. The sample size of 4,000 households 
in each state is comparable in number to the sample 
size in representative surveys such as the PLFS.13 
There were four stages of selection starting from 
the district (primary stage unit), followed by the 
village/block (secondary stage unit), the household 
(tertiary stage unit) and finally the respondent 
(ultimate stage unit). The sampling frame used for 
rural households was the Population Census for 
Villages, 2011 while for urban households, it was 
the Urban Frame Survey  2012-17. At the primary 
stage, one predominantly urban district from each 
state was purposively chosen. A further 6 out of 
a total of 30 districts in Karnataka, and 8 out of 33 
in Rajasthan were randomly selected.14 The total 
number of districts in each state were divided into 
five strata based on the district’s demographic 
characteristics and a circular systematic sampling 
method was used to select the required number of 
districts from within each stratum. 
It was decided that from each village or urban 
block, 25 households would be surveyed. Thus, 
160 (4000/25) secondary stage units needed to be 
selected from each state. Within each state, the 
split of the secondary stage unit between villages 
and blocks was based on the share of the rural 
population in total state population according to 
the Census 2011. In Karnataka, the split was 98 
villages and 62 blocks while in Rajasthan it was 120 
villages and 40 blocks. The number of villages/ 
blocks allocated to the selected districts was 
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The villages were selected using probability 
proportional to size (PPS) circular systematic 
design. The 25 households were selected from each 
village following a two stage household selection 
design involving first, the selection of hamlet groups 
within the village and followed by the selection of 
households within a hamlet group. The urban areas 
in a district were divided into two strata and blocks 
within a stratum were selected according to circular 
design. 25 households were selected from each 
urban block.
From each household, two respondents were 
selected, one male and female respondent, each 
interviewed by a male and female enumerator 
separately. The respondents were selected 
randomly from the list of names in the household 
roster based on the information provided by any 
knowledgeable adult member of that household, 
the only criterion for their selection being that 
respondents should be 18 years or above and in a 
position to answer the survey questions.
Field enumerators were giving training in both the 
process of household selection as well as the survey 
instrument itself. Enumerator training took place in 
Jaipur and Bengaluru during the month of January, 
2020. The instrument was translated in Hindi and 
Kannada and the survey information was collected 
on the CAPI. The intended sample size of the first 
round was roughly around 8,000 respondents from 
each state. 
However, owing to the pandemic we could only 
reach out to approximately 6,000 respondents by 
the time field operations were called off. These 
respondents were approached once again in August 
and September as part of the second round of 
phone survey. The phone survey was conducted 
using the SurveyCTO software’s mobile application. 
For the phone survey, all enumerators were trained 
via video-conferencing during the second week of 
August and online groups were created to provide 
support to enumerators. 
As stated above, the response rate of the second 
round was 57 percent  and we managed to re-
interview 3324 respondents in the phone survey. 
Removing those who were part of an experimental 
round (they were administered a slightly different 
questionnaire), we were left with a panel of 2987 
respondents from both states. This panel consists 
of those who were interviewed both during the 
field as well as the phone survey and we have 
information about these individuals for three time 
points - before the lockdown (February-March, 
2020), during the lockdown, (April, 2020) and post 
the lockdown (August-September, 2020). The final  
sample consists of respondents hailing from seven 
districts in Rajasthan and six districts in Karnataka. 
This sample is predominantly rural with 83 percent 
of the respondents belonging to rural areas. This is 
on account of the fact that our survey had covered 
more rural areas by the time the pandemic struck.15 
Table 23 presents the rural-urban and gender 
breakdown for the field and phone rounds. 
4.2 / Weighting the sample for 
comparability with PLFS
Where the IWS sample estimates are compared 
with PLFS estimates (of WPR, LFPR or UR), we 
have weighted the IWS sample to make it as similar 
to the PLFS as possible. To do this, we limited the 
PLFS sample to only those districts that were also 
in the IWS sample. We then created weights so as 
to replicate the distribution of individuals across 
districts within rural areas in IWS as it is in the 
PLFS. Similarly, for urban areas, we created weights 
such that the distribution of households across 
districts would be the same in IWS as in PLFS. 
Weights have been used only when comparing with 
PLFS. For comparisons within the IWS, we do not 
use any weights. The first quarter of PLFS 2018-19  
is chosen for the comparison, keeping seasonality  
in mind.
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The CMIE-CPHS does not use any time-criterion 
to identify employment status, and instead an 
individual is categorised as employed if they were 
working on the day of or prior to the survey, or 
in general. For PLFS, we closely approximate this 
definition by identifying an individual as being 
employed if they worked on the 7th day or the 
6th day of the week in which they were surveyed, 
or if they were in general employed according to 
their usual principal activity status. In IWS, the 
daily activity status for a week is not collected, 
and instead, individuals were asked the number of 
hours in any economic activity in the last week. To 
arrive at a definition of employment in IWS that 
approximated CMIE-CPHS and PLFS, we defined 
an individual as employed in IWS if they worked for 
at least 5 hours in any economic activity in the week 
of the survey, or if they were employed as per their 
usual principal activity status.
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Endnotes
1 The CMIE-CPHS also contains an Aspirational 
India and Consumption Pyramids module with 
information on debts and assets, and consumption 
expenditure of households. These modules are not 
used in the analysis contained in this report.
2 For details of construction of weights in 
CMIE, see Vyas M. 2020. “Weights”. Consumer 
Pyramid Household Surveys, Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy. Available at https://
consumerpyramidsdx.cmie.com/
3 Typically, in any given month of a wave, 
information for up to 40,000 households and 
1,80,000 individuals is available. During the month 
of April 2020, this fell to about 13,000 households 
and 60,000 individuals. In May 2020, although there 
was an increase to 15,000 households and about 
75,000 individuals, this was still below the usual 
sample size.
4 The monthly weights used by the CMIE for 
generating monthly labour statistics estimates are 
not available as part of the CMIE-CPHS offering.
5 https://dbie.rbi.org.in/DBIE/dbie.rbi?site=home
6 Description of Indicators section on the 




provides details of other alternate methods.
8 Self-employed individuals in rural areas comprised 
primarily farmers. As we note in Box 4.2, farm 
earnings are harder to estimate accurately 
compared to non-farm incomes, perhaps 






11 Round 2 of the survey.
12 Taking into account only those households 
reporting a monthly income of at least I1,000 in 
February.
13 PLFS (2017-18) sampled 4,152 households in 
Karnataka and 4,222 in Rajasthan.
14 Districts selected (Karnataka): Bagalkot, 
Bengaluru Chikkaballapur, Dakshina Kannada, 
Davanagere, Mysore and Yadgir. Districts selected 
(Rajasthan): Barmer, Bikaner, Chittaurgarh, Jaipur, 
Jodhpur, Karauli, Pali, Pratapgarh and Sawai 
Madhopur.
15 The panel covers respondents from 71 villages in 
Rajasthan and 62 villages in Karnataka.
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Glossary
Usual Principal Status: The usual principal status of 
a person is that status on which the person spent a 
relatively long time (major time criterion) during the 
365 days preceding the date of survey. An individual 
is identified as usual principal status employed if 
they spent the largest share of time in the last 365 
days in employment activity.
Subsidiary Status: In addition to their usual 
principal activity, a person may also have a 
subsidiary activity status. The subsidiary activity 
status is determined by the economic activity 
pursued for 30 days or more during a reference 
period of 365 days preceding the date of survey.
Usual Principal and Subsidiary Status (UPSS): The 
UPSS definition of determining a person’s economic 
status combines both the Usual Principal Status and 
the Subsidiary Status. A person can be classified 
as unemployed or not in the labourforce under 
the Usual Principal Status and still be considered 
employed under the Subsidiary Status. An individual 
will be identified as UPSS employed if they engaged 
in any economic activity for the majority of the year 
or for at least 30 days in the year.  
Current Weekly Activity Status (CWS): The 
current weekly activity status of a person is
the activity status for a person during a reference 
period of 7 days preceding the date of
Survey. A person is considered employed under 
CWS if he/ she worked for at least one hour during 
the 7 days preceding the date of survey.
Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR):  LFPR is 
the percentage of persons in the labour force out 
of the total working age population (individuals 
aged 15 years and above) i.e. it includes people who 
were employed and those who were unemployed 
but were seeking work or available for work during 
the reference period. LFPR is calculated for both 
the Usual Status i.e. considering the 365 days period 
preceding the survey, and the Current Weekly 
Status i.e. considering the 7 days period preceding 
the survey.
Workforce Participation Rate (WPR): WPR is 
defined as the percentage of employed persons 
in the total working age population (individuals 
aged 15 years and above). It is usually considered a 
better indicator of conditions in the labour market 
compared to the Unemployment Rate (UR) as UR 
can also fall without an increase in employment 
due to individuals dropping out of the labour 
force. WPR is calculated for both the Usual Status 
i.e. considering the 365 days period preceding 
the survey, and the Current Weekly Status i.e. 
considering the 7 days period preceding the survey.
Unemployment Rate (UR): UR is defined as the 
percentage of unemployed persons in the
labour force (labour force includes those employed 
and those unemployed but looking for or available 
for work). UR is calculated for both the Usual 
Status i.e. considering the 365 days period preceding 
the survey, and the Current Weekly Status i.e. 
considering the 7 days period preceding the survey.
CMIE-CPHS definition of employment status: The 
CMIE-CPHS categorises an individual into  
(i) employed, (ii) unemployed, willing and looking 
for a job, (iii) unemployed, willing but not looking 
for a job, (iv) unemployed, not willing and not 
looking for a job.
An individual as employed if he/she “is engaged 
in any economic activity either on the day of the 
survey or on the day preceding the survey, or is 
generally regularly engaged in an economic activity”. 
Individuals who were in some form of employment, 
but were not at work on the day of the survey due 
to various reasons such as illness, leave or holiday 
are still considered as employed when there is a 
reasonable surety of them going back to work.
Glossar
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